27/11/2014
Status Report
Government Resolutions
Post Disaster Rehabilitation
  Project Related Rehabilitation
  International (ECMWF)
  India
  Regional
 
IMD - Mumbai
 

Introduction

Disasters threaten sustainable economic development worldwide. In the past twenty years, earthquakes, floods, tropical storms, droughts and other calamities have killed around three million people, inflicted injury, disease, homelessness, and misery on one billion others, and caused damage worth millions of rupees. Disasters destroy decades of human effort and investments, thereby placing new demands on society for reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Some of the major disasters that have occurred so far in this decade are as follows:

Year

Hazard

Country

No. of dead

Damage estimate (million US $)

1990

Earthquake

Tropical Cyclone

Tropical Cyclone

Phillipines

South Pacific

Phillipines

1,660

8

503

920

119

720

1991

Earthquake

Volcano

Cyclone and Flash Flood

Tropical Cyclone

River Flood

Cyclone

Earthquake

Tropical Cyclone

Georgia

Phillipines

Phillipines

Bangladesh

China

USA/Carribean

India

South Pacific

270

932

4,889

138,866

2,470

2,000

12

1,700

260

1,780

21,000

20,000

331

1992

1992-93

Tsunami

Tsunami

Earthquake

Mudflow

Drought

Indonesia

Nicargua

Turkey

Phillipines

Southern Africa

2,080

116

547

333

100

25

320

1993

River Flood

Earthquake / Tsunami

31 Typhoons

Tropical Cyclone

Earthquake

Flood

United States

Japan

Phillipines

Fiji

India

Western Europe

122

514

21

10,000

7

20,000

134

hundreds of millions

1994

Earthquake

Earthquake / Mudslide

Volcano

Flood

Flood

United States

Colombia

Papua New Guinea

China

India

271

100,000 affected

1,400

2,001

20,000

1995

Earthquake

Earthquake

Japan

Russia

5,500

100,000

Source : United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs

In a nutshell, the major natural disasters for the period 1960-1996 are as follows:

Decade
1960-1969

Decade
1970-79

Decade
1980-89

Last 10 years
1987-1996

Number

16

29

70

64

Economic Losses

48.4

93.0

147.6

404.4

Insured Losses

6.5

10.9

29.8

98.8


[Source : “Topics: Natural Catastrophes,” Munich Reinsurance, 1997].

The member states of the United Nations General Assembly declared the 90s  as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). This international promotional mechanism was conceived to run from  1990 through 1999, to motivate concerted international action and cooperation which could  “reduce the loss of life, property damage, and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters, especially in developing countries”.

IDNDR is based on the understanding that there is sufficient scientific and technical knowledge, save lives and property  from natural and similar disasters through to more extensive application. IDNDR provides a framework and serves as a catalyst for disaster reduction. It provides a stimulus to provoke the expanded use of practical measures for more effective disaster preparedness and management practices.

The international impact of the subject was expanded in May 1994 at the World Conference for Natural Disaster Reduction, convened by the UN in Yokohama, Japan. Representatives of 155 nations adopted fundamental guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation, embodied in the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. The Yokohama Conference underlined the importance of an economic rationale for disaster reduction, complementing the earlier scientific foundation with an essential commitment from public policy authorities.

The goals established at the start of IDNDR  are as follows:

·        To improve the capacity of each country to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, in the assessment of disaster damage potential, and in the establishment of early warning systems and disaster resistant capabilities.

·        To devise appropriate guidelines and strategies for applying existing scientific and technical knowledge.

·        To foster scientific and engineering endeavour aimed at addressing critical gaps in knowledge.

·        To disseminate existing and new technical information.

·        To develop measures for the assessment, prediction, prevention and mitigation of natural disasters through programmes of technical assistance and technology transfer, education and training, and to evaluate the effectiveness of programmes.

In essence, the decade's activities seek to shift the emphasis from post-disaster relief to pre-disaster risk reduction.  The key tasks in risk reduction are:

·        Avoiding habitation in hazardous areas;

·        Developing structures resistant to the onslaughts of hazards;

·        Developing the ability to rapidly evacuate hazardous areas or to shift residents to hazard-resistant structures;

·        Reducing or eliminating natural hazards through technological intervention (e.g., dams, plantings, beach groins); and

·        Establishing, through preparedness, the means to quickly recover from disasters with minimal additional suffering and loss of life.

At the local level, in Maharashtra, the experience of the September 30, 1993, earthquake near Killari, highlighted the need for a more comprehensive disaster management program at the state level.

Response to disasters, in the absence of a defined plan, would be arbitrary, leading to overemphasis on some actions and  absence of other critical actions.  The objectives of  any disaster management plan should be to localise a disaster, and to the maximum extent possible, contain it so as to minimise the impact on life, the environment and property. A formal plan for managing disasters is therefore necessary. It therefore includes a plan of action for the following disasters : earthquakes, floods, cyclones, epidemics, industrial and chemical accidents, road accidents and fires. At the same time disaster management plan has a strong mitigation aspect as well, which will reduce the frequency of occurrence of such disasters.

The plan would include  :

a.       Pre-planning a proper  sequence  of  response actions;

b.      Allocation of responsibilities to the participating agencies;

c.       Developing codes and standard operating procedures for various departments and relief   agencies involved;

d.      Inventory of existing facilities and resources;

e.       Mechanisms for effective management of resources; 

f.        Co-ordination of  all relief activities  including those of NGOs to ensure a coordinated and  effective response;

g.       Co-ordination with the state response machinery for appropriate support;

h.       Monitoring and evaluation of actions taken during relief and rehabilitation.

Planning for a disaster or emergency is a complex procedure since disaster are largely unscheduled. Emergency planning can be considered as  a process of preparation for a range of possible disasters and will include :

·        Identification and analysis of the potential hazards, and if possible the mitigation or elimination of their consequences;

·        Analysis of the resources available to cope with any potential disaster; and

·        Post - disaster response and recovery planning.

The primary purpose of emergency planning is the anticipation of   problems and development of  possible solutions within existing constraints. Basically the process includes :

·        Analysis of hazards which would include vulnerability and risk assessment of available resources;

·        Identification of necessary post - disaster tasks and allocation of these tasks to organisations and individuals;

·        Co-ordination of  all responding groups to ensure a cohesive and effective response.

The purpose of preparing this plan is :

·        To understand the vulnerability of the various districts to disasters;

·        To ascertain the status of existing resources and facilities available with the various agencies involved in disaster management in the state;

·        Assess their adequacies in dealing with a disaster;  and

·        Identify the requirements for institutional strengthening, and capacity strengthening of human resources. 

 Using this information, a rational basis for strengthening of the present system for management of disasters in the State of Maharashtra can be developed.

With this in view, a brain - storming workshop was held in May 1995, with the state department, experts, local officials, academic and research institutions and NGOs   who had experience in dealing with disaster situations. The workshop recommended that the GOM engage a small team of international and national consultants to work in concert with the GOM to prepare a Disaster Management Action Plan for the state and for selected districts. It was further proposed that a multi-disaster response plan should focus specifically on the following disasters – earthquakes,  floods,  cyclones, epidemics, road accidents, fires and industrial and chemical accidents.

 

1.1     Scope of the Study

This exercise of preparation of disaster management plan in Maharashtra, supported by the World Bank and UNDP, aims to develop a Disaster Management Action Plan (DMAP) for the state and all the districts. The study was  conducted in three phases as shown below.

Phase I - Document on Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment for the state.

Phase II - Preparation of the State Disaster Management Action Plan and the District Disaster Management Action Plan for six districts, one from each division. Simultaneously, with  assistance from the UNDP, the exercise of preparation of District Disaster Management Action Plan with a uniform framework for the remaining twenty five districts is being  undertaken.

Phase  III - Document on Disaster Mitigation Strategy for State of Maharashtra.

1.2     Method

The Disaster Management Action Plan for the state is proposed to be developed as an integrated plan encompassing all  disasters in the multi-response fashion keeping with the international trend. Albeit, a common planning and operational framework is proposed   for all the  disasters which  would  ensure a systematic assessment, communication and management of risk, appropriate for a disaster and identification of response.

During the first phase of the study, the Government of Maharashtra  appointed expert committees for deliberating on the various hazards. The committee meetings provided a platform for discussions on the current status of information related to existing emergency plans in the state, additional study requirements, possible approaches to be followed while developing the plan and a greater focus  on the scope of the study.

Following the meetings, these committees were dissolved and the project continued with more one-to-one  meetings between various experts and the national consultants appointed to undertake  the present assignment.

To obtain district level information  formats / templates of the information requirements had been prepared by the consultants and discussed with district collectors and divisional commissioners at a workshop held on 3rd January, 1997, at the World Trade Centre, Mumbai. Based on the response to these formats and templates, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis exercise was undertaken at the district level by the Collectors through a series of consultative meetings. Co-ordinators were appointed to assist District Collectors for verification of information and collating data. The work of co-ordinators was facilitated by the support from Divisional Commissioner’s office through Divisional Co-ordinators appointed under the project.

The process of consultation subsequently continued through a series of meetings with district collectors and divisional commissioners at the district and divisional level. The draft documents were presented and reviewed at a workshop in Washington in June, 1997, by a group of experts, the World Bank, UNDP and DFID. Based on their suggestions, the documents were revised.

The scope of the present document extends to an analysis of the generic reasons for the risks due to hazards in the state, and an attempt at identifying the vulnerable areas in the state specific to each hazard.  Secondary data from the various state government departments and information from newspaper clippings has been sought. A detailed  review of the existing resources and their adequacy vis-a-vis disaster management entails collection of exhaustive information on the project status in the various districts. The major issues that emerged from the committee meetings are reiterated in this document for the sake of continuity.


2.     Risk Assessment for the Indian Subcontinent

“Sociologically, a disaster is a, event, located in time and space, that produces the conditions whereby the continuity of the structure and processes of social units become  problematic.” (Russell R. Dynes, 1980. Participation in Social and Political Activities, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers. )

 The developing countries where two thirds of the world’s  population live, suffer the most debilitating consequences due to natural disasters.   90  per cent of the natural disasters and 95 per cent of the total disaster  related deaths worldwide, occur in the developing countries. In the light of this data, it naturally becomes important to examine the connection between development and disasters, as also the link between poverty and disasters in order to develop appropriate rehabilitation and mitigation strategies on the one hand, and refinement of development strategies on the other.

Based on the events of natural disaster - those occurring  during the period of thirty  years from 1st January 1963 to 31st December 1992 - a global study was conducted to understand the impacts of disaster on populations.  The impact was understood mainly in three different categories  viz, no. of lives lost, number of people affected in compared to total population of the region and the significant damage, i.e. damage to the country in relation to its total annual gross national product (GNP).  The results of this study are presented below.  These results apply to the region of Indian peninsula and are presented in graphical forms.  

1.     Figure 1: The first figure shows the number of significant disasters which occurred in the region, for each of the three categories described previously, over the entire period, by five-year windows.  It thus shows the five-year period(s) which were particularly severe for the region as far as significant disasters are concerned, as well as the increase of such disasters  over time.

2.     Figure 2: The second figure takes the same data and gives a statistically calculated trend line for the number of significant disasters in each of the three categories over the  30 year period of the study.  It is thus an indication of whether  of significant disasters in each category can be expected to increase in number (and  at what rate), decrease or remain at the same level in the future based on 30 years of history in the region.

3.     Figure 3: The third figure shows the number  of significant disasters in each category which has struck the region over the past 30 years, along with a total of all such disasters in that category.

4.     Figure 4: The fourth figure shows the same data as a pie chart showing the proportion of  significant disaster in each category which the region has  suffered over the entire period.

5.     Figure 5: The last figure in each group shows the statistically calculated trend lines for  significant disaster in each category.  It is thus an indication of whether each type of significant disaster can be expected to increase in number (and at what rate), decrease or remain at the same level in the future based on 30 years of history in the region.

Note : Trends have usually not been computed for all types of significant disasters which have struck the region, but only for the principal ones i.e. only those which represent some 5-10 per cent or more of all such disasters for the region.  It should also be noted that because of the small number of samples of disaster types for some regions, the statistical confidence level of the calculated trends may not be high in those cases.

These figures indicate:

1.       An increasing trend in number of disasters over last thirty years from 20 disasters in 1963-67 to 65 disasters in the period 1988-92

2.       Number of deaths show an increasing trend over the last 30 years, except for minor fluctuations.  Number of deaths is quite high during the five years of 1988-92.  The increasing trend in number of deaths is much more evident in the  figure 2. 

3.       Number of persons affected due to disasters has not increased   as much as the number of deaths.  So the number of people who died is much more  than the number of people affected.

4.       ‘The significant damage’  (damage of one per cent or more of total annual GNP) does not show any  increasing trend over 25 years, 1963 to 1987.   However, the cumulative frequency in figure 2 indicates an increasing trend.   It shows that though the number of deaths  have increase, property damage and damage in  total annual GNP has not increase proportionately.  Over the five years of 1988-92, significant damage  has also increased to a large extent.  It also shows that the five years of 1988-92 were, really disastrous, having  higher number  of disasters more of deaths and  causing more property damage.

5.       Figure 3 and  4 show that floods are the most damaging disasters in terms of deaths, persons affected and damages, followed by tropical cyclones. 38 per cent of the deaths in disasters are due to occurrence of floods. Droughts also affect a large number of persons causing  migration and loss of employment but they do not kill many. 24 per cent of persons affected during disasters have been because of droughts.  Epidemics also take a huge toll of lives  but they do not cause significant damage to assets.  Earthquakes  are rated quite low in terms of their  damaging capacity but this may be because of infrequent occurrences of high magnitude earthquakes.  Figure 4 that shows that damage due to floods is more visible as  they account for  about 50 per cent  of significant damages.  54 per cent  people are affected due to floods and 36 per cent of total disaster related deaths are due to floods.  Tropical storms rate second as far as their damaging capacities go, followed by epidemics.

6.     Based on the trends shown so far, statistical analysis has been done to show expected      trends in disaster characteristics. Figure 5 shows that the significant damage may be increased in case of floods and tropical cyclones in future.  Earthquakes also may cause higher damages than before, however, increase in damage due to earthquakes is expected to be lower than  that by floods and storms.  It is expected that droughts will show reduced damages. However, the number of people  affected due to droughts will be increased.  The number of people  affected is expected to be quite high due to floods and  steady in case  of epidemics.  Interestingly, number of persons affected due to storms is expected to be few, which may be an indication of better predictability and efficient warning systems. The figure also indicates that number of deaths will increase  for floods and epidemics.  Whereas  deaths due to tropical storms will be reduced to some extent.

 7.  Assessments of the  future trends indicate  that natural events causing disasters will be more frequent with floods causing the  most severe disasters.

However, it must be noted that all the above discussions are not limited to India  but covers Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka too.  There are differences among these countries in their geographical locations, topography and their  developmental status.  It also indicates vast differences in relative intensity of hazards that these countries face. 

The Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific  report on “Natural Hazards and Natural Disaster Reduction  in Asia and the Pacific”  indicates that India has a moderate risk of facing cyclones and earthquakes, whereas it is severely prone to the risks of floods and droughts. (Table I)

Table I : Relative intensity of hazards faced by some countries/areas in Asia and the Pacific




Country/Area

Cyclones

Floods

Droughts

Earth-

quakes

Volcano

Land-slides

Tsunami

Fires

Australia

S

S

 

L

 

 

 

S

Bangladesh

S

S

S

L

 

L

L

L

China

M

S

S

S

 

L

 

M

Cook Islands

M

L

S

L

 

L

M

 

Federated States of Micronesia

M

S*

S

L

 

L

S

 

Fiji

S

S

M

M

 

S

S

 

Hong Kong

M

L

 

 

 

M

 

M

India

M

S

S

M

 

L

 

M

Indonesia

L

M

M

S

M

L

 

M

Kiribati

L

S*

S

L

 

L

S

 

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

 

M

L

 

 

 

 

 

Malaysia

 

M

 

 

 

L

 

L

Marshall Islands

M

S*

S

L

 

L

 

L

Myanmar

M

M

M

S

 

 

 

S

Nepal

 

M

M

M

 

M

 

M

Niue

M

L*

M

L

 

L

 

M

Pakistan

L

S

M

S

 

L

 

L

Palau

M

M*

M

L

 

L

M

 

Papua New Guinea

L

S

M

S

S

S

S

L

Philippines

S

S

M

S

M

M

L

S

Solomon Islands

S

S

L

S

S

S

S

L

Sri Lanka

M

M

M

 

 

S

 

L

Thailand

M

S

S

L

 

L

 

L

Tokelau

M

S*

S

L

 

L

S

 

Tonga

S

M

M

S

S

L

S

 

Tuvalu

L

S*

M

L

 

L

S

 

Vanuatu

S

S

L

S

S

S

S

L

Vietnam

S

S

L

L

 

L

 

L

Samoa

M

S

L

M

L

S

S

L

                                                                                                            * Coastal Flooding

 

Source:            Asian Disaster Preparedness Center

                        DHA/South Pacific Regional Environmental       Programme/Emergency Management Australia

Legend:           S = severe; M = moderate: L = low

Thus observing the Asian scenario, it may be concluded that India has a moderately risk of facing natural events which may result in disasters.  The risk of such events is quite high for floods or droughts and  is moderate for  earthquakes or cyclones.  However, considering the heavy damages earthquakes and cyclones inflict on  society, one has to be concerned about not only the degree of risk but also the magnitude of impact of the event.

3.     Risk Assessment for the State of Maharashtra

“Risk is the probability that injury to life or damage to property and the environment will occur. The extent to which risk is either increased or diminished is the result of the interaction of a multitude of causation chains of events.” (Terry Jeggle and Rob Stephenson, Concepts of Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis).

The dominant physical trait of the state of Maharashtra is its plateau character. The state is covered by the Satpura range on its northern side while Ajanta and Satmala ranges run through the central part of the state.  The Arabian sea guards the western boundary of  Maharashtra with a coastal line of 720 kilometres. Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh form the state’s boundaries on its northern side with the latter also covering the eastern region while  Goa, Karnataka,   and Andhra Pradesh  are on the Southern side.      

The state receives its rainfall chiefly from the southwesterly winds. Normally, there are heavy rains  in the coastal region (around 2000 mm), scanty rains in the rain-shadow regions in the central part (around 500 mm) and medium rains in the eastern part of the state (around 1000 mm).

3.1     Basic Statistics of Maharashtra

·        Area :  3,07,713 sq.Km

·        Number of administrative divisions  : 6

·        Number of districts  : 31

·        Number of talukas : 325

·        Number of city and town units :  336

·        Number of  inhabitated villages : 40,412

·        Total  population (census 1991) :  78,937,000

Maharashtra is the country’s leading industrial state, accounting for 23 per cent of the gross value output from the industrial sector. Its main areas of strength are textiles, pharmaceuticals, petrochemical industries, heavy chemical industries, electrical automobile industries, engineering and food processing. The state is a leading manufacturer of three wheelers, jeeps, synthetics, cold rolled steel products, industrial alcohol and plastic. Around 30 per cent of the sugar output of  the country is from Maharashtra. The organisational structure for the state is given in Appendix V. As a part of risk analysis, effort is being made to look at the available data and assess the possible risk for each of the hazards.

3.2     Earthquakes

3.2.1     Nature and Occurrence 

Of  all  natural hazards, earthquakes seem  the  most terrifying.   They  can inflict tremendous damage  within  seconds and  without warning at any time of day, on any day of the  year.  Ground  shaking and surface faulting are often just the  forerunners  of secondary damage, such as fires, floods (caused  by  dam bursts), landslides, quick soil and tsunamis (seismic sea waves).

Earthquakes  are  caused  by the movement  of  massive  land area called plate on the earth's crust.  Often covering areas larger  than the  continent, these plates are in a constant state  of motion, acted upon by the periodic forces of the solar system and movement caused by the rotation of the earth.  As the plates move in to relation  to  one another, stresses form and accumulate  until  a fracture  or  abrupt  slippage occurs.  This  sudden  release  of stress is called an earthquake.

The place at which the stress is released is known as the focus  of an earthquake.  From this point, mechanical  energy  is initiated  in  the form of waves that radiate in  all  directions through  the  earth.   When this energy arrives  at  the  earth's surface,  it  forms secondary surface waves.  The  frequency  and amplitude  of the vibrations produced at the surface,  indicating the  severity  of  the  earthquake,  depends  on  the  amount  of mechanical  energy released at the focus, the distance and  depth of  the focus, and the structural properties of the rock or  soil on or near the surface.

Earthquakes can occur anywhere. They may occur in an area  not known  to  have experienced previous activity and may  suggest  a temporary increase in  risk of  hazard in the area. Or they may occur in areas  which have a previous history of subterranean  sounds  and seismic activities.  Another important  indication  as to where  earthquakes  may occur  human activity like the construction of  a   reservoir. However,  it  may  be noted that some  of  the  physical phenomena causing earthquake are still poorly understood.

 

3.2.2     Nature of   Impact

Earthquakes have several distinct effects that can damage structures, disrupt and even endanger our  lives.  An understanding of these natural hazards and how they result in damage can lead to more effective safety planning at the city level, and to better decisions about the uses of individual lots.

·        Ground Shaking is the most geographically widespread effect of earthquakes, occurring throughout the region.

·        Surface rupture may occur directly along the fault line.

·        Ground failure occurs when soil that is saturated with water, is on a slope,  is otherwise weak, cannot support structures, or even itself, after being subjected to ground shaking.

·        Other hazards that can result from earthquakes include tsunami and seiches.

3.2.2.1     Ground shaking

Most earthquake damage is due to  ground shaking  which occurs in all earthquakes. The impacts of ground shaking will be quite widespread, and are much less predictable than those of surface rupture.  The severity of ground shaking varies considerably over the effected region, depending on:

·        the size of the earthquake;

·        the distance from the causative fault;

·        the nature of the soil at the site;

·        the nature of the geologic material between the site and the fault topography.

In general, sites with stronger soil will experience shaking of less intensity than those in low-lying areas. Some sites, particularly those with poor soils, will experience strong ground shaking even in distant earthquakes.  Sites with stronger soil will experience strong ground shaking only when a nearby fault is involved.

3.2.2.2     Surface rupture

The most obvious and direct effect of earthquake  is the rupture of the ground surface along the fault.  Ground rupture occurs in some, but not all large earthquakes.  Structures are often not able to withstand surface rupture.  Streets, utilities and other lifelines that cross an earthquake fault are at great risk of damage.  The impacts of fault rupture, while locally severe, are not widespread and are relatively predictable. 

3.2.2.3     Ground failure

Ground failure means that the soil is weakened so that can it no longer support its own weight or the weight of structures.  The major types of ground failure associated with earthquakes are liquefaction, landslides  and settlement. 

3.2.3     Possible Damages

In addition to the characteristics of the earthquake and of the site (such as the magnitude, duration, soils type), a structure's characteristics, including structural type, materials, design, and quality of construction and maintenance, will determine how well it will perform.  After San Francisco's 1865 earthquake, the front page of a local newspaper observed, "Well-built structures on good ground survived the shaking effects of the earthquake better than structures on made ground. It may be noted that  buildings having walls properly secured and lain in cement, with sound foundations, suffer the least damage during earthquakes.

3.2.3.1     Potentially Hazardous Building Types

There are other building types, in addition to unreinforced masonry buildings, that have not performed well in earthquakes.   The most serious hazard, and also the most difficult policy issues, may be posed by non-ductile concrete frame structures.  In many of these buildings, the frame was not designed or constructed to allow it to move without fracturing.  As a result, these are susceptible to collapse in strong earthquakes.  There were many falls of such buildings in the San Fernando 1971  earthquake.  Many deaths in the Mexico City 1985 ,  Armenia 1988,  Northridge 1994 and  Kobe 1995 earthquakes resulted from the fall of non-ductile concrete frame buildings.

“Soft-storey” buildings or those in which at least one storey often the ground floor has much less rigidity and/or strength than the rest of the structure, are significant hazards.  The 1974 Blume report identified smaller  wood-frame buildings with soft storeys as having the potential to collapse during an earthquake. During  both the Loma Prieta and the  Northridge 1994 earthquakes, soft-storey residential  buildings failed, resulting in deaths. Small wood-frame residential buildings can be very resistant to earthquake ground shaking, especially if they are bolted to their foundations and have strong first storeys.

Typically, in Latur, the housing material consisted of stone and mud resulting in total or sizeable loss of  houses along with the loss of nearly 8,000 people in the affected villages. The data on vulnerable houses is given in the vulnerability analysis.

The impact of earthquakes differ for urban and rural areas, primarily because of the nature of infrastructure, quality of housing and occupational differences. In rural areas, it is primarily the housing and physical structures (including irrigation infrastructure) which may suffer extensive damage, without necessarily destroying the crops.

In urban areas, in addition to housing and physical infrastructures, it may also disturb the service infrastructure such as water supply, sewage, telephones, electricity, piped gas supply etc., which are essentially underground installations and hence exposed to a direct impact. The disruption, therefore, in urban areas and consequent investments for rehabilitation becomes a major challenge. So, more emphasis  may  be given  on  mitigative and preparedness measures to  minimise  the disastrous effects of an earthquake.

Earthquakes’ most profound impacts are deaths and serious injuries.  Number of casualties largely depend on the number of people in the area at the time and the types of structures that they occupy.  Most deaths and injuries are caused by the failure of buildings and structures. The number of casualties also depend upon the time of occurrence of the earthquake.

Important variables could substantially reduce the toll.  The failure (or lack of failure) of a few high-occupancy or  critical facilities such as arenas, theaters, or dams could influence the final casualty count significantly. The degree of water saturation of the ground will influence the occurrence of landslides and the area subject to liquefaction.  Weather conditions, especially wind speed and direction, will affect the spread of fire and the ability of emergency responders to control fires.

 

3.2.4     Indian Peninsula and Maharashtra

During its evolution, the Indian peninsula was subjected  to intense  tectonic forces due to which numerous folds, faults  and fractures have been developed in the ancient rocks of this land mass.  peninsular  India is classified as  a  stable  continental region.

The earthquakes in a stable continental area, such  as the  one  at  Killari  on 30th  September  1993,  were  caused  by adjustments of crustal blocks along such pre-existing weak  zones.  Isolated seismic activity within the shield is indicative of  the movements going on along some of the old basement faults, perhaps at a very slow rate.

The state of Maharashtra and its adjoining areas form  part of  the peninsular shield of India.     The state of  Maharashtra occupies   the  central-western  portion  of  peninsular   India, technically  an intraplate continental area. Most of  Maharashtra is  covered  by  the deccan traps, a  sequence  of  basalt  flows placed about 65 million years ago.  In most of the area,  these flows   are  nearly  horizontal,  demonstrating   that   tectonic deformation  accumulated  is very little or nil.   Though  this  area was  treated as seismically stable with no potential for   disastrous  earthquakes, this belief was shattered by  the  Koyna earthquake of December 11, 1967, with magnitude of 6.5 on the Richter Scale. Recent Latur  earthquake  of September  30, 1993, having magnitude  6.4  which occurred  well  within the central part of the shield  led  to  a review of the seismic activity in the stable shield zone. 

Thus, tectonic stability in the deccan plateau may appear  to be  inconsistent  with the observed level  of  seismicity.   This apparent contradiction reflects the primitive stage of  knowledge about  seismogenesis  in stable continental region, and is  the root  of  problem  of rise assessment  of an earthquake. Thus the potentially  active tectonic features which could produce earthquakes with  engineering consequences need to be studied.

It may be noted that stable continental region  worldwide are characterized by  a very  large  number  of unknown faults that can  at  some  point produce  an earthquake.  Many of these faults may be  located  in areas  that  have  low  or  no  seismicity  and  are  technically stable.

Maharashtra and adjoining regions are prone to  earthquakes of  moderate  magnitude  as can be seen from the experience of  several  years.   Koyna regions experiences the maximum number of tremors in Maharashtra. Excluding the Koyna region, and other regions of Killari, Khardi (Bhatsa) and Medhi (Surya),  appendix III lists 137 earthquakes  of which 121 earthquakes of magnitude about 3.0 or above  are in Maharashtra and 16  are in the adjoining regions. Table II gives a list of the major earthquake occurrences  in Maharashtra.

Table II: Major Earthquakes in Maharashtra

3.2.5     Pattern of seismicity

The Deouskar committee report of 1995 presents the pattern of seismicity in Maharashtra. The above map indicates  the location of areas which have experienced earthquakes till date. The study reports  that :

·        Earthquakes  in Maharashtra show major alignment  along  the west coast and western ghats region.  Seismic activity can be  seen near Ratnagiri,  along the western coast, Koyna Nagar,  Bhatsa and Surya areas of  Thane  district.

·        The  north - south trend further continues  deep  inside  Gujarat.  The striking characteristic  of this narrow region is its  alignment  with the hot spring belt.  It appears that the  off - coast activity is associated with submerged faults along the west coast of Maharashtra.

·        In  north Maharashtra, the seismic activity near  Dhule,  Akola, Jalgaon  and  Amravati could be due to movements  on  the  faults present in the area associated with the complex system of Narmada, Tapi and Purna lineaments.  However, the exact seismic  status of these lineaments needs to be evaluated with extensive monitoring.

·        In north - east corner of Maharashtra, the earthquake activity  in  Nagpur  and Bhandara districts may  be  associated  with Deolapar thrust or sheared and faulted zones of Ramtek and Sakoli Basins.  This needs to be confirmed.

·        Isolated  activity  is seen near  Beed,  Nanded,  Ujjani  and Solapur  in eastern Maharashtra and  Uran, Kolhapur and Sindhudurga  in south-west Maharashtra.  These activities may be due to  movements on local faults in  the basement.  

·        Seismicity  is  also seen  near  Bhatsanagar  and  Suryanagar.  Recently,  isolated  activity also  occurred  in  Latur-Osmanabad districts in south-east Maharashtra.

 

3.2.6     Future  Risk Analysis

Based on the earthquakes occurred so  far in the state and considering the seismic pattern, a rezoning, for new dam designs only, has been proposed  by the Deouskar Committee for the state of Maharashtra. The existing and the proposed zoning map  is  presented below.   It  may  be  noted  that  even   after   using sophisticated  techniques  like  carbon dating,  it  has  not  been possible to identify whether the fault is active. If some seismicity is associated with a  major lineament, it can be considered as an active tectonic feature for the  purpose  of  engineering seismic  risk  analysis  and  these regions can be considered as risk prone.

The  west  coast - Western Ghats seismogenic region is  the  most active  area in the Maharashtra state.  The Koyna-Warna  and  the Bhatsa areas are located in this region.  Even before the  occurrence of the Koyna earthquake of 11 December, 1967, with  magnitude 6.5,  earthquakes  with  magnitude of about 6.0 are  known  to  have occurred in this region. The report further observes that :

·        The  activity in the Koyna-Warna region  has  been  continuing  for the  past three decades with  occasional  spurts, producing events with magnitude above 5.0.  This trend is expected  to  continue in future. 

·        Bhatsa region experienced a swarm of seismic activity  during  1983-84, with  a  maximum magnitude of 4.9.  The activity  has  died  down since  then with only a temporary spurt in 1990.

·        The Surya area about 50 km. north-west of Bhatsa, has recently shown  increase in seismic activity.  The energy in  Bhatsa-Surya region  may  not have been fully released and possibility  of  an earthquake  with a magnitude of around 6.0 in future, cannot be  ruled out.

·        Further south of Warna, some micro seismic activity  has been  reported  in  the past. Because this region  lies  in  the active west coast-Western Ghats, the   possibility of a maximum magnitude earthquake of around 6.0 cannot be ruled out in future.

·        There was no evidence of any significant seismic  activity  in the  Latur-Osmanabad area in the known past.  Also,  the  tectonic features  to  which the Killari earthquake of 30  September,  1993, could be attributed are not known sufficiently.  However, the  occurrence of Killari earthquake of moderate magnitude of 6.4 gives an  indication  of   neotectonic  activity  in  the  area.  Though,  the stress has  been released at Killari,   a similar magnitude earthquake at some other place in the area cannot be ruled out.

·        Before  the Killari  earthquake,  infrequent  tremors  and subterranean sounds had been reported  in  the area.  Similar instances were also reported from many other  locations in Beed, Parbhani and Nanded districts.  In the absence of knowledge  about  any seismotectonic features in this  area,  low to moderate earthquakes can be experienced.

·        In addition to the above seismogenic regions in Maharashtra,  the  Narmada-Tapi  region covering the  border  areas  of Maharashtra  and Madhya Pradesh states  has been reported  to  be active  since historical times. Tense fracturing, alignment of  hot springs  and locations of epicenters in these areas leads to  the conclusion  that these two are the zones of crustal  weakness  in Maharashtra.

·        The  Tapi  and  the Purna lineaments in  the  northern  part  of Maharashtra have been recognized as active faults with  potential to   generate  low  magnitude  earthquakes. The   Tapi   lineament represents  a line of crustal weakness along which  activity  has been  recurrent  during  different  periods.  Earthquakes   above magnitude 6.0 are known to have occurred in the northern parts of this region across the border of Maharashtra.

·        According  to a scientist, there is a major anticipated  zone  of uplift  in the Sangola area and another to the east of  Sholapur.  Vertical  movements  of these crustal blocks  may  cause  seismic disturbances  in the areas, as  has happened in Killari .

·        Due to increasing trend of seismic activity noticed in Maharashtra in recent times, earthquakes with low  magnitudes around 4 to 4.5 may occur in areas where there has been no  seismic activity in the past.

3.2.7     Reservoir Induced Seismicity    

While doing a risk assessment for  earthquakes, mention has to be made of  reservoir induced seismicity (RIS). The 1967 Koyna earthquake of 6.5 magnitude  is contended to be due to RIS.  Between 1963  to  1998, the Koyna region has faced  102715  tremors,  of which 79 were  above magnitude of 4 (Richter scale) and seven were above magnitude of  5 (Richter scale) as listed below.

 

 Table III: Intensity of Earthquakes in Koyna Region (1963 to 1998) on Richter scale

Year

Number of episodes

above 3

above 4

above 5

1963

12

4

 

 

1964

262

20

 

 

1965

109

16

 

 

1966

152

15

 

 

1967

5049

249

21

3

1968

8558

162

11

1

1969

3304

62

4

 

1970

2508

35

4

 

1971

1833

60

4

 

1972

1805

52

 

 

1973

2182

33

1

1

1974

2773

54

2

 

1975

1522

46

1

 

1976

2245

38

 

 

1977

2631

25

1

 

1978

2612

25

1

 

1979

3335

25

 

 

1980

8071

138

5

 

1981

3477

43

 

 

1982

3310

21

2

 

1983

3250

39

2

 

1984

2233

14

2

 

1985

2387

31

 

 

1986

2640

11

 

 

1987

3751

12

 

 

1988

3507

16

1

 

1989

1992

11

1

 

1990

2130

11

 

 

1991

2195

16

2

 

1992

2774

10

 

 

1993

5050

45

6

1

1994

5717

49

1

1

1995

3737

31

2

 

1996

2397

30

1

 

1997

2414

19

1

 

till March’98

1005

7

2

 

Total

102715

1464

79

7


Keeping this contention in mind, therefore there is a need to take into account the presence of various water reservoirs in the state for earthquake risk assessment. MERI has produced a list of water reservoirs in the state which indicates a potential risk in these particular regions and will have implications for any future development of large water bodies.

Table IV: List of Water Reservoirs


Name of Project Taluka

Lower Terna Osmanabad
Manjra Osmanabad
Majalgaon Beed
Paithan (Jayakwadi) Ahmednagar
Ujani Solapur
Mula Aurangabad
Bhatgar Pune
Vir Pune
Dhom Satara
Kanher Satara
Koyna Satara
Kolakewadi Ratnagiri
Warna Kolhapur
Kasari Kolhapur
Dudhganga Kolhapur
Tulshi Kolhapur
Radhanagari Kolhapur
Tillari Hydro Electric Project Kolhapur
Tillari Forebay Kolhapur
Tillari Irrigation Project Sindhudurg
Upper Vaitarna Nashik
Lower Vaitarna Nashik
Tansa Thane
Masalga Latur
Khandala Osmanabad
Dhamni Thane
Kavdas(Pick-up Weir) Thane


Apart from these 27 major projects, there are 171 medium projects and 1,545 minor irrigation projects.

It is very important to consider these regions as earthquake risk prone areas, as qualitatively there are no differences in damages due to an earthquake, whether induced by active/non-active faults or a water reservoir.



3.2.8 Instrumentation

Earthquake risk assessment is all the more difficult in Maharashtra because of a lack of seismic instrumentation in many parts of the state. Maharashtra is no doubt the most seismically instrumented state in India with 52 seismic risk observatories (map given above). However, almost all this instrumentation is concentrated in some pockets such as Koyna-Warna and Bhatsa-Surya areas, while in remaining parts of the state, there is hardly any instrumentation at all, excluding the cities like Pune, Mumbai, Nagpur etc.

The conditions are further aggravated by almost 80 per cent of the state being covered by a thick pile of lava, thus hiding from direct view the seismogenic faults lying below the basalts. Added to the above is the very scanty availability of reliable historical records of past earthquakes in the state, which moreover, extend over a short period of only 150 years or so. Popular confidence in the ability of seismologists to provide useful information has been dealt a blow by the Killari earthquake. First, this deadly earthquake occurred in an area previously classified as the least hazardous among five categories. Secondly, popular concerns arising from a burst of precursory seismicity were dubbed as alarmist by expert opinion. Therefore, earthquake prediction is very inexact even with all the technology.

Results from seismological investigations on the Killari earthquake and other recent stable continental region earthquakes suggest, that damaging earthquakes will not be confined to areas that have experienced earthquakes in the past, nor to areas that are characterized by prominent tectonic features. Thus, a uniform distribution of potential earthquake sources can be expected in Maharashtra, indicating that the risk of earthquakes is omnipresent.

Prediction of earthquakes (as regards time and place of occurrence, magnitude and intensity) is as yet inadequate. With all the sophisticated instrumentation and large array of personnel collecting vital data over a fairly long period, it has not been possible to predict earthquakes and avoid disasters as is seen in the Kobe earthquake in Japan.

3.3 Cyclones

3.3.1 Nature and Occurrence

A cyclone is a violent natural phenomenon occurring in the atmospheric blanket enveloping our earth. In the tropics it occurs as a vast violent whirl, 150 to 300 kilometers across, 102 to 117 kilometers high, spiraling around the center and progressing along the surface of the sea, covering 300 to 500 kilometers a day. Wind speeds rise very high near the center (eye) of the cyclone upto 160 kilometers per hour or more.

Three major devastating effects associated with cyclones are storm surges, gale winds and very heavy rain. The pressure systems are classified as: cyclonic storm (61-85 kilometers per hour), severe cyclonic storm (86-115 kilometers per hour), severe cyclonic storms with core of hurricane winds (equal to or exceeding 116 kilometers per hour).

Much is known about how a cyclone forms. In order to develop, a cyclone must have a warm sea and calm warm air. The warm air rises -- heavy, humid, and full of water vapour. Its place is taken by air rushing in from the sides and, because of the earth's rotation, this moving air is given a twist, so that the entire system begins to revolve. The warm rising air meets cooler air and releases its water vapour in the form of rain. It takes a tremendous amount of energy for the air to lift the water in the first place, and now this energy is released in the form of heat. This increases the rate of ascent of the air and a continuous cycle begins to develop. More water is released and also more heat : more the water and heat released, faster the cycle moves. This cycle becomes the engine that drives the beast, and gradually it goes faster and faster and the air mass becomes much larger.

Because the wind system is revolving, centrifugal force tends to throw the air outward so that the pressure in the center becomes very low, thus forming the eye of the storm. The pressure on the outside is very high, so the wind moves faster in an attempt to fill that low pressure area. The faster it moves the more the centrifugal force throws it outward. Soon there are very fast circular winds and, when they reach 120 kilometres per hour, the system becomes a cyclone or hurricane.

The system then begins to move forward like a spinning top. This brings it into contact with more warm sea and air, and the process becomes self-sustaining. Once a cyclone is formed, it will continue to move and expand until it passes over land or over an area where the sea is cooler.

In the northern hemisphere, cyclones generally move in a north-westerly direction; in the southern hemisphere, in a south-westerly direction. Little is known about what makes these storms move and change direction, other then that they are affected by the high altitude winds and rotation of the earth. So far, scientists have found it difficult to predict the movement of the cyclone, making this hazard one of the most dangerous.



3.3.2 Potential Impact

Cyclones are considered as one of the most damaging natural disasters. They make impact by killing people, damaging property, crops and infrastructure. In the rural areas, the damage is primarily to lives, crops and to housing. It may also affect the irrigation infrastructure. The damage to forest and plantations, when it occurs, has a long term effect, and also takes a much longer period for restoration. In urban areas, both transport and communication receive a serious damage, in addition to loss of life and shelter.

As mentioned above, cyclones rise in the seas and get calm when it comes in contact with the land. Thus, the coastal areas are very much at risk to cyclones. Maharashtra has a coastal belt of over 720 kilometers between Gujarat to Goa. Thus the Konkan region including Mumbai becomes prone to the risk of cyclones. There are 386 marine fishing villages / hamlets with 17,918 boats engaged in fishing in this coastal belt.

3.3.3 History of Cyclones in Maharashtra

In the Arabian sea, during the period 1890-1995, 207 depressions/cyclonic storms/severe cyclonic storms have been recorded. Most of them have moved away from Maharashtra. Thus, the coastal region of Maharashtra is climatologically an area where frequency of cyclonic disturbances is very low. Out of 207 disturbances, only 19 have affected Maharashtra - Goa coast. Of these six were major ones causing 70 deaths, with 150 boats and 160 crew missing and extensive damage to trees and ships. Some of these which made an impact on Maharashtra are listed below. The wind and cyclone hazard map for Maharashtra has also been produced indicating the risk zones according to possible impact.

Table V: List of Cyclones

Thus, in spite of having a long coastal region, Maharashtra has experienced only 6 cyclones in last 50 years, though there have been numerous threats. Thus climatologically, this area is having low risk of cyclone strikes.

Mumbai which is the economic capital of India, is also a coastal city which has faced many threats of cyclones in recent times. It has faced peripheral impact in 1982, 1988 and October 1996 (a note on October’96 episode is given in Appendix I), and has been hit on two occasions (June, 1996 and 1948). It indicates that the city is prone to cyclones. Considering the problems the Indian economy may have to face if Mumbai is hit by a cyclone, it becomes far more important to implement preventive and preparedness measures here.

 

3.3.4 Warning Systems

Presently, Area Cyclone Warning Centre, Colaba, Mumbai, is responsible for issue of cyclone warning bulletins for Arabian sea north of Latitude 5 deg N and east of Longitude 60 deg E excluding the area north of 20 deg N and west of 68 deg E. According to the two stage warning scheme, ACWC, Mumbai, issues warnings for coastal districts of Goa and Maharashtra in 2 stages.

Whenever the coastal belt is expected to experience adverse weather (heavy rain/gales/tidal wave) in association with a cyclonic storm or depression likely intensify into a cyclonic storm ACWC, Mumbai, issues warnings for coastal districts of Goa and Maharashtra in two stages under two stage warning scheme.

• Cyclone alert (lst stage warning) : It is issued 48 hrs in advance of expected commencement of adverse weather over coastal areas.

• Cyclone warning (2nd stage warning): It is issued 24 hours in advance of expected commencement of adverse weather.

• Frequency of issue and mode of communication :

Chief secretary, collectors and other address: Twice a day at 1330 hrs
and 21.30hrs by telegram/ telefax.

AIR Mumbai, Ratnagiri : Every 3hrs by telegram and every hour
whenever the system is close to coast and is tracked by the cyclone
detection radar.

• Automation of cyclone warning bulletin : The preparation of cyclone warning,/alert message has been computerised.

• Main mode of communication of cyclone warnings is by telegram -000 weather immediate telegram, Telex, W/T (full-form), Telephone, Fax, Police wireless if other channels fail and satellite communication (disaster warning system).

New scheme of dissemination of cyclone warnings has been introduced by issuing VSAT where the cyclone messages prepared by ACWC, Mumbai, are transmitted to the satellite uplink station at Yeour (Mumbai). From the satellite earth station at Yeour, the messages are sent to the satellite with appropriate instructions to communicate and activate only those receivers located at the particular areas where storm is likely to cross. The receiving system is a dish antenna, which receives the signals and converts into audio messages. An audio alarm proceeds the bulletin. The DWS receiver has been installed in the east coast and installation in west coast is in progress in different places while in DWS phase III. 8 stations in coastal Maharashtra and 12 stations in Gujarat are planned. Goa is one of them.

 

3.3.4.1 Cyclones over Land

a) Informatory messages are issued at the earliest to all concerned authorities in plain language, emphasising the likely adverse weather over their areas along with details of position and likely direction of movement etc. of the cyclone.
b) Warning messages are issued at least 24 hrs in advance.
c) Two warning messages per day, based on 0830 and 1730 IST charts, are issued till the system weakens. In case, the occasion demands one or two more warning messages are issued based on 1430 and 2330 IST charts.
d) Warning messages are issued to:-
• Chief secretary of concerned state/states.
• District collector/collectors of the concerned districts.
• Other concerned officials indicated by the state government. Warning messages are also issued to local AIR/ Doordarshan for repeated broadcast/telecast.
e) Chief secretary or his representative is informed over telephone. District authorities are informed by '000 WX immediate" telegrams/telex or telefax.
f) Safe situation messages are issued immediately after the cyclone moves away/weakens.

Due to the devastating effects of cyclonic storms as well as the unpredictability of their movement, it is necessary that adequate preventive and preparedness measures be undertaken, by way of improving the warning systems, for facing such an eventuality. An action plan has already been made and needs to be integrated with the state disaster management action plan.

3.4 Floods

3.4.1 Nature and Occurrence

It can be clearly seen from table VI, that floods affect Maharashtra quite frequently. Also, floods are not just restricted to one particular region, but are spread all over the state. Maharashtra, therefore, exhibits a high proneness to floods. Most floods occur during monsoon and hence, the accompanying damage such as deaths due to lightning, landslides, house crashes and drowning have been commonly reported from most districts.

Floods kill by destroying houses, crops and food stocks. They strip farm lands, wash away irrigation systems and erode large areas of land or make them unusable otherwise. Floods are more threatening for an agricultural economy such as that of Maharashtra, especially because of the heavy damage they cause, thereby disrupting the economy.

It may be noted that there are lots of man-made reasons for the occurrence of floods. Analyzing the floods in Maharashtra, one observes that most floods in Maharashtra are flash floods due to nallah-overflows and poor drainage systems. Very few floods, like the one in Konkan in 1983, are due to heavy rains in the region.

3.4.2 Floods and Flash Floods

Majority of the floods have taken place either because of a breach in embankments of dams, or because the engineers on dams had to release surplus water from the reservoirs (resulting from heavy rains in catchment area), causing floods in the low-lying areas along the river belt. Thus, areas in proximity to dams become more risk prone to floods. As per 1978 data, 2.3 lakh hectares of land in Maharashtra is prone to floods and protection work has been undertaken for 0.01 lakh hectares land.

The list as well as the map showing rivers and dams has already been given in the earlier section on Earthquakes. Going by the past experience, it is important to consider the catchment and command areas of the dams as risk prone to flash floods. Ecologists believe that large dams contribute to increased humidity and evaporation which results in heavy rainfall. Though one cannot neglect the importance of irrigation projects, it adds to the risk of heavy rainfall which may result in increased risk of floods. (Report of major floods in Appendix II)

The map showing average rainfall in Maharashtra is produced below. One can see that only the Konkan region comes under the heavy rainfall region (2000-4000 mm), whereas Vidarbha and a very small part of Marathwada have moderate rainfall (1000-2000 mm). The rest of Maharashtra has scanty rains (below 1000 mm).

Table VI: List of Floods


3.4.3 Deforestation

Maharashtra has 39,949 sq. kilometres of reserve forest, 14,979 sq. kilometres of protected forest and 6,026 sq. kilometres of unclassified forest. However, if one examines the revenue from forests, a major source of revenue is the sale of Bamboo and Tendu leaves (minor forest produce), thereby indicating the quality of forest. It is estimated that by the year 2000, only for industrial wood there would be a shortage of 18.36 million cubic metres, which would be accentuated with the demands from other sectors. Though forest fires further worsen the situation no specific estimates of losses are available on this count.

According to the expected norms, both nationally and internationally, at least 33 per cent of the total land should be under forest cover. The country has hardly 22 per cent of the land under forest cover. The situation in Maharashtra is worse. Although Maharashtra claims to have 21 per cent of forest land, the satellite imagery indicates that actually, only 9 per cent of the land has a forest cover. The rest of the land is only a recorded forest land.

Because of deforestation the ability of ground to absorb water decreases and at the same time, rate of soil erosion increases. Both result in higher possibilities of silting of the existing dams and rivers, reduction in the holding capacity of dams, blockage of natural drainage systems and consequent floods as the run off rate of water is increased.

It may be noted that poor watershed management increases risk of floods and hence developmental projects need to assess the impact on natural drainage to avoid the incidence of flash floods and resultant damage to infrastructure.

 

3.4.4 Urbanisation

Another important factor that causes floods is urbanization. Urbanisation is characterized by lot of incoming migration and high rates of increase in the population. It leads to a heavy pressure on the existing storm-water drainage systems in the city. Floods in urban areas mainly result from faulty planning. Available data on Mumbai shows that land reclamation over the years has disturbed the natural drainage system. Therefore, Mumbai’s low lying areas are under the threats of floods even if there are minor rains. Various reasons are attributed to this as mentioned below :

1. Many of the gutters are below sea level and this naturally creates problems in the drainage of water, which aggravates during high tide. Rains during this period flood the city with rain water which takes time to recede, adding to the havoc and disrupting the entire traffic system.

2. The problems in drainage system are also aggravated because of the high number of new buildings that have come up in the city.

3. The drainage system in Mumbai was built 75 years ago. Considering the growth of city during this period, and the damage that has occurred, the system is proving to be inadequate and inefficient.

4. Lots of slums and unauthorized settlements have come up beside the drainage system. Because of these settlements, the width of the ‘nallas’ get reduced and at the same time lot of garbage and solid waste gets piled on. The problem is aggravated by the number of waste dealers’ shops and cattle-sheds built near the nallas, cleaning of which, therefore, becomes difficult. The roads to the nallas are blocked because of these settlements, creating problems in clearing the streams. This clots the drains resulting in floods in rainy seasons.

In Mumbai alone, there are 111 places in the city – 26 in Mumbai city district, 73 in the eastern suburbs and 12 in the western suburbs – that were identified in 1993 as flood prone areas. The ward wise list is given herewith.

Ward wise list of flood prone areas in Mumbai

Ward No. of flood prone pockets
City A 3
B 3
C 0
D 2
E 7
F (South) 4
F (North) 4
G(South) 2
G(North) 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total 26
-------------------------------------------------------------

Eastern Suburbs
L 14
M(East) 6
M(West) 10
N 19
S 13
T 11
------------------------------------------------------------
Total 73
-------------------------------------------------------------

Western Suburbs
H(East) 2
K(East) 4
K(West) 2
P (South) 1
P (North) 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 12
----------------------------------------------------------------------

This list is made from the available data in 1993. Various works for clearing of nallas were then planned. However, data on completion of these works is not available. Also, changes after 1993 are not incorporated in the table.

Thus, there were 111 places in Mumbai which had chances of flooding. Thus, the city of Mumbai has high risk of being flooded in rainy seasons especially if it rains during high tide, resulting in disruption of traffic, loss of man-days and often making slum dwellers in low-lying areas homeless for more than a week.

The above discussion not only reflects the situation in Mumbai, but can be generalized as an urban situation. The situations are more or less similar for other urban cities too. However, flood-proneness of other cities has not been discussed here.

 

3.4.5 Conclusion

With improvements in irrigation infrastructure (dams) and other developments disrupting the natural drainage, Maharashtra has been increasing the risk for flash floods. At the same time the urban areas also are under the threat of floods because of problems of indiscriminate land use and inadequacy of appropriate drainage systems. High rates of deforestation and urbanization have added to this problem making the state more risk prone to floods. Thus it is important to adopt mitigative and preparative measures to face floods.

3.5 Epidemics

In all the districts of Maharashtra, preventive, promotive and curative health is being looked after by the health department, under the leadership of the district health officer supported by the health staff at the district level. Every district headquarter has a civil hospital catering to the curative needs of the patients from the district. There are also PHCs(what is a PHC??), referral hospitals and community hospitals supplementing the task. (Table VII gives the details of health and medical institutions in Maharashtra as well as the number of specialised hospitals in Maharashtra). It may be noted that bed - population ratio in Maharashtra, which is 1.46 per thousand is much better than the all india ratio of 0.75 per thousand. Also, as per 1987 statistics, the ratio of persons per doctor is better in Maharashtra (1750:1) as against the national ratio (2290:1)

Table VII: Health and Medical Institutions in Maharashtra as of January 1990.

A. Health and Medical Institutions Number Beds

1. Hospitals :
State Government 417 42,220
Central Government 45 6,638
Municipal 92 10,955
Private and others 1,364 38,558
---------------------------
Total 1,918 98,371
---------------------------
2. Dispensaries :
State Government 145 209
Central Government 107 76
Municipal 508 539
Zilla Parishad 796 452
Private and others 7,579 1,075
--------------------------- Total 9,135 2,351
---------------------------

3. Primary Health Centre 1,671 10,026

4. Sub-Centres 9,248

5. All other Institutions :
Primary Health Units 81 324
S.M.P Centres 183

6. Grand Total 22,221 1,11,072

7. Bed Population Ratio 1 : 683

8. Doctor Person ratio 1 : 1750

B. Specialised Hospitals in Maharashtra

1. Medical Colleges 23 (11 Govt, 7 Private)

(Including Private) 3 Municipal

2 Central Government

2. E.S.I. Scheme Hospitals 11

Dispensaries 67

3. T.B. Sanitoria / Hospitals (Govt) 6

4. Mental Hospitals 4

5. District Hospitals 25

6. Women Hospitals 9

7. Leprosy Hospitals (Govt) 3

Apart from these, there were 30 mobile units in Maharashtra, as of 1988.

By the end of the 7th Five Year Plan, every district hospital was intended to render services in the following 14 specialties :

I. Basic Specialties


1. Medicine
2. Surgery
3. Obstetrics and Gynaecology
4. ENT
5. Opthalmology
6. Paediatrics
7. Skin and V.D.
8. Orthopaedics
9. Dentistry
10. Psychiatry
11. Anaesthesia
12. Radiology
13. Pathology
14. Chest Tuberculosis

In addition to the above 14 specialties, following additional facilities are established in most of the hospitals.

II. Ancillary Facilities

1. Blood Banks
2. Leprosy isolation ward
3. Physiotherapy Unit
4. T.B. Clinic and T.B. Isolation ward
5. Diagnostic Facilities : All hospitals have got a number of X-Ray machines, well-equipped laboratories, ECG machines etc., for routine investigations.

III. Out-reach Services

A large number of surgical and diagnostic camps, sterilization camps, eye camps, dental camps, cancer and tuberculosis detection camps are regularly organised by these hospitals in rural areas. They have also adopted some rural hospitals for regular extension services. They also give referral services to the lower institutions like rural hospitals and primary health centres and refer cases beyond their competence to the hospitals attached to the medical colleges or specialised hospitals.

IV. Training and Health Education

All district hospitals conduct regular training programmes for medical officers and para-medical staff for teaching the technique of tubectomy, vasectomy, M.T.P, I.U.D. and other surgical and clinical procedures. They carry out health education activities not only through exhibition of posters, slogans painted on hospital walls, regular screening of films in O.P.D and announcements on public address systems wherever they are installed, but also through inter-personal discussions with the patients and relatives. In order to create public awareness a number of campaigns are launched.

V. Referral Services

District hospitals not only serve as referral centres for the health institutions located in small urban areas of the district, but also supervise and guide in effective implementation of the National Health Programmes.

In terms of infrastructure, therefore, the public health department is a well staffed department which has played a crucial role in practically all the emergencies at the district level. At times, they have also reinforced their efforts with the support from adjoining districts’ staff. One therefore cannot undermine the role played by health department in the management of emergencies in the disaster situation. However, there are certain areas, such as diagnostic facilities, that need to be examined in the context of epidemics.

3.5.1 Laboratories

The Public Health Laboratory, Pune, came into existence as “Sanitary Board Laboratory” in the year 1912, and is the pioneering institute for the development of Public Health Laboratory Service in the state. Later on, another laboratory was started in Amravati in 1957, and Regional Health Laboratories were established at Nagpur and Aurangabad and District Public Health Laboratories in all districts. The State and Regional Public Health Laboratories are notified by the government as “Water and Waster Water Characterisation Laboratories” under the Maharashtra Water (Prevention and Control) Act, 1974. The Public Health Laboratory, Pune, was recognised by World Health Organisation as District Referral Laboratory in 1960 and as Regional Referral Laboratory in 1971, for receiving UNICEF aid. Food and Agricultural Orgnisation has recognised the laboratory for monitoring pesticides and residue in food commodities. The functions of this Public Health Laboratory are :-

1. To analyse samples of food under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rules there under 1955.
2. To analyse samples of water for its potability and to fix the dose of sterilizers.
3. To analyse sewage, trade waste and river waste and river water samples under the Statutory Control of Environmental Pollution.
4. To monitor food and water samples for pesticide residues.
5. Examine stool, vomit, sputum and blood for pathogens.
6. To exercise vigilance over communicable diseases, their control and prevention.
7. To participate in the investigation of communicable diseases at the time of epidemic, by opening a laboratory on the spot.
8. To investigate the food poisoning cases
9. To impart training to medical officers, sanitary inspectors, food inspectors etc.

It has been reported that the diagnostic facilities are not adequately spread throughout the state. In case of epidemics, time plays a crucial factor in controlling the spread of viruses and any delay could add to the vulnerability of the population. Therefore, strengthening the present diagnostic facilities would ensure better response.

Secondly, because of the lack of diagnostic facilities, a lot of time is spent in transportation of samples. Even the results of tests take time. In case of epidemics, time plays a crucial factor in controlling the spread of viruses and any delay could add to the vulnerability of the population.

The recent dengue virus took two days for diagnosis. As pointed out during the meeting of the Committee on Epidemics, the Brihan Mumbai Municipal Corporation does not have kits for the testing of water-poisoning. During the plague epidemic of 1994, dead rats had to be sent to the Haffekine Institure, Mumbai, for further analysis and even then the controversy ensued whether it was really was plague or not. These incidents clearly highlight the fact that the diagnostic facilities need to be strengthened.

The department has already issued guidelines and a manual for managing disaster situations. There are also Grs(what’s a GR??) on “Control of Epidemics”, a “Malaria Combat Plan”, and special immunization campaigns such as “Pulse Polio” etc. However, Maharashtra is yet not free from the threats of epidemics.



Box 1 : Dengue Epidemic

In  October’96, the  epidemic of dengue fever hit Delhi and adjoining regions.  By October 20th, 206 people died and 5000 were affected by this fever.  It also resulted in a fear of dengue fever in Mumbai and some other parts of the state.  In the light of this fear, it is very important to analyse the possible risk of such disasters in future.

As it is seen, dengue fever is not fatal in itself and  can be cured with minor medication.  However, haemorrhagic  form of it is fatal if not promptly treated.  The places which have been affected previously are more prone to  a future epidemic of dengue.  In Maharashtra, Akola, Aurangabad, Satara, Dhule, Buldhana, Jalana etc.  are the places which had experienced the dengue epidemic previously. These places are prone to the risk of dengue haemorrhagic fever, making the surveillance  necessary by  the district health authorities. Virus of dengue is passed on through ‘Aedis Aegipti’ mosquitoes, which breed in stored water.  In Mumbai, there were about 2000 places identified where the larvae for breeding of these virus was present, according to the Municipal Commissioner of Mumbai.  It makes Mumbai and also adjoining areas of Navi Mumbai and Thane very much risk prone to dengue fever.

The plague made an impact on Surat in Gujarat in September 1994.,  District Beed in Maharashtra also faced the impact of plague.  People from these affected area migrated to Mumbai. Because of this migration, Dahanu, Palghar etc. coastal regions, which are adjacent to Gujrat border were under a threat of plague.  Even Mumbai was under the threat of  plague. Thus Mumbai and adjoining regions are risk prone because of incoming migration.

Lack of hygine in the city is also a primal cause of Malaria occurring every year. Recent cases of food poisoning show that hygiene plays an important role in controlling health hazards. Inadequacy of toilets resulting in open defecation, inadequate sewage facilities and problems in waste management have made the city an unclean one.  Garbage dumps are seen everywhere, inadequate control of rodents, flies, mosquitos and other pests have made the city vulnerable to epidemics.  There are inadequate facilities for storage of water and food which prepares a breeding ground for viruses of various diseases.




The major health problem, as far as Maharashtra is concerned, is that of water borne diseases, like gastro-enteritis, cholera  and jaundice, which usually erupt in the form of epidemics. There are other diseases like Malaria, viral fevers and dengue which are a result of poor environmental sanitation. However, in the recent past, the state has faced threat of plague. A high incidence of tuberculosis have also been observed.

Table VIII : List of Epidemics

3.5.2     Safe Drinking Water

From the figures showing analysis of the bacteriological quality of water for the five years from 1984 to 1988, it can be seen that on an average, nearly  17 per cent of the samples examined in the urban areas are contaminated. In the rural areas, the average contamination was much less at 3.20 per cent. Out of 4360 samples examined in 1988 for water technology mission, 337 samples (13 per cent) had luoride levels over 1.5 P.P.M.

3.5.3     Surveillance and Monitoring of Communicable disease

With the view of detecting epidemics at the earliest, an epidemiological cell has been established under the Jt. Director of Health Services (Pune). The following epidemics are monitored in Maharashtra:

Cholera

Gastroenteritis

Acute Diarrohea / Dysentery

Infective Hepatitis

Encephalitis

Poliomyelitis

Typhoid

In addition to the above, the following outbreaks are also monitored :

Food poisoning

Viral Fever

Meningitis

Dengue Fever

The monitoring is in the form of daily epidemic report, weekly health condition report and monthly report. Each outbreak is supposed to be thoroughly investigated by the district level staff and the report regarding the action taken to contain the outbreak, the actiology and the measures to prevent similar occurrences has to be submitted.

High incidence of water borne diseases, such as gastroenteritis, cholera, dysentery, infective hepatitis, polio etc., has been observed.  This is mostly due to high contamination of drinking water which comes from heavy rains, leakages in pipelines, unsatisfactory sanitary conditions, improper disinfection of water etc. In order to reduce the incidence of water borne diseases, an action plan,  stressing on the training of  various levels of officers/workers, certain specific measures for the control of diarrhoeal diseases and overall health education of the community, has been prepared.

The map of cholera endemic districts, infective hepatitis endemic districts, and diarrhoeal diseases endemic districts is given.

Table IX : Information of Attack and Death Due to Cholera, Infective Hepatitis, Gastro enteritis, Diarrhoeal Diseases and Polio

                                                                                        YEA R S

     Sr.                                                  1984                        1985                         1986                       1987                        1988

     No.          Diseases                     A            D               A            D                A            D              A            D               A         D

     1.             Cholera                       864        15          2,197           71          1,316        23          1,677        63       4,729 164

     2.             Infective                 25,437      663        23,676         624        18,080      513        18,160      473     24,213 406

                      Hepatitis

     3.             Gastroenteritis        17,834      286        22,373         556        36,671      496        19,847      180     33,878 669

                     

     4.             Diarrhoeal         11,10,953      781   13,51,341         919      l2,6l,423      680   12,67,343      290 10,34,006 602

                      Diseases 

     5.             Polio                        1,816      108          1,867         120          3,327      204          1,830      203       1,378 102


A booklet, covering all the practical aspects, on water borne diseases and communicable diseases was to be published. This would have been useful for M.O., P.H.C. and field staff working at Primary Health Centres.

Apart from these, the following programmes are being implemented in the state :

National Family Welfare Programme

National Malarial Eradication Programme

National Filaria Control Programme

National Leprosy Eradication  Programme

National Tuberculosis Control Programme

National Programme for Prevention and Control of Blindness

National Guinea Worm Eradication Programme

National Goitre Control Programme

Universal Immunization Programme

Minimum Needs Programme

S.T.D. Control, Cancer Control, Oral Health, AIDS Control, Mental Health Programme.

3.5.4     Control of Malaria and Vector Borne Diseases

The National Malaria Eradication Programme (NMEP) was initially launched as a control programme in  1953  to reduce the incidence of malaria in the country by indoor residual spraying by D.D.T twice a year in highly malaria prone areas, leaving out areas with spleen rate below 10 per cent. The control programme was changed to eradication in  1958. During the control programme the incidence of malaria dropped from 75 million cases in 1953 to 2 million cases in 1958. So also the proportional case rate came down from 10.8 in 1953 to 3.2 in 1958. Thus malaria declined in the country by more than 80 per cent. In the years between 1984 and 1988, the positive cases of malaria stand at an average of 70,000 cases every year, where the number of falciparum cases were at an average of 17,500 cases every year.

The main districts affected by malaria are Thane, Raigad, Dhule, Nashik, Bhandara, Yavatmal, Amravati, Satara, Chandrapur, Gadchiroli, Buldhana, Pune, Ahmadnagar, Jalgoan, Nagpur and Wardha. The Annual Parasite Index for Maharashtra  in 1988 stood at 1.2 and has been fluctuating from 0.7 to 1.4 in the previous years.

NMEP was divided into four phases initially :

1.      Preparatory phase

2.      Attack phase

3.      Consolidation phase

4.      Maintenance phase

This programme achieved remarkable success during the period from 1958 to 1961. The incidence of malaria came down as low as  50,000 cases. But from 1961, the incidence again started rising and in 1976 it rose to 6.467 million cases with 59 deaths.


Therefore in 1977, a modified plan of operation was implemented with the following objectives :

1.      To prevent deaths due to malaria

2.      To reduce morbidity due to malaria

3.      To retain the achievements of the past

4.      To maintain the industrial and green revolution

The following activities are undertaken in this programme

I. Surveillance

For this, the entire area is first stratified based on the following criteria,

            a. Annual Parasite Index (API)

            b. Border areas

            c. Problem areas

            d. Irrigation / Projects and then followed up by active or passive surveillance.

II. Treatment

All fever cases are given presumptive treatment with tablet chloroquin and positive cases are given radical treatment with primaquine for 5 days and chloroquine on 1st day for facilitating the community. For prompt treatment, drug distribution centres are opened in all grampanchayats and schools and fever treatment depots in remote and inaccessible areas. One day radical treatment is given to the labour population.

III. Spraying

The area for spraying is selected on the following basis :-

            a. Sections having API 2 and above in one of the last three years

            b. Sections forming contiguous area even though API is below 2

            c. Vulnerable and problem areas

            d. Fringe population in urban areas

            e. Bordering sections to neighbouring states in 16 kilometre belt.

The insecticide used is based on the entomological and epidemiological study of the district. To contain the major outbreaks fogging operation is carried out.

IV. Antilarval Measures

For biological control of vectors measures like elimination of breeding places by minor engineering interventions, use of guppy fish by developing 10-15 hatcheries, is undertaken.

V. Others

            a. Telegraphic intimation of local outbreaks

            b. Personal visits by higher authorities to the areas of local outbreaks

            c. Involvement of Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, Talathis in carrying out anti larval measures.

At the same time 15 towns have been covered under the Urban Malaria Scheme. The main activities under this scheme is antilarval measures by following ways :

            a. Treatment of breeding places with malariol.

            b. Adopting minor engineering measures such as deweeding, desilting, canalisation etc.

c. Biological method like introduction of larvivorous fish.

3.5.5     Incoming Migration

Because of high rates of incoming migration,   the city of Mumbai and adjoining areas of Thane and Navi Mumbai become highly prone to risks of any such epidemics. 

Mumbai is overcrowded, with about 60 per cent of its population staying in slums and dilapidated buildings, which have inadequate facilities, ventilation, and are highly congested. These factors add to the risk of epidemics and spread of tuberculosis.

3.5.6     Nutrition

Undernourishment and malnutrition are other important factors which add to the risk  of  health hazards. Tribal and rural areas of Thane, Raigad and Vidarbha (Melghat, Gadchiroli etc.)  have been facing  this problem.  There have been regular reports of deaths due to various infections in these areas.  It clearly indicates these areas as high risk prone.

3.5.7     Health Education

A separate State Health Education Bureau has been established for undertaking following activities :-

1.      To monitor Health Education activities conducted at district level.

2.      To procure, distribute and monitor the Health Education material and equipment.

3.      To undertake field education studies

4.      To publish monthly Health Bulletin (Arogya Patrika) for continuing education of Health Workers.

5.      To celebrate world Health Day and other days related to important Health themes.

The bureau has produced and supplied number of Health Education material such as exhibition sets, audio visual equipment, slide sets, films, booklets, folders, posters, tin plates to the district and also explored the new media for publicity such as painting on S.T. buses, display of hoardings.

Also there are 67 training institutes in Maharashtra where a number of courses for various levels are conducted.

3.5.8     Immunisation and Inoculation

The work on immunisation is done at various health institutions since 1969, but as a national programme the expanded programme on immunisation was launched on 1st April, 1978. Under this programme, immunisation for Diptheria, Pertusis, Tetanus, Polio and Tuberculosis are given.

The objective of coverage of 65 per cent beneficiaries was envisaged on 19th November, 1985 and the programme was redesignated as Universal Immunisation Programme (U.I.P) with the following objectives :-

·        85 per cent coverage of all infants with DPT, Polio, BCG, and Measles.

·        100 per cent coverage of Antenatal mothers.

The distinguishing features of U.I.P are :

1.      Addition of Measles immunisation

2.      Coverage of beneficiaries upto 100 per cent

3.      Additional inputs by way of cold chain equipment, vehicles and staff.

4.      Intensive training for health personnel at all levels.

5.      Monitoring of deaths due to vaccine preventable diseases.

6.      Ensuring quality of immunisation services by proper supervision.

3.5.9     Conclusion

Considering all these factors, one comes to conclude that Maharashtra is highly prone to epidemic diseases.  Water borne diseases, tuberculosis, and malaria are the major health hazards.

The state has a system to forecast epidemic. However, it seems that health facilities at Municipal level get activated quickly on perception of threat. Thus Mumbai, Navi Mumbai, Pune etc. corporations made hospital arrangements to face the situation if Dengue strikes.  Actions were taken to survey the risk prone areas and also to control mosquito breeding in various places.  Similarly, actions had been also taken for vector control during the threat of plague in 1994.  Planning was done even to set up emergency laboratories in Mumbai-Nagpur etc. as it was observed in recent threat of Dengue. The response mechanism to epidemics gears up only after there is a perception of threat  which mitigates the  risk of  the hazard to a certain extent. Essentially, however,  the diagnostic facilities need to be strengthened.

3.6     Road Accidents

3.6.1     Nature and Occurrence 

Roads in India are dangerous by developed country standards with an annual fatal accident rate of about 2.65 deaths per 1000 registered vehicles with the figure for Maharashtra  State being 1.87 (India Transport Sector - Long Term Issues, March 16, 1995, Infrastructure Operations Division Country Dept. II - India South Asia Regional Office. World Bank Document  Report no. 13192 - IN). This compares to a range of 0.15 (Japan) to 0.38 (France).  The generic reasons are poor roads, mixed traffic, unsafe vehicles, poor driving habits, lack of safety belts and helmets, poor emergency services and lack of police enforcement.

Data on road accidents  reportedly indicate that 70% of Indian road accidents arise from driver failure. From this it would follow that the priority should be in training, screening and certifying bus (and truck) drivers. However, poor engineering of roads, absence of pedestrian amenities and mechanical failures can easily be construed as driver failure.   The State of Maharashtra has 72,000 km of National, State and major district roads vs. 376,000 km nationally. The total number of reported road accidents in Maharashtra and for India as a whole between 1970-1993 (Source : Motor Vehicles Statistics of India, Govt. of India Publication, 1994)  is shown in Figure 8. 

A comparison of the trend in the number of accidents shows that  from 1970-1980 the total number of accidents in India increased by 19%  while the counterpart figure for Maharashtra State was of the order of  10%. In the next ten years between 1980-1990, the respective figures for India and Maharashtra were 49% and 31% . The rate of increase fell stabilising between 1990-1993 for India as a whole while  in the case of Maharashtra state, between 1991 and 1993, the figure decreased sharply by 34%.

On an average in Maharashtra, 134 road accidents reportedly take place everyday leading to  81 persons being injured and 15 persons losing their lives (Pathankar Committee report, 1995). Figure 9 shows a profile of number of persons killed vs the total number of road accidents that have occurred in Maharashtra between 1970 and 1996.

3.6.2     Definition

Road accidents, for the purpose of the Disaster Management Action Plan include all forms of motor vehicle accidents involving  two / three/ four wheeler passenger vehicles, vehicles carrying goods including hazardous substances. These accidents may lead to injuries and fatalities to pedestrians, bystanders and/or passengers.

3.6.3     Vulnerable locations

Discussions with officials of the State Traffic Police Department and secondary data obtained from the same office indicated that there are 107 accident prone spots on National Highways serving the State and  50 on Maharashtra State Highways.  A distribution of these accident prone spots on the national highways is shown in Table X below while figure 10 shows a comparison in the accident status on the various types of roads in the state.

Table X: The distribution of  accident prone spots on the National and State Highway

S.No

National

Highway

No. of accident prone spots

State Highway

No. of accident prone spots

1

NH 3

18

Sion-Panvel Expressway

8

2

NH 4

51

SH 10

12

3

NH 6

9

SH 30

2

4

NH 7

1

SH 60

21

5

NH 8

6

SH 204

7

6

NH 9

9

 

 

7

NH 17

13

 

 

Total                                       107

Total                                  50

The data clearly shows that NH 4, Mumbai-Pune highway is the most vulnerable to accidents. This highway has the maximum traffic density and the main cause of accidents on this highway apparently was due to carelessness of drivers especially during overtaking. These observations are reflected in newspaper reports which formed the basis of a traffic safety exercise conducted in Thane district. Box-2 below shows an extract from  a recent  newspaper item.

Box -2 - Road accidents on Maharashtra’s Major National Highways

Source : December, 15, 1996, Times of India

“The high accident rate on the major national highways of the State shown in Table 1-A has catalysed  the commencement of a month long (from Dec. 17, 1997) strict vigil campaign on the major national and state  highways passing through Thane. 

Table 1-A

Highway                       Year                   Total Number of Accidents

NH-4                             1994                                   2901

(Mumbai-Pune)            1995                                  3576

                                      1996                                  2740

NH-8                              1994                                 1183

(Mumbai-Ahmedabad) 1995                                 1470

                                       1996                                 1370

NH-3                              1994                                  2367

(Mumbai-Nasik)            1995                                  3004

                                       1996                                  2523

NH-17                            1994                                   1276

(Mumbai-Goa)              1995                                   1730

                                       1996                                   1640

Source : Safe-T drive plan aims at road discipline for all - Times of India Dec. 15, 1996”


3.6.4     Reasons for Accidents

The various reasons attributed for the road accidents have been  discussed extensively by two committee reports viz., the Pathankar Committee report and the Sinha Committee report. Some of the  major findings of these committee reports are given below.

3.6.4.1     Road Network

The State has about 1,77,000 km of roads but more than 20% of the road length is unsurfaced. Many roads have become substandard due to paucity of funds. As a result,

·        substantial length of district roads is poorly maintained

·        length of the surfaced roads is only about 79% of the total network

·        about 13.6% of villages in the State are without road link

·        large number of missing links in the NH grid

·        a number of bridges need to be widened and strengthened

·        substantial length of single lane roads are to be widened as two lanes

A disproportionate  increase in traffic volume both passenger and goods and in the number of different kinds of vehicles in the country has taken place vis-a-vis the growth of the number and type of roads.  

Passenger traffic, in the case of road transport, has reportedly gone up from a level of 23 to 3000 billion passenger km from 1951-1991 marking a 130 fold increase. Similarly goods traffic has increased by 91 times. Table XI depicts the increase in vehicle population in Maharashtra  in the last forty years. In Maharashtra, the total number of registered vehicles has grown by about 54 times during this period with maximum percentage rise in vehicle population recorded between 1961 and 1971 of 206.6% and  between 1981 and 1991 of  222.4%.

Table XI: Vehicle population in Maharashtra

S.No.

Year

Vehicle Population

% rise

1

1951

50,398

-

2

1961

1,00,144

98.7

3

1971

3,07,030

206.6

4

1981

8,34,299

171.7

5

1991

27,03,355

224.0

6

1992

29,00,164

7.3

7

1994

32,69,340

12.7

As against these figures, the registered increase in road network has been only 3.3 fold as shown in Table XII.

Table XII: Road Length in Maharashtra

S.No.

Year

Road length (000 kms.)

 

 

NH

SH

MDR

ODR

VR

Total

% rise

1

1965-66

2

11

13

9

17

52

-

2

1970-71

2

14

18

11

20

65

25

3

1980-81

3

19

25

25

69

141

117

4

1990-91

3

31

39

38

62

173

23

5

1991-92

3

31

39

39

62

174

0.6

The data shows that between 1980-81 and 1991-92, there have been no new national highways while there has been a substantial increase in the  state highways, major district roads, other roads and village roads.

This is of significance especially with respect to the increasing pressure on national highways  since they are used not only to transport passengers but also goods, chemicals etc. Moreover they serve as feeders to ports, and railway  stations in the transport of freight across States. In the total road length,  NH is only 1.7% . Because of grossly inadequate length these NHs carry about 40% of the total traffic in the State. An illustrative case study of the National Highway is shown in Box -3.

Box -  3  :  Hazards on National Highways -  A Case Study of NH 8 adapted from a study by Loss Prevention Association of India.

The route :

NH 8 links Mumbai to Delhi passing through important cities and trade centres viz., Vadodara, Ahmedabad, Ajmer, Jaipur to name a few.

Problem :

Rapid growth of vehicular traffic on this road  accompanied by an increase in accidents at an alarming rate.

The accident prone area  was identified  by General Insurance Corporation of India and All India Motor Transport Congress as the stretch from  Vasai to Talasari.

Study :

LPA was asked to study the referred stretch and suggest suitable measures to mitigate  this  hazard.

Observations from the study :

Road Characteristics : The stretch under study is about 100 kms in length with width varying between 22’-0” and 24’-0” with a  rolling terrain. There are sharp curves, hairpin bends, steep slopes and culverts at some places. The road in this stretch is two-lane (total), two-way without a divider and the surface is black-topped.

Many sharp curves and hairpin bends appeared  to have insufficient or incorrect extra widening and superelevation which may have been the cause of head-on-collisions and overturnings at sharp bends.

Absence of  stable parapet walls at  many of the culverts.

Inadequate carriage-way width and lack of stabilised shoulders did not permit parking of vehicles during accidents / breakdowns, thus preventing free flow of traffic.

 

Traffic Characteristics : Heterogeneous road traffic comprising mainly of heavy vehicles  such as trucks, tankers, buses and some over-dimensional vehicles. Types of cargo transported ranged from straw  to  manufactured vehicles as well as  hazardous chemicals and petroleum products.

Average travel speed observed on straight alignment  was 70 kmph in the case of heavy and medium motor vehicles and 80 kmph in case of light motor vehicles. On sloped bends, the average speed was 40 kmph in the case of the former and 50 kmph in the latter case.

Traffic Control Measures : Numerous Tee - junctions at an average of  one for every two kms. However, none of the Tee-junctions had singnals..

No arrangement for checking speed limit violations.

No patrolling by the highway police.

Only one Traffic Aid Post was located on this stretch maintained primarily for clearing bottlenecks on the highway during movement of VIPs.

Insufficient number of traffic signs along the highway. The existing ones were rusted and corroded. Placement of  mandatory and cautionary signs at road bends were erroneous at many locations.

No part of the highway between Vasai and Talasari was marked with road marking paints to indicate carriage-way centre-lines or lane-lines.

Existing Roadside Facilities and other services

In the stretch under study, available facilities such as petrol pumps, refreshment centres, garages for minor repairs, first aid centre, ambulances etc. were found to be inadequate.

Absence of a big garage for undertaking repairs in the event of a major breakdown.

Telephones located in very few places and not in working condition for use of .

First-Aid centres manned by untrained personnel.

Road Accident Characteristics

Accidents were of types : single vehicle accidents and head on collisions. The main causes of the former were brake failures, tyre bursts, overloading of vehicles. In the latter case, the frequency was higher at sharp road bends, particularly blind corners.

The accident prone sites were identified as :

a) Between Vasai and Manor (45 km)

b) Between Manor and Charoti (30 km)

c) Between Charoti and Talasari (25 km)

Location-wise, straight alignments were as vulnerable as bends from the accident point of view. Number of accidents were more during the early morning hours when traffic flow was predominantly towards Mumbai.

Based on this study LPAI had made a number of recommendations for improvement of this stretch, which is under consideration.

Table XIII provides a comparison between road lengths, number of vehicles and no. of accidents between the years 1970-1992.

Table XIII: Road lengths, number of vehicles and no. of accidents between the years 1970-1992.

S. No.

Year

Road length
(000 km)

No. of Accidents

No. of vehicles

1

1970

65

36,115

3,07,030

2

1981

141

40,376

8,34,299

3

1991

173

57,289

27,03,355

4

1992

174

50,304

29,00,164

The data in the table shows a maximum increase by 224% in the number of vehicles between 1981-1991. The corresponding increase in total road length for this period is only 21%. This disparity in change in the number of vehicles and the road length is reflected in  the number of accidents having  increased by 42% during this period. 

Between 1971-1981, on the other hand, the number of  vehicles rose by  172%  while  accidents  increased by  12%.  The road length, however,  was increased  by 117%.

3.6.4.2     Condition of roads

There are basic design deficiencies in road alignment, which is compounded by poor repairs and maintenance.  Another contributory  factor  to deterioration of the condition of roads is encroachment.  On the national highways, many sections and bridges require widening. Basic road safety requirements such as road markings, traffic signs etc. are inadequate.

The quality of road surface is measured by a “Roughness Index” (RI) expressed in terms of  millimetres per kilometre. An index of 2000 mm is needed for good riding quality. More than 4000 mm is  regarded as unacceptable.  In USA, the road is resurfaced when the index exceeds 2500 mm vis-à-vis the Indian situation where even freshly laid roads reportedly  have an RI exceeding 2,500 mm. Manually constructed roads start with an RI of 4000 to 8000 mm while machine laid roads start with an RI between 2000 and 3000 mm.

Some of the most risk prone roads  are the ghat roads. Parapet walls damaged in the ghats are not renewed or repaired for 2-3 years.

On city roads, some of the main problems  leading to accidents are  :

·        presence of hoardings at intersections and crossings which distract vision and hamper the smooth flow of traffic; 

·        encroachment on roads by squatters, shopkeepers;

·        potholes during repair of roads  left exposed for long periods;

·        poor street lighting;

·        pedestrians  disobeying  traffic rules; and

·        provision of speed breakers without adopting Indian Road Congress’s design standard.

Inadequate traffic management on the highways  is a factor contributing to accidents and traffic congestions. There are inadequate essential amenities such as parking facilities for refueling, repairing and  resting. 

3.6.4.3     Condition of Vehicles

Poor maintenance of vehicles with a large percentage not being road-worthy and lack of fitness of tyres leads to skidding are other major causes of accidents.

The number of well designed and well-equipped vehicle repair workshops are inadequate. Dependence is largely on unauthorised workshops with poorly trained mechanics, scanty equipment and  poor quality of spare parts.

Overloaded vehicles, especially on city roads, accelerate the damages to roads and movement of these overloaded cargo vehicles causes a number of accidents.

Vehicular lighting system is another  major cause of accidents during the night, monsoon or thick smog. On unlit highways, due to poor visibility and  glare of oncoming vehicles, accidents are common.

3.6.4.4     Drivers

Two thirds of the accidents in the state are apparently due to driver negligence, rash driving and lack of adequately trained drivers. Two wheeler drivers are more vulnerable to injuries and fatalities compared to motor vehicle occupants.

An examination of the primary cause of motor vehicle accidents in the state for the year 1995, (figure 11) shows that the predominant cause of accidents is  the fault of the driver.

This may be due to illegal overtaking which stems mainly from a lack of awareness of traffic rules or over-speeding by drivers. A case in point to illustrate the latter is  shown in the case study in Box-4.

Box - 4  Road accident due to overspeeding

Source : Times of India 14 and 15/3/96

The death of seventy passengers travelling to Nashik in an MSRTC bus was caused when the bus plunged into the Kadawa river.  The accident occurred due to over-speeding by the driver. Compensation to the victims and to families of victims was announced by the Maharashtra state govt. to the tune of Rs. 50,000 to the next of kin of deceased, and Rs. 2000 towards funeral expenses. 

Rescue and relief was provided by police, assisted by local villagers. First aid was provided on site and the victims were taken to  Nashik civil hospital. Cranes were provided by MSRTC, the army and a private agency to pull out the bus.

A compilation of newspaper clippings of various road accidents that have occurred in the state in the last ten years reflecting  the various causes of accidents, is placed as Table XIV.

Table XIV: A compilation of  newspaper clippings of  the major reported road accidents that occurred between 1985 and 1996 in Maharashtra State.

S. No.

Accident Site

Date

Damage Caused

Death     Injuries      Loss

Reasons of Occurrence

1

Tanker  carrying liquefied  natural gas overturned at Dahanu.

23/11/91

97

Several

 

The reason for the death and injury was that the LNG caught fire. As a result, nearby hutments and the residents were engulfed.

2

Truck carrying Naphtha overturned on Eastern Express Highway.

1/10/93

18

NA

 

The truck overturned due to the bad condition of roads. Slum dwellers mistook the naphtha for kerosene and started collecting it. The naphtha caught fire resulting in the deaths.

3

Road accident involving a ST bus and truck at Tiswa, 40 km from Amravati.

2/1/94

6

40

 

The ST bus rammed a  truck on NH 6.  The bus driver tried to overtake  a truck and collided with a second truck coming from the opposite direction.

4

ST bus plunged into Kadawa River near Nashik.

14/3/94

70

 

 

Overspeeding by the driver.

5

Trailer containing chlorine gas cylinders collided with a truck at Vasai.

1/10/94

4

298

 

Deaths and injuries occurred due to the explosion of the chlorine gas cylinders which affected 1200 odd villages on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad Highway.

6

ST bus accident on Mumbai-Pune highway.

15/4/96

17

 

 

 


S. No.

Accident Site

Date

Damage Caused

Death     Injuries      Loss

Reasons of Occurrence

7

Bus accident  near Savitri River, Mahad.

10/8/79

34

 

 

A Goa-Mumbai bus skidded from the highway due to rain and poor visibility and fell into the flooded Savitri river.

8

Bus accident between Khardi and Kasara.

18/2/84

17

39

 

The private bus with passengers rolled off a bridge between Khardi and  Kasara.

9

Bus accident near Asangaon.

18/2/84

 

42

 

A ST bus  flipped over as the driver tried to avoid hitting a two-year old girl crossing the road.

10

Lorry rams into slums at Sewri.

14/1/95

10

6

 

Driver lost control of vehicle.

11

Bus accident at Khambataki Ghat, 60 km from Satara.

17/1/86

49

9

 

A Belgaum-Mumbai bus fell into a 150 m deep ditch in the Khambataki Ghat.

12

Petrol spill from tanker, Satara.

Oct-Nov. ‘87

36

 

 

Tanker overturned and caught fire.

3.6.5     Accidents involving Hazardous substance transport

Hazardous substance transport also poses a major accident risk. The record of accidents reported involving motor vehicles transporting hazardous substances in the state in 1993 and 1994, is represented graphically in figure 12. These accidents constitute 0.4-0.6% of the total road accidents that occurred in the state during these two years.

The four most important highways which have a high traffic density, both with respect to transport of  passengers and hazardous / non-hazardous goods, and which have a high incidence of accidents are :

NH 8 (Mumbai-Ahmedabad), NH 4 (Mumbai-Pune-Bangalore), NH 17 (Mumbai-Goa) and NH 3 (Mumbai-Agra).

Accidents involving motor vehicles carrying dangerous or hazardous substances, often result in the leakage of gases or spillage of liquids.  In a large number of cases, this is reportedly not due to the tanker construction, but due to a leaky discharge faucet. Availability of provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Petroleum Act, 1934 and Petroleum Rules, 1976, under the Explosives Act , 1884, for transport of hazardous substances- inadequate.

Both the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, together make only one provision with specific reference to drivers of vehicles transporting hazardous chemicals / substances. Statutes regarding the license provision and renewal, medical  examination  to assess fitness, training etc. for drivers are grossly inadequate.

Another factor that increases the risk due to accidents related to hazardous substances transport is that the fire brigade personnel, except in Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR),   are reportedly not adequately trained to deal with gas leakage and other chemical accidents. Additionally, there are inadequate medical facilities on highways to deal with such specific  accidents, thereby exacerbating the risks.

3.6.5.1     Responsible Agencies

The main agency responsible for taking spot action in the event of a road accident in the state is the Traffic Police. The various emergency  services likely to be involved in accident management are the, fire brigades, ambulance services, medical aid facilities and vehicle salvage services.

The officials to be contacted immediately on occurrence of an accident are the district collector of the district, tahsildar of the taluka, deputy / assistant regional transport officer under whose jurisdiction the area lies.

Accident rescue and relief facilities such as towing services, medical attendants, ambulances etc. are conspicuous by their absence.

In the past there were 25 Police Aid Posts on the national highway, equipped with wireless facilities, first aid etc., for accident relief. In addition there were eleven state highway posts.

Recently, the state govt. has approved the proposal by the state police department to merge these posts to form 36 Police Aid Posts. These posts will be fully equipped  with adequate first aid and medical facilities and wireless sets for immediate communication in the event of an accident. Additional forklifts to clear the traffic in the case of an accident thereby preventing traffic congestion have also been proposed.

Provisions therefore have been made under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for compensation to accident victims. An alternative and more reliable means of obtaining compensation has been devised by General Insurance Corporation. According to this scheme, elaborated in box-5,  compensation can be obtained within a time bound schedule of two months from the date of application and in any case within six months from the date of accident.



Box -5 Compensation for Road Accidents - Insurance Claims

Source : Blitz Weekly 16/3/94

Prior to March 1992, compensation for motor vehicle accident victims were provided by approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal established under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885, and Motor Vehicles Act 1939. However, the compensation was assured after an inordinate delay. 

In this connection, General Insurance Corporation introduced a novel scheme called Jald Rahat Yojana  from March, 1992. At present, this scheme is being introduced only for non-fatal bodily injuries occurring through road accidents. The yojana aims at offering compensation within a time bound schedule of two months from the date of application and in any case within six months from the date of accident.

The amount of compensation is decided by a panel consisting of a retired judge, a medical practitioner and a retired executive of an insurance company who jointly examine  individual cases on a regular basis.

The actual settlement of compensation is speedy, since the claimants do not have to go through court  proceedings. Between March 1992 and March 1994, 63 claims have been settled in Mumbai.

       


3.6.6     Conclusion

The salient conclusions of the assessment are as follows :

·        A number of factors such as,

·        poor design,  operation and maintenance of roads,

·        non-roadworthy condition of a large number of  vehicles,

·        disproportionate increase in  road length and number of vehicles  and a

·        lack of awareness of road safety and carelessness of drivers

have contributed to  the high incidence of  road accidents in the state. However, the most notable among these appear  to be due to the fault of the driver.

·        The roads that are vulnerable to accidents are the state and national highways with 50 and 107 accident prone locations, respectively. These spots have been identified by the state traffic police based on history of  road accident occurrences. 

·        There is a need to provide for emergency medical assistance especially on highways. Accident rescue and relief facilities such as towing services, medical attendants, ambulances etc. are also conspicuous by their absence.

·        Recently, the state govt. has approved the proposal by the state police department to upgrade Police Aid Posts and fully equip them  with adequate first aid and medical facilities, wireless sets for immediate communication in the event of an accident. Additional forklifts to clear the traffic in the case of an accident thereby preventing traffic congestion have also been proposed.

·        In the case of accidents involving transport of hazardous substances, the relief and rescue measures are inadequate. Fire brigade personnel, except in MMR region,   are reportedly not adequately trained to deal with gas leakage and other chemical accidents.  Moreover, medical facilities on highways are inadequate.

·        Training courses are provided for drivers of hazardous goods transporting vehicles by NOCIL, HPCL, Thane Manufacturers Association and Herdillia Chemicals. These are 3 day courses prior to getting the license, with a one day refresher course every year. There is a need for more institutions of this nature.

3.7     Fire Hazard

3.7.1     Nature and Occurrence 

Fires could be caused by explosions, chemical reactions, short circuits in the electrical systems etc. These occurrences could be due to carelessness, inadequate safety precautions or intentional arson and sabotage. The risks due to fire hazards could vary depending upon the level of preparedness of the emergency services, fire services and medical services.

Maharashtra is one of the states which does not have a State Fire Service. Presently, all fire stations are under the jurisdiction of the respective municipalities. There are 233 municipal councils and  13 municipal corporations in Maharashtra. Of these, fire tenders are maintained in 96 councils and 12 corporations.

The data on the number of  fire calls attended by the fire services in the state is published every five years in the form of a red book. The latest edition (for 1992-1996) is under preparation. According to the records published for the period 1987-1991, the number of fire calls and rescue calls attended by the various fire services in the state are as follows :

No. of fire calls attended                       8722

No. of special rescue calls

attended                                               4836

Some of the major fire accidents recorded in Maharashtra  in the last 10 years, based on newspaper articles, are compiled and shown in Table XV.

Table XV: Major Fire Accidents reported in Maharashtra State 

(Source : newspaper clippings)

S. No.

Accident Site

Date

Damage Caused

Death         Injuries      Loss

Reasons of Occurrence

1

Telco Plant, Pimpri

3/4/89

NA

NA

NA

NA

2

Fire at Dongri

25/8/89

35

31

NA

Fire broke out in a two storey building

3

Soap factory at Mazgaon

27/11/89

NA

NA

Raw material worth lakhs of rupees destroyed

Fire broke out in the godown

4

Shanmukhanada Hall

28/2/90

NA

NA

The inside of the hall completely destroyed

NA

5

Lamington Road

5/3/92

5

NA

NA

Fire broke out in a house

6

Hotel in Dharavi

Mumbai

31/5/92

21

NA

NA

LPG blast in the hotel

7

Bhiwandi, Thane District

9/2/93

1

NA

150 huts destroyed

NA

8

Malvani slums

25/12/93

3 children

NA

NA

NA

9

Chikhalthane village, Solapur

3/5/94

23

77

NA

Explosion in a godown storing firecrackers sparked by a flash released from  bursting of firecrackers.

10

Ganesh Murthy Nagar slums

19/2/96

3

NA

180 huts gutted

NA

11

GPO, Mumbai

13/5/96

None

None

Estimated loss to Telecom Dept. is Rs. 1 crore

Short circuit  or a burning up of the air conditioning ‘s unclean, choked filters.

12

Hotel President

Mumbai

18/5/95

None

None

Short circuit in the electrical fittings of the house keeping pantry.

13

Cama Industrial Estate, Mumbai

10/2/85

4

About 100 industrial units manufacturing plastics and garments and a printing press were gutted.

14

Mambatiwala Chawl, Nagpada

13/8/85

42

52

Building collapse, a  part of Bldg. No. 47, collapsed.

As seen from the table,  most of the reported accidents are in the city of Mumbai and the various reported causes of these accidents, are mainly due to inadequate safety of electrical installations, inadequate fire safety measures to deal with chemical and LPG fires as well as careless practices while handling and storage of  inflammable materials. 

3.7.2     Definition

Fire hazards, for the purpose of this study, include fires due to chemicals, LPG, explosives as well as short circuit of electrical systems. However, while assessing the resource needs of the state fire services, it must be considered that these services are also used in rescue operations during building collapses. Additionally, the fire department’s services are also required in rescue and relief operations in fires caused by  accidents involving hazardous inflammable substances.

3.7.3     Vulnerable locations

Unlike in the case of hazards, such as floods or road accidents, definition of specific vulnerable spots is not possible. However, a broad definition of the type of locations where there is a potential of fire hazard can be identified. Some of these areas are :

·        Storage areas of flammable / explosive material in the vicinity of populated areas.

·        Hotels and restaurants in crowded areas using improper practices of storage of cooking fuel such as LPG, kerosene etc.

·        Multistoreyed buildings, especially in cities, with inadequate fire safety measures.

·        Narrow lanes, congested, overcrowded buildings, old buildings with poor internal wiring.

3.7.4     Reasons of Fire Accidents

Some of the major fire related accidents are discussed  in greater detail in the form of case studies in Boxes 6 and 7 to understand the  reasons for same.

Box -6 - Fire due to LPG cylinder blast.

Source : Times of India - 1/6/92.

LPG cylinder blast resulted in a fire at a  hotel in Dharavi killing 21 persons. The cause of the accident was gas leakage from an LPG  cylinder.

A post accident review of the safety aspects  revealed that four LPG cylinders and two pressure stoves fueled by kerosene were lined up together, thereby creating a potentially hazardous situation. The main cause of the accident, as registered, was due to negligence on the part of the owner of the hotel. Apparently, the gas installation was not official and the gas regulators did not bear the seal of  any of the standard approved gas companies. There was only one entrance / exit from the hotel which was blocked  by the fire.

Rescue operations commenced with the arrival of the fire brigade within 12 minutes of the accident.    

The main observations on analysis of the case are :

·        Potentially hazardous condition  created by placing LPG cylinders in close proximity to kerosene stoves.

·        The gas installation was not a by standard, approved  gas company

·        Availability of only one exit which also served as the entrance aggravated the situation.

The accident could have been avoided by maintaining a  safe gas installation and  basic precautions such as not placing kerosene stoves in close proximity to gas cylinders, thus ensuring safe working conditions.

Box -7 -  Fire due to faulty electrical  system.

Source : Times of India - 19/5/96.

Over  8,000 sq. ft. of the heritage GPO building was burnt down when a fire sparked off in a faulty air conditioner in the conference room in the telecom section.

The various reasons attributed to the fire are :

·        Short circuit,

·        Burning  of the AC’s uncleaned filters,

·        Lack of  regular inspection and overhaul of the  department’s electrical system.

The telecom employees did not use the fire fighting equipment available at the premises, even as  a preliminary  measure before the  arrival of the fire service.  Loss of documentation and property may have been minimised if this emergency response action had been taken. The fire department officials felt that due to a lack  of emergency drills, the employees panicked and  were unable to react in such an emergency.

The post accident analysis revealed  the following :

·        A gross neglect of  fire safety measures and insurance in a number of heritage buildings in the city of Mumbai.

·        Electric installations and the wiring is not regularly checked and replaced. This negligence frequently leads to short circuits, which are a great fire hazard.

·        Safety measures like accessible fire escapes,  smoke detectors and water sprinklers are also absent. 

·        A number of the heritage buildings also do not have a general insurance against fire.    

In addition to the reasons discussed in the two case studies above, the risks due to fire accidents are compounded by the following :

In Mumbai and other cities, fire fighters face severe problems due to the narrow lanes, congested, overcrowded buildings, old buildings and  poor internal wiring.

Since the fire services are under the jurisdiction of respective municipalities, movement from one municipality to another requires official administrative procedures, resulting in delay in providing assistance across municipalities. This could result in elevation of  the risk levels.

3.7.5     Resources available

Maharashtra is one of the states which does not have a state fire service. All fire stations are  under the jurisdiction of the municipalities. There are 233 municipal councils and  13 municipal corporations in Maharashtra. Of these, fire tenders are maintained in 96 councils and 12 corporations. Presently, a proposal is being prepared to include all fire stations, except Mumbai, under the State Fire Department, with district and taluka level fire offices.

The fire stations fall under the jurisdiction of the Urban Development Department, unlike in other states where the fire stations are under the State Fire Department, which is within the jurisdiction of the department of Home Affairs.

The facilities in each fire station are proportionate to the municipality’s financial position. However, due to a paucity of  funds in most municipalities, except Mumbai and other metro cities in the state, the fire stations are poorly equipped. Presently, loans are being provided through General Insurance Company to municipalities by the govt. of Maharashtra to equip the fire stations.

Human resource capacity building is done through regular training programmes. The senior officers are trained at the training college in Nagpur. Field level firemen from all over Maharashtra have to mandatorily undergo training at the State Training Centre at Vidyanagri, Mumbai. The content and duration of the courses are as follows :

·        3-6 month duration courses.

·        Practical and theoretical courses with training, on  the various methods of fire fighting and equipment used.

·        Some  practical experiences, especially with respect to fire fighting practices for high rise buildings, are imparted with assistance from Mumbai  fire dept.

The strength of the State  Training Centre is 19 with only two trainers. There is a need for more equipment, training facilities and hostel facilities to provide training to larger groups of  recruits since the current capacity is 25 per batch. A proposal has been sent to the govt. of Maharashtra for upgradation of facilities at the training centre. Community awareness programmes  on fire safety are also organised by the State Training Centre.

The status of  fire service related resources in Maharashtra as of 1991, are shown in table XVI.

Table XVI:  Status of Fire Services in Maharashtra State (1987- 1991)

Resource

Status of resource

Admissible resource*

Services

 

 

Number of Fire  Stations

161

**

Number of Pumping Units (includes fire engines)

467

**

Staff

 

 

Station Officers

82

284

Asst. Station Officers

92

163

Leading Firemen

408

719

Driver/Operator

837

757

Firemen

2548

3744

 Source : State Fire Training Centre, Mumbai.

* Admissible resource indicates the sanctioned number of posts

** This is governed by norms established  by the Fire Advisory Council, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India. According to these norms,  the number of pumping units (PU) is a function of the population as follows :

1 PU per 50,000 population                             4 PU for a population of 200,000

2 PU upto a population of  100,000                  5 PU for a population of 250,000

6 PU for a population of  300,000 and so on.

In addition to combating fire related hazards,  the fire fighting services are also required during building collapses, road accidents, and chemical  hazards. The need, therefore, for a well equipped, well maintained and adequate fire service cannot be overemphasized.

3.7.6     Conclusion

·        There is a  need for a common Fire Brigade Act, adopted by all local municipal governments, which would ensure certain standards of fire services with state support and enable the fire brigade to reach out beyond municipal  jurisdiction. Presently, each municipal corporation has its own set of rules regarding the fire brigade, and this affects relief and rescue operations across the state.

·        Fire services are required in smaller districts and talukas and there is a  need for a government regulation to simplify bureaucratic procedures to enable fire services to travel across municipal limits.

·        Streamlining of fire service operations across the state is required.

·        There is a need for immediate communication after fire accidents, granting of blanket permission during emergencies and upgradation by providing wireless and computer systems.

·        Mapping of areas prone to fire accidents based on the frequency of occurrence of these hazards, is necessary.

·        The main causes of fires in the state are inadequate safety of electrical installations, inadequate fire safety measures to deal with chemical and LPG fires as well as careless practices while handling and storage of  inflammable materials. Additionally in cities, old buildings and  congested areas aggravate the risks due to fire.

3.8     Industrial Hazards

3.8.1     Nature and Occurrence 

Industrial hazards, like natural disasters, can be understood in terms of their occurrence in time and place, how they affect social units and how these units take responsive actions to mitigate disaster consequences.

The off-site impacts of industrial accidents and other hazards such as fire or natural disasters, often lead to loss of human life, property,  financial damage and considerable environmental pollution. The severity of these disasters occurring in a developing country like India is increased due to high levels of poverty, illiteracy, inadequate housing structures, under-resourced health services, lack of expertise in training and planning for risks and hazards, necessary support structures and finance from relevant organisations for the rehabilitation of victims. Both preventing and mitigating effects of crisis depend upon the improvements made in the above areas.

Some of the major off-site industrial accidents that have occurred in Maharashtra  are compiled from newspaper clippings and shown in Table XVII below. Appendix IV provides a case study of the two major industrial accidents at IPCL and BPCL.

Table XVII: Industrial and Chemical Accidents

S. No.

Accident Site

Date

Damage Caused

Death     Injuries      Loss

Reasons of Occurrence

1

Ammonia Gas leak from RCF, Chembur, Mumbai.

2/3/85 to 4/3/85

NA

NA

NA

Faulty cooling tower.

Ammonia storage tank  at the Trombay complex not maintained under suitable conditions.

 

2

Chlorine Gas leakage at Chembur, Mumbai.

29/8/85

1

200

 

Leakage of toxic chlorine gas from a corroded valve in one  of  the  three highly corroded chlorine tanks housed in a shed in the barbed wire compound.

 

3

Fire at BPCL refinery, Mumbai.

Nov. 1989

30

NA

NA

 

 

4

Explosion followed by fire at IPCL, Nagothane.

6/11/90

32

50

Damage to roofing, pipe racks and street girders

Leakage of ethylene gas with an unconfined vapour cloud formation and explosion.

Possible reasons for leakage :

(i)failure  of a nozzle to flange weld on the exchanger ,or

(ii)loss of sealability of the flange unit between the aluminium flange of the exchanger and steel  flange of jumpover line.

 

5

Century Rayon, Kalyan-Thane belt.

17/3/93

11

60

 

 

 


S. No.

Accident Site

Date

Damage Caused

Death     Injuries      Loss

Reasons of Occurrence

6

Essar Shipping tanker spilled 100 tonnes of crude oil at Butcher island.

29/3/93

None

None

 

 

7

Oil spill at Bombay High by ONGC.

17/5/93

None

None

A three mile long water stretch on the Murud - Janjira beach affected.

Due to external corrosion at the Splash Zone on the rise pipe that  ruptured

8

Acetylene gas cylinder explosion in godown at Lowist Wadi, Thane.

3/3/94

2

2

NA

NA

9

Explosion in a factory at Dondaiche, Dhule.

24/3/94

7

22

NA

NA

10

Explosion at the army ammunition factory at Khadki near Pune.

10/10/94

8

5

The pyrotechnic section was burnt down in a major fire.

 

11

1000 litres of furnace oil leaked in Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Nhava Sheva.

8/3/95

None

None

Marine life was affected.

Ship was dmaged.

Oil leak during bunkering operations.

12

Fire at BPCL, Mahul.

20/10/95

None

None

Losses worth Rs. 20 crores

NA

13

Bomb blast in Garware Polyester Unit, Aurangabad.

9/12/95

11

30

The factory with a turnover of Rs. 250 crores was completely gutted.

Police felt it was due to negligence.

Management felt it was sabotage.

3.8.2     Definition

Industrial accidents may occur as a result of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, forest fires etc., however, most accidents occur as a result of human activity leading to accidental or deliberate harm. Although there are a number of different definitions of these accidents, the most practical appears to be as follows : any incident connected with an uncontrolled development (such as leak, fire and /or explosion) of an industrial activity involving a serious immediate or delayed hazard to man and / or the environment. This is summarised in table XVIII below.

Table XVIII: Definition of  industrial accidents

Type of  accident

Examples

Natural

Earthquakes, forest fires

Man made :

Accident or error

Uncontrolled release of hazardous substances

fire/explosion.

Mechanical failure : operational deficiency, design, construction, installation deficiency.

During transportation : collision / overturn.

Deliberate

Misuse of or failure to control hazardous material.

Arson / malicious act.

War.

(Source :  Natural Risk and Civil Protection, Ed. by T. Horlick-Jones, A. Amendola, Casale, R, E&FN Spon, London, 1995)

Industrial hazards are most likely due to accidents occurring during chemical processing, manufacturing, storage, transport and from the disposal of toxic waste as described in the table below :

 

Chemical Process

Examples of potentially hazardous circumstances

Manufacturing,  processing

In the workplace, industrial plant, manufacturing site, higher education facility and research labs.

Storage

In warehouses, chemical stores, silos, storage tanks.

Transport

On the public highway, railway, waterway, shipping and air freight.

Freight handling areas of  transport systems, such as harbour, airport or station.

Waste

Disposal of potentially toxic waste by dumping or incineration, knowledge of toxic waste and landfill sites.

For the purpose of  preparation of an emergency action plan for the state of Maharashtra, the focus would be on off site industrial accidents. The Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health maintains records of industrial accidents in Maharashtra. By definition, however, these records include accidents due to chemical incidents as well as mechanical. Records of injuries to  workers  while on duty, such as fall from height etc. are also included.

In view of the fact that the focus of the present plan is on developing emergency action plans for off site accidents, the available data from the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health was  screened to select only accidents that have occurred  due to explosions, fires and gassing in select industries viz., manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, rubber, coal, petroleum and non-metallic mineral petroleum. These three causative factors and the specific industries have been selected, since they have the maximum potential for significant off-site impacts.

3.8.3     Reasons for Accidents

The Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health is compiling the records of industrial accidents, year wise.  Compiled information for various divisions in the state was available in 1995. This accident record was screened to select the statistics with respect to fatal and non-fatal accidents in certain categories of industries. It must be emphasized at this juncture that this does not providea comprehensive picture of the vulnerability of locations or the type of industries which are potentially hazardous. However, this provides some preliminary information on the likely hazard potential due to specific industries,  causative factors,  as well as indicates the likely areas in the state which may be vulnerable to industrial hazards. A more detailed information database is necessary, which is being collected presently for each district.

Table XIX    shows the number of accidents recorded in industries involving manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, rubber, coal,  petroleum and non-metallic mineral petroleum.


Table XIX: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents* recorded in 1995 for specific categories of industries.

Name of Office

Category of Industries**

 

30

31

32

 

 

F

NF

F

NF

F

NF

Total

Mumbai

4

235

9

369

1

131

749

Thane

8

221

6

514

9

273

1031

Pune

3

190

-

154

-

43

390

Nashik

-

315

3

92

-

1

411

Kolhapur

2

58

-

22

1

12

95

Aurangabad

-

18

14

39

-

24

95

Nagpur

2

21

-

25

2

28

78

Raigad

7

54

1

11

2

46

121

Total

26

1112

33

1226

15

558

2970

F - Fatal; NF - Non-Fatal                                                      

* The fatal and non-fatal accidents shown in this table are only those recorded due to  explosions, fires and gassing.                                                                    

** Category of Industries are :

Industry No.30                      Manufacture of chemical and chemical products

Industry No.31                      Manufacture of rubber, coal and petroleum 

Industry No.32                      Manufacture of non-metallic mineral petroleum

As seen from table,  the maximum number of  accidents in all the selected categories of industries are recorded in Thane and Mumbai. The industry category showing maximum number of accidents and fatalities is the manufacture of rubber, coal and petroleum.

Nashik, Mumbai and Thane divisions have recorded  the maximum number of  accidents in industries manufacturing chemical  and chemical  products. The number of  accidents recorded in the manufacture of  non-metallic mineral petroleum are almost half  of those recorded in the other two categories.

In order to understand the hazard potential of each of the selected categories  of industry, a list of fatal and non-fatal accidents was compiled. Table XX shows the record of accidents for industries  in the manufacture of chemical and chemical products.

Table XX: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents* recorded in 1995 in the industries belonging to category of Manufacture of Chemical and Chemical Products

(Industry No. 30)                                                                    

Name of Office

Cause of Accident **

 

118

119

120

 

F

NF

F

NF

F

NF

Bombay

-

-

1

1

-

-

Thane

5

-

-

-

2

-

Pune

-

-

-

-

-

-

Nashik

-

-

-

3

-

1

Kolhapur

1

-

-

-

-

2

Aurangabad

-

-

-

-

-

-

Nagpur

-

-

-

-

2

-

Raigad

1

-

-

-

1

3

Total

7

-

1

4

5

6

F - Fatal; NF - Non-Fatal                                       

* The fatal and non-fatal accidents shown in this table are only those recorded due to  Explosions, Fires, Gassing.

** Causes of Accidents are :

No. 118                Explosions due to electricity, fire works, excessive pressure of      steam,  air, gas, vapour etc.,

No. 119                fires include backfire in boilers and others miscellaneous               

No. 120                Gassing                                                                      

The data in table  shows that the maximum number of accidents have occurred due to gassing. Raigad division shows the maximum number of accidents due to gassing in industries manufacturing chemical and chemical products.  In this category of industrie,s accidents due to explosions were maximum at Thane while fire related accidents at Nashik.

Table XXI  shows the recorded accidents in 1995, in the category of industries termed Manufacture of  rubber, coal and petroleum. 

Table XXI: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents* recorded in 1995 in the industries belonging to the category of Manufacture of Rubber, Coal and Petroleum

(Industry No. 31)                                                                                   

Name of Office

Cause of Accident **

 

118

119

120

 

F

NF

F

NF

F

NF

Bombay

-

-

1

3

5

-

Thane

-

-

-

-

-

-

Pune

-

-

-

-

-

-

Nashik

-

-

-

-

-

-

Kolhapur

-

10

-

-

-

-

Aurangabad

13

29

-

-

-

-

Nagpur

-

-

-

-

-

-

Raigad

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total

13

39

1

3

5

-

F - Fatal; NF - Non-Fatal                                       

* The fatal and non-fatal accidents shown in this table are only those recorded due to  explosions, fires, gassing.

** Causes of accidents are :

No. 118                Explosions due to electricity, fire works, excessive pressure of      steam and air, gas, vapour etc., Miscellaneous

No. 119                fires include backfire in boilers and others;                                   

No. 120                Gassing                                                                      

As shown in table XXI , although Thane and Raigad divisions have the largest major industrial belts  in the state, there are no recorded accidents in 1995, in these two divisions. Aurangabad division, however, shows the maximum number of  accidents both, fatal and non-fatal, due to explosions. Additional information on, distribution of types of industries in the state would be required to make a more qualified assessment of the results. This information would be obtained through the district level data which is being elucidated from the district collectors.

Industries belonging to the category of manufacture of  non-metallic mineral petroleum have not recorded accidents in any of the divisions during 1995, except in Thane where two non- fatal accidents have been recorded due to explosions and fires. This data is represented in table XXII .

Table XXII: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents* recorded in 1995 in the industries belonging to the category of Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Petroleum

(Industry No. 32)                                                                                    

Name of Office

Cause of Accident **

 

118

119

120

 

F

NF

F

NF

F

NF

Bombay

-

-

-

-

-

-

Thane

-

2

-

2

-

-

Pune

-

-

-

-

-

-

Nashik

-

-

-

-

-

-

Kolhapur

-

-

-

-

-

-

Aurangabad

-

-

-

-

-

-

Nagpur

-

-

-

-

-

-

Raigad

-

-

-

-

-

-

Total

-

2

-

2

-

-

F - Fatal; NF - Non-Fatal                                       

* The fatal and non-fatal accidents shown in this table are only those recorded due to  explosions, fires, gassing.

** Causes of accidents are :

No. 118                Explosions due to electricity, fire works, excessive pressure of      steam and air, gas, vapour etc., miscellaneous

No. 119                fires include backfire in boilers and others                                    

No. 120                Gassing                                                                      

In addition to the data provided above, a review of the causes of off-site accidents that have been reported in Maharashtra state as shown in Table XXII, indicates  that a large number of them are due to negligence of the management with respect to safety of equipment, processes and storage. This is compounded by faulty equipment and poor housekeeping. All these factors make a number of the industries, especially chemical and petrochemical industries extremely hazard prone and the surrounding environment vulnerable to industrial accidents. Two cases in point to illustrate this are discussed in Boxes 7 and 8.

3.8.4     Vulnerable locations

The types of industries prone to accidents are those involved in the manufacture of :

·        Chemical and chemical products

·        Rubber, coal and petroleum

·        Non-Metallic Mineral Petroleum

As seen from the  data,  the most vulnerable areas are Thane, Mumbai, Pune  and Nashik.

The causes of accidents as recorded in these industries are due to :

·        Explosions resulting from  electricity, fire, excessive pressure of steam and air, gas, vapour etc;

·        Fires including backfire in boilers and others                                        ;

·        Gassing                                                                            

Raigad division shows the maximum number of accidents due to gassing.  Explosions were maximum at Thane and Aurangabad, while fire related accidents were most at Nashik.

In terms of the occurrence of accidents with potential off site consequences, the vulnerable  locations are  Mumbai, Thane, Raigad, Nashik  and Pune districts. The types of industries in these locations which have a high potential for accidents, are those involving manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, rubber, coal and petroleum and non-metallic mineral petroleum. The given map  details the MIDC industrial area in the state along with the level of development.

Box-7 - Gas leakage due to negligence during storage.

Source : Indian Express, 5/3/85

Ammonia gas leaked from the RCF plant at Chembur for three days from March 2-4, 1985.  The leak, detected in the Chembur area, happened when the cooling tower fan became faulty and  conditions of   the ammonia storage tanks in the Trombay complex  were improper.

Subsequent to the leakage, pressure from environmentalists and local residents resulted in installation of pollution control devices  and safety measures  by RCF.

Box - 8 - Gas leakage due to negligence during storage.

Source : Indian Express, 9/12/95

A bomb blast in the chilling room of the Garware polyester unit at Aurangabad resulted in the death of nine persons and injury to 30 others. The chilling room was used to store molten polymer prior to processing into film.

Safety negligence on the part of the company management was considered to be the reason behind the accident.  However, the company management stated that the boilers where the accident took place, were extremely  safe and  the  least vulnerable area of the factory.

**Resources available :

3.8.5     Action Plans

Action Plans have been developed by the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health and a number of district authorities for off-site emergencies for the following industrial areas :

·        The Action Plan for Disaster Control in Pune district.

·        The Disaster Management Plan for Hazardous Factories in Thane District

·        The Disaster Management Plan for Bombay, Chembur and Agra Road areas only.

·        The Disaster Control Plan for  Khopoli Raigad - Dist.

·        The Disaster Control Plan for  MIDC-Lote Parshuram, Ratnagiri Dist.

·        The Disaster Control Plan for  MIDC - Taloja, Raigad Dist.

·        The Disaster Control Plan for  MIDC - Roha, Raigad Dist.

·        The Disaster Control Plan for  Rasayani Patalganga, Raigad-Dist.

Typically, two types of fact sheets  have been used in these plans viz.,

(I) Fact sheet for each chemical compound used or manufactured in the industries in the area; and

(II) Fact sheet with information about each industry in the district.

A review of the  various plans was carried out to assess the  following :

·        To ascertain the adequacy of the formats used.

Þ    To collect information about the available infrastructure to combat emergencies due to industrial / chemical hazards.

Þ    To assess the level of preparedness of emergency services.

Þ    To collect and compile information about the industrial units in the district in an attempt to assess the potential of occurrence of chemical and industrial hazards  in the areas covered in each of the plans.

·        Recommend any additional information requirements or changes in formats used, so as to formulate a comprehensive action oriented plan.

The review showed that a generic type of fact sheet is used in all these plans as shown below :

Fact sheet on Chemicals

The typical generic format used is shown here :

Name of the Chemical

I. General Properties

·        Physical appearance

·        Odour

·        Colour

·        Chemical  formula

II. Physical properties

·        Flash point

·        Melting point

·        Boiling point

·        Vapour density

III. Toxicity - In terms of Threshold Limit Value (TLV)

IV. Fire hazard - Flammability

V. Explosion hazard - Ignitability

VI. Disaster hazard -

VII. Caution - While handling the substance

VIII. Emergency control methods - In case of spillage / fire / leakage

IX. Personal protective equipment required while handling the compound.

X. First aid treatment  - In the event of exposure to the compound.

Fact Sheet on the Industry

This sheet is called the chemical fact sheet and is compiled for each industry.

The format used was follows :

I. Factory identity

II. Address

III. Location

IV. Contact persons

V. Principle activity

VI. Inventory of the hazardous chemicals

Name of the Chemical

Quantity stored

Storage method

Quantity of chemical in the processing system

VII. Consequences of major hazards from storage for each chemical

VIII. Consequences of major hazards from processing


IX. Physical range of consequences

Storage

Manufacturing

The area of influence not very clearly defined for each chemical 

The area of influence not very clearly defined for each process

X. Emergency actions required within 5 minutes of occurrence of accident.

XI. Emergency actions required within 15 minutes of accident.

XII. Action required

·        Fire brigade - action required to be taken by the fire brigade including the names and telephone numbers of contact persons.

·        Police service - action required to be taken by the police, including the names and telephone numbers of contact persons.

·        Medical Services - action required to be taken by the medical services, including the names and telephone numbers of contact persons and hospitals.

XIII. Response time - a general statement regarding the need for immediate response on occurrence of a chemical accident.

XIV. Other information - general precautionary measures to be adopted during the emergency. This is chemical specific.

In addition to the fact sheets, the following information is also a part of the action plans.

Information regarding fire services, police, emergency health services, offsite transport for evacuation of  people in the area of influence of the accident. 

·        Names and addresses of contact persons in each of these agencies is provided.

·        Action plans for each level of personnel of the fire, police and medical  services to handle emergencies during an industrial hazard / accident.

Maps have been provided in these plans showing the location of industries, medical, fire and police services.  A  list of the hazardous factories located in each area are also given.

In addition, the following information is also provided :

·        An exhaustive list  of hazardous chemicals used in these industries is provided together with a classification that indicates those with  high and low disaster potential.

·        The symptoms exhibited due to acute and sub-acute poisoning by these chemicals.

·        The antidotes and line of treatment to be adopted to alleviate the symptoms.

In addition to emergency action plans developed by the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Heath, some industries have also developed on site emergency action plans. A comprehensive plan of this type was developed by NOCIL in  1992. 

NOCIL’s on-site emergency action plan consists of two parts.  Part 1 is an abridged version of the plan, forming the basis for efficient functioning of the plan. This section provides information on the types of emergencies envisaged, the action to be taken, the role of the various personnel, alarm systems present and how they should be used, duties of the emergency leader, instructions  etc. This is simple and is targetted to be understood by all the employees.

Part II, on the other hand,  gives detailed descriptions and is to be used more as a training material for managing emergencies. In this section, details of the emergency services available, the emergency procedures that should be adopted for various types of  chemical accidents, the emergency equipment to be used, storage details of the various chemicals used on the premises and the action to be taken by the various personnel  are provided.

A third part to this plan includes an off-site emergency action plan. This plan is to assist the local district authorities to deal with off site emergencies. It was proposed to integrate this plan  with the Thane district disaster management plan  and the emergency action plans developed by other industries in the area. Here again, the roles of the various factory personnel and emergency services as well as their co-ordination with local district authorities are defined.

3.8.6     Emergency Response Centres

Apart from these district plans, emergency response centres (ERC) have also been established in some of the industrial areas in the state. The Thane-Belapur Industries Association operates and manages a fully government owned  emergency response centre at Thane-Belapur. MIDC provided the investment for setting up of this facility to as a part of the disaster management plan for the industrial belt.

A second emergency response centre has started functioning since August 1996, at the Hindustan Organics Limited premises . The Patalganga Industrial Complex, where the ERC is located,  is one of the four industrial areas that had been identified by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, govt. of India. This is a joint venture of  MOEF and DISH ( state government)  to be operated by the industries located in this region.

This ERC  will respond to emergencies due to hazardous chemicals within a radius of 20 km and for factories located in the Patalganga - Rasayani industrial belt. Presently the ERC is being housed at the fire station in HOCL. Operating procedures for telephone operator, duty manager, fire and safety officers have been developed. A format for recording of the emergencies has also been developed.  An inventory of the emergency facilities, such as fire services, ambulances, essential medical services, breathing apparatus etc., available with the member industries has also been prepared.   

3.8.7     Conclusions

·        The district emergency  plans require to be updated in terms of the status of the emergency services and their communication details. 

·        The plans were prepared between 1986-88. There is a need to derive an easily implementable action plan from updated versions of such reports so that they can be readily used as emergency actions during an industrial hazard - more of a What to do and When? type of document.  

·        The action plan should be made available in a comprehensive, action oriented, accessible form e.g., in a searchable electronic form which can be readily updated. This is of relevance especially for updating the names and telephone numbers of contact persons at the various emergency services.

·        Prediction studies on the impact of industrial hazards and accidents may be mapped to indicate the area of influence and the population affected.

·        The use of a tool such as geographic information system (GIS) would be extremely useful in this respect.

·        Meteorological information and topographical features of the area should also be provided since these would be useful in predicting the area affected by a chemical hazard.

·        Need for detailed maps, probably for each industrial zone showing :

Þ    the location of industries, especially the hazardous units, in each area or industrial zone of the district;

Þ    the land use pattern in the area ;

Þ    density of population surrounding the various industries, with special reference to sensitive population e.g., hospitals, schools etc.;

Þ    area of influence and population likely to be impacted due to an industrial hazard;

Þ    location of emergency services such, as fire fighting, police and medical vis-à-vis the industries;

Þ    likely locations for setting up relief camps such as schools, community buildings etc., during an emergency; and

Þ    communication routes such as roads, railway lines, stations and airports etc.

·        A separate manual, delinked from the action plan, should be developed detailing,

Þ    the properties of the various chemicals with potential hazards that serve as  raw materials, the intermediate products, final products and waste products.

Þ    the symptoms resulting from exposure to these hazardous chemicals; and     

Þ    the antidotes to the injuries caused by the hazardous chemicals.

·        This manual should be provided to each industry and as well as emergency services such as police, fire brigade and  medical  services. The manual should be used to create general public awareness regarding  immediate first aid measures to be taken in the event of an accident.

·        The fact sheets on the industry should provide information on the hazard potential of the chemicals and processes used.

·        Information should be provided on the potential hazard of not only the raw materials but also on,

Þ    intermediate products,

Þ    final products and

Þ    waste.

·        The layout maps for each factory need to be regularly updated.

·        All action plans should have an organization chart showing coordination between the essential services as shown in the action plan for Bombay, Chembur and Agra Road areas. Coordination between the fire, medical, police and transport services with the air force / army / navy also needs to be included.

·        The formats developed in the Chembur, Bombay and Agra Road action plan for reporting an emergency are extremely useful

Þ    to maintain a history and record of the accidents in individual factories in the area;

Þ    in assessing the level of preparedness of the emergency services; and

Þ    additional requirements of facilities to deal with emergencies in future.

·        In addition to government initiatives, industries such as NOCIL have also developed comprehensive on-site action plans as well as off - site emergency action plans. The latter are to be integrated with the district level action plans.

·        These plans, developed to respond to industrial disasters in various districts of Maharashtra, catalysed the enactment of the Manufacture and Storage of Hazardous Goods, Rules which mandates the  preparation of an on-site disaster management plan under the overall guidance of municipal commissioner or district collector.

·        MOEF has issued a notification dated Aug 1, 1996, for setting up of state, district and local level committees for preparation of “Rules on Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents”.    

·        There is a need to identify district wise, the possible industrial and chemical hazards, the agencies  presently dealing with the management of these hazards, resources available, and present level of preparedness. Based on this information, standard operating procedures (SOPs)  may be formulated in responding to the hazards. Detailed district level information towards this end, is being collected from the district collectors.

4.     Vulnerability Analysis for the State of Maharashtra

“Vulnerability analysis is a process which results in the understanding of the types and levels of exposure of persons, property and the environment to the effects of identified hazards at a particular time.” (Terry Jeggle and Rob Stephenson, Concepts of Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis)

From the vulnerability assessment models given in Appendix VI, it is clear that information on certain key parameters are essential in conducting a vulnerability analysis. These models permit a micro level analysis. However, for the state level exercise, which is essentially intended to evolve a more generic state response, these models may not offer a very appropriate framework. So, while recognising the need for micro level analysis and recommending the application of these models, possibly at the district level to evolve DDMAP, for the state level exercise we intend to concentrate on certain key qualitative and quantitative  parameters and their contribution to  vulnerability.

4.1     Economy

1.  Economy plays a key role in increasing or decreasing  vulnerability of a population to natural phenomena. An analysis of the occupational  activities of the people in the state reveals, that the economy is by and large concentrated on agriculture or agriculture related activities. According to data available from the 1991 census, around 61 per cent of workers are engaged in the primary sector. (see Table XXIII below). The percentage of cultivators and agricultural workers in the state amounts to 59.6 per cent. It may be noted that women account for a majority of work force in the rural sector,  particularly in cultivation and agricultural labour. The disaster impact, therefore, will be more severe on and directly affect women employment and wage labour in the rural areas. The situation will be similar for male workers in urban areas. The differential vulnerability of male and female workers in urban and rural areas,  therefore, will have to be taken into account in the management of disasters.

Table XXIII: Percentage of main workers in various sectors to the total main workers

 

 

Cultivation

Agricultural Labour

House Industry

Others *

 

Persons

32.81 %

26.91 %

3.07 %

37.21 %

Total

Males

29.85 %

18.75 %

3.27 %

48.13 %

 

Females

38.87 %

43.59 %

2.65 %

14.89 %

 

Persons

46.33 %

36.80 %

2.40 %

14.47 %

Rural

Males

47.35 %

28.68 %

2.83 %

21.14 %

 

Females

44.85 %

48.63 %

1.78 %

4.74 %

 

Persons

2.91 %

5.05 %

4.54 %

87.50 %

Urban

Males

2.65 %

3.33 %

3.95 %

90.07 %

 

Females

4.30 %

14.41 %

7.69 %

73.60 %


* Other workers include industrial, plantation, business, commerce, and government employees.

As floods and cyclones have a devastating effect on agriculture, the primary sector comes under serious threat. Land owners suffer during these events as crops can be damaged; soil erosion leads to the lessening of soil fertility.

The denudation of land is one of the most harmful effects of flood, as the land is then rendered useless for cultivation for the season, thereby directly affecting the marginal (below one hectare) and small (between one to two hectares) farmers  depending entirely on agriculture for their livelihood.  Labourers suffer from loss of livelihood and employment. Although the percentage of marginal and small farmers in Maharashtra is lower than the all India average, the state economy  is under threat with 34.58 per cent marginal and 28.80 small farmers, who would be vulnerable.  

Table XXIV: Number of Marginal and Small Farmers

Number of Holdings (00)

As percentage of total

Marginal

Small

Marginal

Small

India

621100

199700

59.0

19.0

Maharashtra

32748

27276

34.58

28.80


2.  The distribution of industries in selected  states  for manufacturing and other units is given in the table below.

Table XXV: Industry by Industry Number of Registered working factories -1989

States

Percentage of  manufacturing units

Percentage of other units

Percentage share of all industries to all India

Andhra Pradesh

99.3

0.7

10.30

Goa

93.5

6.5

0.12

Gujarat

99.0

1.0

6.98

Karnataka

98.2

1.8

5.06

Kerala

99.6

0.4

5.86

Madhya Pradesh

98.0

2.0

4.53

Maharashtra

94.2

5.8

11.80

Punjab

97.6

2.4

5.4

West Bengal

95.1

4.9

4.46

It may be noted that the percentage share of all industries to all India is significantly higher, that is, 11.8 per cent for Maharashtra as compared to other states, whereas the difference between  manufacturing and other units across the states is not very significant. Therefore,  urban Maharashtra demonstrates a high degree of industrialisation, provides   significant employment opportunities and contributes a major share to the national economy. But at the same time, indicates vulnerability to urban disasters like industrial hazards, earthquakes and  fires.

3.   Social science research shows that diversified economies are more sustainable in case of disasters.  In Maharashtra ,as  people are involved in many economic activities, the economy is able to sustain itself  even if some activities are affected because of a disaster.

Also, recent years have seen a percentage increase in the number of workers as well as a shift of the work force from the primary sectors to the other sectors, thereby indicating the development of the economy in the right direction.

4.2     Poverty

1.      Disaster studies point to a direct relation  between poverty and vulnerability to disasters. The people worst hit during a disaster are the poor with limited access to food and nutrition. The increase in  disaster potential is one result of the cycle of poverty. The roots of poverty, which are also the predominant roots of vulnerability, are the increased marginalisation of the population caused by a high birthrate and the lack of resources to meet the basic human needs of an expanding population. (birth and death rate can be given)

As in the State of Maharashtra, as per 1987 data,  29.2 per cent of people are below poverty line (36.7 per cent rural and 17.0 per cent urban). This becomes the major  group that is vulnerable to any type of disasters situation. The inter-state comparison shows that the disparity between urban and rural percentage is more in   Maharashtra. Thus, rural Maharashtra shows a higher degree of poverty linked vulnerability. The nature of urban agglomerations and concentration of the poor in these select location, restore make certain urban centres more vulnerable such as MMR, Pune, Nashik, Nagpur regions.

Table XXVI: Population below poverty line -- 1988

States

Percentage  of population below poverty line

Rural

Urban

Total (all persons)

Andhra Pradesh

33.8

26.1

31.7

Goa

N.A

N.A

N.A

Gujarat

21.2

12.9

18.4

Karnataka

35.9

24.2

32.1

Kerala

16.4

19.3

17.0

Madhya Pradesh

41.5

21.3

36.7

Maharashtra

36.7

17.0

29.2

Punjab

7.2

7.2

7.2

West Bengal

30.3

20.7

27.6

All India

33.4

20.1

29.9

2.  Poverty leads to marginalisation of the population.  The groups of landless labourers, unskilled workmen, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and especially women  in these groups, are  marginalised .  These are the groups mainly occupying the non-habitable areas, hill - side slopes, slums, settlements near the storm-water drainage systems etc.  These areas themselves are risk prone, and the population staying here are, therefore, all the more vulnerable.

3.  Education is a basic requirement which helps  improve the coping capacities of the population and reduce disaster impact. The 1991 census shows that the literacy rate for Maharashtra is 64. 9 per cent (see table) which is higher than the literacy rate for the country.

 

Table XXVII: Distribution of Literates by sex and location

Total Literates (000)

Male (000)

Female (000)

Rural Literates

22,165 (49.9 %)

14,105 (63.64 %)

8060 (36.36 %)

Urban Literates

20,774 (68.1)

12,174 (58.6 %)

8600 (41.4 %)

Total Literates

42,939 (64.9%)

26,279 (61.2 %)

16,660 (38.8 %)

Note : Literate rate relates to literate population as a percentage of total population aged seven years and above.

Yet this is  no consolation   as one   finds that in Mumbai   alone, more than 400,000 children are non-school going or drop-outs. The state level data shows a student teacher ratio of 36:1  (upto secondary level), which is quite satisfactory at the face value. However, if one differentiates  the location of schools, that is, urban, rural and tribal, one finds that in certain urban locations the ratio is as high as 15:1 and in the rural/tribal  areas, it is as low as 60:1. This has implications for enrollment as well as  drop-out rate (59.87 % by standard VIII).

4.  Although, the entire state is covered through  primary health centres, a more clear statement on its coverage and effectiveness would help in  establishing its relevance for the  population, in terms of vulnerability  reduction. Currently,   in Maharashtra, the  Bed   Population Ratio is 1 : 683 and the  Doctor Person ratio is  1 :  1750. Again, as seen in the case of school education, these ratios are highly deceptive when examined in the context of location. Apart from the total number of  posts for medical practitioners in health system, one has to also look at the number of vacancies and non-field posts. This is specifically important in case of tribal and rural areas, where a number of posts are lying vacant in the absence of either the appointment or the postings. Also, the situation of stocks of medicines and usables is reported to be inadequate. The rural and tribal areas, therefore, exhibit a high degree of vulnerability due to  the absence of adequate staff manning the services.

4.3     Social Structure

1.      A number of sociological studies have mentioned caste-class nexus in Indian society.  The economic class also represents the social caste of the people, which decides their status in the society.  Thus, most of the poor happen to be from scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward castes, making this group more vulnerable to disasters. The state of Maharashtra has 11.09 per cent SC and 9.27   per cent ST population as per the 1991 census, with certain districts such as Thane, Nasik, Dhule, Gadchiroli, having a concentration of these population.  One finds that only 45.93 per cent of the SCs and 29.33 per cent of STs are literate. This is much lower than the literacy percentage of the general population, thereby increasing the vulnerability of this group. Further, this caste and class factor has to be taken into consideration in rehabilitation work and mitigation strategies as seen in the Latur earthquake, where initially there were reservations against the mixing of different castes.

2.      Women   generally have a lower status in an orthodox Indian  society. The division of labour, opportunities,  wage returns and participation in decision-making reflect the consequences of the lower status of women, thus making them a vulnerable group. The literacy rate for women is lesser than that of men (52.3 per cent as against 76.6 per cent) as also the working population of  women (33 per cent as against 52 per cent males).  This makes  women  more vulnerable. In the absence of an opportunity to participate in critical decisions,  both in mitigation and rehabilitation, this vulnerability takes a serious form.

4.4     Urbanisation

1.      Urbanization increases vulnerability because of high rates of incoming migration and because of high density of population. Unabated  urbanization  results in higher vulnerability for these already vulnerable.   As per the 1991 population census, the urban population in Maharashtra (3.05 crore) was 38.7 per cent of the total population. This percentage is much higher than that of India (25.7 per cent). The proportion of urban population has been continuously increasing in the last three decades. Mumbai alone has 32.50 per cent of the estimated urban  population of the state. Although, one finds a higher degree of industrialisation in Maharashtra, the state does not necessary rate very high in urbanisation. However, if one looks at urban density, Maharashtra shows that the density has increased from 3,735 in 1981, to  5,180 persons per sq. Km in 1991. It is this high density and the rate of increase, that adds to the vulnerability of urban population.  The density for all of Maharashtra is just 256 persons per sq. Km, indicating that the density for rural Maharashtra is much lower.

Table XXVIII: Urbanisation and Density for select states

States

Urbanisation (per cent)

Urban Density (persons/sq. km)

1981

1991

1981

1991

Andhra Pradesh

23.3

26.8

3,086

4,403

Goa

32.0

41.0

1,673

2,485

Gujarat

31.1

34.4

2,225

2,973

Karnataka

28.9

30.9

2,913

3,761

Kerala

18.7

26.4

2,668

4,293

Madhya Pradesh

19.9

23.2

2,170

3,146

Maharashtra

35.0

38.7

3,735

5,180

Punjab

27.7

29.7

3,875

5,003

West Bengal

26.5

27.4

5,460

7,038

All India (average)

23.3

25.7

3,009

4,098

2.     Urbanisation leads to more incoming migration. According to the 1981 census, there were 46.78 lakh immigrants in the state, accounting for seven per cent of the population. The inter-state migration rates for Maharashtra between 1981 and 1991 for males and females respectively, is assumed to be 3.20 and 2.30. More than 50 per cent of total migrants (23 lakhs as per 1981 census) had immigrated into Mumbai.  Immigrants accounted for 28 per cent of the population of Mumbai in 1981.  West Bengal and Maharashtra indicate the maximum influx of population from the other states, possibly for employment and education.

Table XXIX : Interstate migration 1971-81 for select states

States

Net migrants (000)

% share to gross migrant

Immigrants

Out-migrants

1971

1981

1971

1981

1971

1981

Andhra Pradesh

-315

-438

41.3

40.2

58.7

59.8

Goa

-12

60

47.4

60.4

52.6

39.6

Gujarat

79

238

52.2

55.0

47.8

45.0

Karnataka

67

162

51.5

52.6

48.5

47.4

Kerala

-672

-771

22.3

24.2

77.7

75.8

Madhya Pradesh

1130

867

68.3

61.2

31.7

38.8

Maharashtra

2485

3178

76.1

75.7

23.9

24.3

Punjab

473

429

58.3

57.0

41.7

43.0

West Bengal

4552

4621

87.2

85.3

12.8

14.7

The increasing influx of poor immigrants to the state adds pressure on the existing infrastructure  and land resources. As the cities and towns expand, the land  serviced  by utilities and  safe for development is in high demand for both housing and industry. Thus the prices rise. Low-income families in search of land for housing, must settle in areas of low value. The slum population, therefore, increases and these become more vulnerable to disasters. There are approximately 2,500 recorded slum pockets in Mumbai accommodating 50 per cent of Mumbai’s population. Destruction of natural holding ponds for monsoon drainage, is a direct result of unplanned settlements and indiscriminate housing,  and in turn, brings newer areas under the risk of flooding, as can  be seen in Mumbai.

4.5     Infrastructure

The vulnerability of the state can be examined in terms of the nature of infrastructure and its coverage. In the context of the state economy and the extent of industrialisation, certain infrastructural provisions assume importance. These include irrigation, power, communication, transport, sewage and drinking water supply. Effort, therefore, has been made to examine the status of these infrastructure at the state level.

4.5.1     Irrigation

The map showing the rivers and dams has already been given in section III (Earthquakes). However, the vulnerability of dams and irrigation systems with respect to other disasters can be seen from the following :

Table XXX: Potential effects of natural hazards on water supply systems

       Natural hazards     Components              Effect                               Consequences

       High winds        Reservoirs                   Wave surcharge,   Scour downstream,

                                                                    overtopping of                  endangered dams

                                                                    dams

                                 Overhead cables         Blown down                     Power and telecoms

                                                                                                            failure

        Storm surge        Treatment works          Flooded                           Close down

                                  Pumping station           Flooded                           Close down

         Heavy rain         Reservoirs                   Overtopping of                 Possible dam failure

                                                                     dams

                                  Rivers                         Riverine floods                 Difficult treatment

                                  River offtake                Scour                                  Loss of source

                                  Treatment works         Flooding                           Close down

                                  Pumping stations          Flooding                          Close down

          Earthquake       Reservoirs                   Structural failure               Loss of supply,

                                                                      of dams                           flooding

                                                                                                            damage downstream

                                  Ground-water              Liquefaction of                 Fracture of wells,

                                                                     deposits                           supply failure

                                  Transmission                Line fracture                     Supply cut

                                  mains, aqueducts,

                                  canals

                                  Treatment works         Damaged                         Loss of operation,

                                                                                                            reduced output, close

                                                                                                            down

                                  Service reservoirs      Damaged                           Loss of storage

                                  Pumping stations          Damaged                         Lost or reduced

                                  below and above                                                 capacity

                                  ground

                                  Distribution                  Pipe fracture                    Burst, increased

                                  system                                                                leakage through

                                                                                                            pipes, loss of storage

     Landslide              Reservoirs                 Overtopping or                  Loss of supply,

                                                                   failure of dams                    flooding

                                                                                                            damage downstream

                                  River offtake              River diversion                   Loss of source

                                  Rivers                        High sediment                    Turbidity

                                  Transmission              Fracture by                        Supply cut

                                  mains, aqueducts,      ground movement

                                  canals

                                  Service reservoirs    Damaged                             Loss of storage

                                  Treatment works,     Damaged by                       Lost or reduced

                                  pumping stations        ground movement               capacity

4.5.2     Power Installations

The map showing the location of power stations in the state is given below. It is necessary to examine the vulnerability of these installations with respect to different disasters. 

Table XXXI: Potential effects of natural hazards on electricity generation and distribution

            Natural hazard    Component             Effect                         Consequence

            High winds          Transmission            Collapse                     Loss of supply

                                       towers and lines

                                       Generating               Damage and               Loss of supply

                                       stations, cooling       partial collapse

                                       towers, sub-

                                       stations

                                       Distribution lines      Collapse                     Loss of supply

                                       (overhead)

            Sea surge            Generating               Equipment                  Shut down

                                       stations, other          flooded

                                       facilities

                                       Distribution cables   Flooded                     Loss of supply

                                       (underground)

            Heavy rain          Reservoirs               Overtopping of           Possible progressive

                                                                      dams                          failure

                                       Generating               Flooded                     Loss of supply

                                       stations, other

                                       facilities

          Earthquake            Dams                    Damage from             Loss of supply

                                                                   ground failure and

                                                                   motion

                                      Generating             Damage from             Loss of supply

                                      stations, sub-         ground failure and

                                      stations, other        motion, e.g. isolators,

                                      facilities                  equipment support

                                                                   frames

                                     Distribution lines      Collapse of lines         Local loss of

                                     (overhead)              and pole mounted       supply

                                                                   transformers

          Landslide            Dams                      Failure from               Loss of supply

                                                                   overtopping

                                    Generating               Failure by ground       Loss of supply

                                    stations, other          movement

                                    facilities

4.5.3     Communication

Table XXXII: Potential effects of natural hazards on communication systems

Natural hazard         Component           Effect                           Consequence

       High winds       Radio and TV       Disorientation of           Disruption to or loss of

                               towers                   aerials                           transmission capability

                                                            Collapse                       Complete loss of transmission

                               Overhead cables   Collapse of poles          High Fault rate

                                                            Severing of cables         Loss of service

       Earthquake       Radio and TV       Damage/collapse          Complete loss of transmission

                               towers

                               Overhead cables   Collapse of poles,         High Fault rate

                                                            severing of cables         Loss of service

                               Underground         Minor quake:                High Fault rate

                               cables                   little damage

                                                            Major quake:                Complete loss of service

                                                            severed cables

                                                            and broken ducts

                               Telephone             Minor quake:                Temporary loss of service

                               exchanges             dislocation of

                                                            printed circuit boards

                                                             Major quake:               Long-term loss of service

                                                             collapse of building

       Heavy rain        Radio and TV       Interference with           Temporary loss of service

                               towers                  signal path

                               Underground        Flooded                        High fault rate

                               cables

                               Telephone             Flooded                        Complete loss of service

                               exchanges             Flooding and                 Long-term complete loss

                                                            major damage               of service

       Storm surge      Radio and TV     Flood damage to             Complete loss of

                               towers                radio equipment              transmission

                               Overhead           Collapse of poles,           Loss of service

                               cables                 severing of cables

                               Underground      Flooding                         High fault rate

                               cables

                               Telephone           Flooding and                   Complete loss of service

                               exchanges           major damage

 

4.5.4     Warning Systems

An effective warning system which communicates risk of an impending disaster to the population, reduces the  vulnerability of the population.  Thus, threat perception and effective warning systems become important tools to be discussed, which define the degree of vulnerability.

Warning messages are generally communicated through mass media (radio, television and press releases). Weather bulletins are issued by the Colaba observatory under the Indian Meteorological Department. Besides sending regular messages to All India Radio, the Colaba observatory sends alert message to the chief secretary and the district collectors 48 hours in advance, about any depression in the Arabian Sea.  Thereafter, the said observatory sends warnings depending on the weather situation.

Disaster prediction varies for different events.  An event like an earthquake can not be accurately predicted even with the use of sophisticated  technology.  Though the presence of a cyclone in the sea can be described, its movements cannot be predicted yet.  So, even the prediction of impending cyclone is difficult.

However, floods and epidemics can be predicted to a large extent. For instance, unlike, other regions, floods in western Maharashtra are caused by heavy discharges into rivers when irrigation engineers are forced to open dam gates, following unprecedented heavy rainfall in catchment  reservoirs located in the ghats. Floods, therefore, can be regulated, measured and forecast. However, the irrigation department seems to go by its own experience rather than the forecasts   and  store enough  water in the lakes in spite of heavy rainfall prediction. 

Thus,  prediction of an impending disaster is very inexact.  The absence of necessary equipments for better analysis  and their  regular use  increases the vulnerability of the system.  As pointed out in the committee meeting on floods and cyclones, various equipments are lying idle,  switched off or used for other purposes. Communication of warning signals thus become problematic. The existing system is not  enough to reach out to all vulnerable populations, nor is the warning enough to direct the population about do’s and don’ts. Such situations lead to increasing vulnerability and  ‘sudden onset’ of events.

By and large, people,  and more specifically, the vulnerable groups, tend to ignore weather predictions,   thereby making evacuation more difficult. Inability to understand the significance of warning systems and the role they play in reducing the damage to life and property increases the existing vulnerability.

4.5.5     Transport

The state has 3,601 broad gauge, 754 metre gauge and 1,100 narrow gauge tracks (refer map) totalling to 5435 kilometres. The  unmanned railway crossings add to the vulnerability of road transport, whereas tracks of different gauges create a vulnerability in the railway traffic itself. For example, the Lifeline Express of the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, had difficulties in reaching out to Latur victims because of the limitations of the railway gauge.

For transport, most of the people depend on the state transport buses (MSRTC). But the poor conditions of roads after  heavy rainfall as well as narrow roads in many of the places, makes it  impossible to access the remote villages. The communication system remains disrupted for many days and police wireless sets also remain dysfunctional due to  bad weather. Damages to bridges which are at a low height further aggravates the situation. Local authorities often have to depend on military personnel for rescue operations. The non-availability of escape routes or alternative routes, makes many of the villages vulnerable to the effects of disasters, as they are either trapped or inaccessible. A detailed discussion on the road and transport vulnerability has already been presented in section III (Road Accidents)

4.6     Housing

In most disasters, quality and design specifications have, to a large extent, determined the nature and quantum of losses. It is therefore, necessary to look at the access to housing, type of housing, materials used and the compliance to   building codes,  appropriate to the seismic zones. As has been discussed earlier, there are already proposals for rezoning the state in the wake of the Latur earthquake.

As far as access to housing is concerned, both the homeless and those under institutional care are considered as houseless. As per 1981 data, there were 5,42,457 houseless and 5,53,8889  insitutionlalised, amounting to 10,96,346 ( 1.75 % in the state) houseless population. Absence of residential premises also creates problems of post-disaster compensation, thereby adding to their vulnerability.

It is seen that materials used for housing also have a significant role to play in determining vulnerability, as was evident in Bhopal gas leak of 1984 and the Latur earthquake. The data (table XXXIII) shows that as many as  77,62,980  houses out of 1,14,58,145 that is 67.75 per cent are vulnerable to disasters  resulting from housing material  used. Additionally,  in spite of the use of appropriate materials, aging and  poor maintenance results in  dilapidated  and dangerous buildings, beyond economic repair. In MMR region alone, there are 17,000 such tenements needing urgent repairs.  The replacement rate of the public agencies   has only been  760 tenements per year. At this rate of reconstruction, the backlog of tenements needing replacements in MMR region by 2021, would be 4,48,881 units. (refer to table XXXIV on house crashes based on newspaper reports). The situation in other urban centres and towns is no exception.  Poor housing is vulnerable to earthquakes, fires, floods, cyclones, house crashes etc.

The houses have proved  highly vulnerable during floods and earthquakes. In the Konkan region, during the floods in 1983, a majority of the rooftops were blown off and thousands of families  left homeless with their houses either completely destroyed or severely damaged. During the Killari earthquake of 1993, the number of casualties was quite high as the roofs of the stone masonry house structures  caved in directly on the people. Government godowns are equally vulnerable to floods. A number of times, heavy damages of materials and food stocks have been reported after the floods.

Table XXXIII : Distribution of households by material used for roofs and walls.

Material Used for walls

Total Households

Material used for roof

Grass leaves, mud, unburnt bricks, wood

Bricks, stone and lime

Stone

  Grass, wood

           Rural

12,80,310

7,54,840

N.A

N.A

           Urban

 3,51,965

1,58,375

N.A

N.A

           Total

16,32,275

9,13,215

N.A

N.A

  Mud

           Rural

28,35,415

8,51,510

N.A.

N.A

           Urban

  4,42,790

   62,685

N.A.

N.A

           Total

32,78,205

9,14,195

N.A

N.A

Unburnt Bricks

 

           Rural

 6,97,190

1,86,350

2,130

  465

           Urban

 3,29,395

   29,095

5,550

  715

           Total

10,26,585

2,15,445

7,680

 1,180

  Stones

           Rural

16,23,665

4,80,620

 9,285

 8,310

           Urban

  2,02,250

   14,285

 3,280

 1,945

           Total

18,25,915

4,94,905

12,565

10,265

Table XXXIV : Details on house crashes in Mumbai

All these add to the vulnerability of the occupants as well as the structures. It is observed that

·   While building codes based on the zoning exist, there is a laxity in the implementation of these     codes, as pointed out during the earthquake committee meeting.  From the point of view of vulnerability of the structures, it was noted that rezoning in the context of earthquakes and defining building codes for specific zones, is one of the urgent requirements. Further, inspection of existing structures as per the new codes and classifying these in terms of vulnerability is equally important. Particularly in urban areas like Mumbai, where a number of buildings have been listed for repairs and reconstruction, this becomes  a priority issue. No survey of houses has been carried out to classify them as safe or unsafe during earthquakes or cyclones, and thereby pinpoint safe structures. After the threat of the 1982 cyclones, reports pointed out that majority of the sky-scrapers in Mumbai would have been adversely affected had the cyclones hit Mumbai.

·        However, it must be mentioned that building codes are implemented very strictly for dams.     This probably is the reason why there have been no dam-bursts during the earthquakes even though there were frequent tremors.

 

4.7     Claims

4.7.1     Government Intervention

When a disaster occurs, the government sets up a control room at the Mantralaya as well as a district control room to monitor the damages and the administration response as also provide  disaster details. The government undertakes relief work, such as providing food supply, ensuring safe drinking water and setting up of relief camps. The government provides compensation for loss of life as also subsidies and loans for reconstruction work. Government also enlists the help of military whenever required.

However, often there is a  feeling  that the government responds to a call for help rather belatedly, and that the government machinery is inadequate to deal with the situation (an inquiry was ordered after the 1991 floods into the delay by the official machinery in informing the chief minister and other top officials about the tragedy in Mowad). The norms of compensation come to be questioned as the compensation amount is felt to be too meagre. The assessments are found to be faulty and there are charges and counter charges of corruption and manipulation of beneficiary lists. A settlement  along one of the highways was  left out of relief because it was not a recorded village. People indirectly affected due to the disruption of the economy  find no relief available to them.

Difficulties, therefore, in identifying the victims and also at times the rigidity of  compensation norms inappropriate to local conditions aggravate the existing vulnerability.

4.7.2     Community Participation and NGO Intervention

During the post disaster period, people do not resort to  panic. Rather, the people respond immediately and help each other in rescue operations and management of locally organised relief camps. There is a spontaneous organised effort on the part of the community. The people help in searching and identification of the dead, helping the police in preparing the list of missing people and inventory of artefacts and property lost in the floods. Sometimes, people in several villages voluntarily come forward to sell their land for a good cause. The immediate response of the community goes a long way in maintaining the morale and confidence of the survivors. It is this help which draws people out of numbness and shock.

However, it has often been  noticed  that once outside intervention commences, the local initiative is totally  ignored. The response of the outside population to a disaster situation gets reflected through financial and material contributions. In most situations, these contributions are channeled through relief and rehabilitation groups such as political parties, charity organisations or NGOs, engaged in development work in the area, thus reflecting community capacity. At times,  too many NGOs at the same site creates confusion, resulting in  lack of coordination amongst NGOs and between NGOs and government resulting in claims and counter-claims.

The ability of the community to respond to a disaster situation, therefore, demonstrates the degree of vulnerability of the victims. This may increase or get reduced, depending on the nature and quality of intervention by the NGOs. Strengthening grass-roots NGOs and CBOs will go a long way in sustaining their capacities for intervention. Fortunately, NGOs in Maharashtra have a long tradition of partnership with the government during disaster situations, thereby contributing to the reduction of vulnerability on this score.

4.7.3     Administration

The administrative response to disaster threats and  a post-disaster situation is mainly directed through the office of the district collector.  Presently, the collector as a person, makes a difference between efficiency and inefficiency. The district collector is normally responsible for coordinating mitigative and preparedness measures. He also has an important role to play in damage assessment and compensation, in addition to immediate relief and rehabilitation. Frequent transfers mean that the collectors have to very quickly acquaint themselves with the disaster vulnerabilities of the district, as well as political and social environment, including the assessment of NGO capabilities.   Absence of standardisation of response structures through action plans,  preparation and updating of district disaster management plans also contribute to this problem. So, often when a disaster strikes in an area, if  the district collector is  new to the place,  he could be vulnerable to many influences, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the administrative machinery.

4.7.4     Disaster Insurance

The absence of any disaster insurance means that the government has to bear a huge cost for compensation and rehabilitation. Currently, in only one state, that is,  Goa, disaster related compensation has been introduced by United India Assurance Company. Though, the disaster insurance exists in a number of countries  demonstrating the possibilities, it has raised doubts about its efficiency. The practice of insurance does not reduce the vulnerability, but tends to shift the burden of losses to another area, thereby creating new types of vulnerabilities. It is reported that many insurance companies involved in disaster insurance are rethinking  their strategy. Also, there are problems with disaster insurance, as these are linked with the notification of the disaster.

4.7.5     Developmental Policies

Various activities  which are development, oriented are a product of development policies adopted by the state. Policies  directed towards poverty alleviation are important and needs  mention because they reduce the vulnerability of the population to disasters.  Schemes like Niradhar Yojna and policies of social welfare help people to come out of marginalised status.  Jawahar Rojgar Yojna, Nehru Rojgar Yojna, Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna etc.  are implemented for employment generation for youth.  Legislations have been made to combat traditions like bonded labour.

Schemes like Development of Women and Child in Rural Areas  (DWACRA) are particularly important for empowerment of vulnerable groups like women and children.  Schemes like Indira Awas Yojna are aimed at giving ‘pucca’ houses to poor population. All these schemes, and   programmes  help in  creating a better infrastructure for the village,  thereby reducing the  vulnerability of the village.

The existence of such schemes and their effective implementation will decide the degree of vulnerability.

The list of different disaster episodes, given in the section on risk analysis, also reflects the degree of vulnerability of the state to various disasters.

 

4.8     Summary of Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis in Maharashtra

Disaster Type

Districts  of maximum risk

Vulnerability

Earthquakes

Latur, Beed, Parbhani, Nanded, Nagpur, Nashik, Thane,  Satara, Pune, Sangli,  Ratnagiri and Mumbai

High

Floods

Flash Floods

·        Nagpur, Bhandara, Chandrapur, Gadchiroli, Wardha Mumbai, Ratnagiri, Pune, Sholapur, Nanded.

·        Nagpur, Bhandara, Chandrapur, Gadchiroli, Wardha, Parbhani, Ahmednagar, Pune, Sholapur, Dhule, Nashik

High

High

Cyclones

Mumbai, Thane, Raigad, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg

Low

Epidemics (water borne diseases)

All districts

Medium

Road Accidents

Thane, Raigad, Nashik, Pune

High

Fires

All districts

Medium

Industrial and Chemical Accidents

Mumbai, Thane, Pune  and Raigad

High


Appendix I

Threat of Cyclone - October’96 : A Report

(Analysis of press reports and popular reactions)

Because of the low depression belt in the Arabian sea, the western coasts of Maharashtra faced the threat of cyclone on 24th   October 1996.  The cyclone had already made a  peripheral  impact on Goa and was moving towards north creating a fear of its strike  on Mumbai. 

The day - 24th October :

Morning

The non - English language vernacular newspapers warned that Mumbai was under the threat of  cyclone ‘presently located at about 430 kilometres to the southwest of Mumbai and  moving with a speed of 250 kilometres per hour northwards  from the coasts of Goa, after making a strong impact there (falling of trees and blowing off tin sheets).’   The cyclone was expected to move towards Dahanu and Verval but ‘Mumbai will be affected by strong winds of  the  speed of 70-80 kms per hour and rainfall of 7-8 inches’.  It was mentioned that Mumbai may not be the epicentre of the cyclone if it moves towards the north, but if it moves towards the north east, Mumbai will be severely affected.  The direction of cyclone was not clear.

12 noon

TV. and radio stations started sending warning signals that  Mumbai  will be hit by a severe storm.  ‘The cyclone is moving northward, but it may divert and hit Mumbai’.  Warning of storm resulted in schools and offices closing.

2 p.m.

T.V. and  radio stations announced that the cyclone has moved towards north and is stable near Dahanu - north of Mumbai.  It was likely to bypass  Mumbai and have a  peripheral impact on Mumbai - Heavy storm with rains and winds were expected.

5 p.m.

T.V. and radio stations announced that the cyclone has moved northward and   Mumbai was definitely out of its range.  It was announced that cyclone would definitely not hit Mumbai but heavy rains and high winds with the speed of 40-60 kms. per hour were expected.

7 p.m.

T.V. stations announced that the  danger of cyclone no longer existed.  There was no fear any more as the cyclone had  moved towards north.  It was also mentioned that in the same night, it would hit Gujarat - Saurashtra areas. However the expectation of stormy weather continued.

What actually happened

The cyclone touched  no land area, but instead  calmed down over the  sea.   There were no storms or high winds in Mumbai or nearby the regions, except in Dahanu.

Some Observations :-

1.      Though it is expected that the first stage warning of cyclone should be issued 48 hours before and the second stage warning  24 hours before it actually hits, there was no warning given.  The warning reached the people through newspapers ten hours before it was expected to strike Mumbai at 4.p.m. Secondly,  leading English newspapers like Times of India and Indian Express made no mention of the cyclone threat, keeping a vast population of their readers in ignorance.

2.      The warnings about the  speed of winds meant nothing for the people. Statement like ‘Winds blowing with the speed of 70-80 k.m. per hour’ have no meaning unless such warnings are accompanied by indicators of wind speed (breaking of glasses, falling of trees etc.)  and with information on the necessary actions to be taken (enforcing the house, evacuation etc.)

3.      Because of the inadequacy in warning, people were not fully aware of the seriousness of the disaster that could have occurred.  Though the fishermen were told not to venture out into the sea, and the activities of MPT were dismissed, one could see a few boats and ships in the sea.  People were seen on strolling Girgaon-Dadar sea shores and Haji Ali.  Even in the evening, one could see people on the seashore, who had come there to see how the ‘storm’ arrives.  This could have been a potentially dangerous situation, but the people were not aware of the possible effects.

4.      Possible impacts of wind speeds were  also  unknown to the people.  In some slums, people tied plastic sheets with their houses and heavy stones were kept on tin shades, so that they don’t fly away.  These measures would not have been enough if the cyclone had really  hit.  Though strict warnings were issued in Worli,  Koliwada, Navinagar and  Gorai slums etc., there was no evacuation. Nor did  people know  when to evacuate.  People staying in high rise buildings were also  not told about the precautionary measures they needed to take.

5.      Though, the prediction that the cyclone will move north towards Dahanu - Veraval was quite correct, it was seen that accurate prediction about cyclonic conditions were not possible.  There were no rains in Mumbai, nor stormy weather  observed.  Neither did the cyclone strike Dahanu- Veraval or Gujarat.  Thus, limitations in precise predictions of cyclone movement over  land were apparent.

6.      It seems that the police, the fire brigade, the traffic department, the health department etc., were quite prepared to face the situations.  These departments reported  having taken preparations to manage the situation, if the storm hit the city.  Precautions were also taken to keep the railway, water, electricity and other  services working, as reported by various departments.

Conclusion :

From this episode we know that

1.      There are serious limitations when one talks of cyclonic conditions and the prediction of a cyclone.  Though warnings of impending cyclones can be given, it  can’t be predicted very accurately.

2.      There were many shortcomings in warning.  General public was given no direction as to the  do’s and don’ts  in such situations. The document on disaster preparedness and mitigation deals with this particular aspect in detail.

3.      It seems that the various departments of state government  were quite well prepared, as was reported by them.  However, one is not  in a position to evaluate state the response mechanism and its effectiveness as there was no feedback on this.

 

Appendix II

Report  of Major Floods in Maharashtra

(Source : News items during the events)

I. 1983 Floods in Maharashtra :  A Report

The year 1983 saw as many as three major floods; the first occurring in the Sindhudurg and Ratnagiri districts of  the Konkan region in late June, the second in the Pune and Nanded districts during August and again in the same region in the month of September.

362 lives were lost in the floods that year, and property worth Rs. 26.8 crores were damaged.

Summary Report on the Floods in June 1983.

Continuous rains for more than four days from  June 26 to June 29, 1983, resulted in massive floods in the Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg districts.

Deaths : Official figure - 16, newspaper figures - 86

Damage caused :

·        An estimated 3,551 people, belonging to 756 families were affected by the floods.

·        Several rooftops were blown off, trees uprooted.

·        Thousands of families were left homeless, with their houses either completely destroyed or severely damaged.

·        Landslides, at Sangameshwar and Guhagar tehsils, major and minor landslides in about 59 villages.

·        Electric supply was affected in 111 villages.

·        In Ratnagiri, 1,200 tonnes of rice in government godowns was damaged. 

·        133 cattle were swept away in the rains and their cost was estimated at Rs.80,000.

·        Over 5,000 hectares land was marooned, the total damage being Rs.327 lakhs.

·        More than 14,000 cultivators in Ratnagiri and 10,000 in Sindhudurg had been directly hit. About 80 % of these cultivators were small  land holders -- possessing less than five acres of land.

·        The approximate fall in food production was expected to be less by 50%.

·        1,848 houses were damaged, wholly or partly, costing Rs.47.25 lakhs.

·        Around 108 hectares of land in Sangmeshwar Taluka were rendered useless by the flood waters of the Shastri River.

·        Estimated loss of life and property was around Rs.14.5 crore.

Communication : 

·        Power supply, transport and telecommunication were disrupted for many days.

·        Two bridges were severely damaged and the Kasal-Kudal road caved in.

·        The Maharashtra state road transport corporation’s bus service was suspended because of damage to a “mori” (mini-bridge) near Shravan village.

·        The police lost contact with both the districts as,  even the wireless sets could not be operated due to continuous bad weather.

Political reaction : The Maharashtra BJP vice-president, Mr. Jagannath Patil, MP, demanded that in view of the flood havoc in Ratnagiri district,  the zilla parishad stop the recovery of cess. He felt that Rs.3,000 per hectare should be given for  repairs and levelling of the flood affected agricultural land.

Community reaction :

·        People were quick to point out the inadequacy of the government machinery to cope up with the situation. They felt that the government had  responded to the call for help rather late. The chief  minister or his deputy didn’t visit the affected areas, they complained.

·        The assistance was also meagre.

·        The norms of compensation came to be questioned , on the basis that a proper assessment wasn’t done.

Condition of  rivers : The swelling of the Kalawali, Vasisthi and Shastri rivers created havoc affecting many villages. Due to landslides, many rivers changed their course and therefore many houses located at a different  area were also  affected.

Compensation :

·        The chief secretary to the Maharashtra government, Mr. R.D. Pradhan, announced that families which had lost its members in the floods, would be given an immediate relief of  Rs.4,000.only  Rs.2,000 was given as compensation  for damaged houses.

·        Nearly 565 families received Rs. 3,33,778 by way of aid from the state government.

·        Rs.83,990 was also granted to 224 people for construction of houses.

·        Rice destroyed in the government godown was to be supplied from Kolhapur.

Reason for occurrence : Heavy rains for continuous four days. Many people felt that the tremors felt in the region was also due to  earthquake and that the government didn’t agree because the norms of compensation in an earthquake are different (and more) than in a flood. There was widespread and indiscriminate felling of trees, which had robbed the soil of its support. For want of trees on the hillocks, the rain water brought all the silt down to low lying areas  and flooded the farms and rivers.

Other points : The district collector of Sindhudurg, Mr. R.K. Bharghav, was posted  there two to three weeks before the calamity struck. Since he was new, some people in the district expressed apprehension that he might have to depend entirely on the advice of tahsildars who might be carried away by their personal pride and prejudices in assessing  the losses of individuals.


Summary report of floods in August 1983

Flash floods struck the western region as dam waters were released following heavy rainfall in the second week of August.

Deaths : 144. Most affected was the Marathwada region.

Communication : 

·        Road communication between Konkan and Kolhapur and between Nanded and other parts of Marathwada was disrupted. Three villages  in Degloor taluka  had been marooned. The Goa-Bombay national highway was closed. Nanded remained cut-off from the rest of the country for more than three days.

Condition of  rivers :

·        The Godaviri river went above the danger mark.

·        The Mitha river in Bombay region was in spate.

·        Massive release of water from several swelling dams in Maharashtra threatened more areas with flash floods. Six gates of the Koyna dam were opened. Waters of the swollen Bhima river swept through the pilgrimage centre of Pandharpur.

Response system :

·        There was evacuation of houses situated on the banks of the Mitha river.  Municipal wards and police stations were asked to broadcast alerts to the residents of buildings and hutments situated on the banks of the  Mitha River. Around 15,000 people were shifted to safer places.

·        Over 5,000 people, including about 2,000 from the Harijan restore  Santpeth in Pandharpur, were shifted to safer places.

·        Around 27 camps for 10,000 people were set-up  in  Pune. These relief camps were already earmarked by the Pune authorities in anticipation of flash floods.

·        Doordarshan and All India Radio issued hourly warnings.

·        The Indian  navy was called for  the  evacuation of  marooned people at many places in Maharashtra. Army  boats had been pressed into service to reach marooned people in Pune city.

·        Food packets, drugs and clothes were being air-dropped by IAF helicopters.

·        The public health department was asked to take preventive measures in the affected districts against the possible outbreak of epidemics.

·        The water supply to some areas was increased to bring down the force of water spilling out of the lakes.

·        The fire brigade also evacuated people from low-lying areas.

Co-ordination problems  :

·        There was no liaison between the irrigation department and the meteorological department. The irrigation department seemed to have no faith in the forecasts of the meteorological department, and therefore, stored  more water in the lakes in spite of heavy rainfall prediction. Therefore, water had to be released resulting  in flash floods. (Unlike other regions,, floods in western Maharashtra are caused by heavy discharges into rivers when irrigation engineers have to open the dam gates following unprecedented  rainfall in catchment  reservoirs located in the ghats. Floods,, therefore, can be regulated, measured and forecast).

Community reaction : The public on the main roads did not take  the warning messages by the police and municipal jeeps very seriously.  The police had  to forcibly evict those very close to the banks of the river.

Political reaction : Mr. Rajarambapu Patil, President, state Janata Party, asked the government to set up all-party flood relief committees in the state, district and taluka levels to tackle the problem of floods. He suggested the provision of a Rs.10 crore relief fund, to be handled by the  committees.

Suggestions : The Konkan Vikas Tarun Aghadi headed by Mr. Mohan Keluskar, drew up a scheme to face such natural calamities more effectively. A Rs.100 crore blueprint was prepared and presented to the state government.  The recommendations were as follows :-

·        Silt accumulated in rivers flowing through Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg should be removed and dumped on the rocky sites where trees producing Alphonso mangoes, cashewnuts and coconuts should be planted.

·        Rivers should be deepened to  25 feet.

·        Deforestation should be put to a halt and a positive programme for afforestation should be taken up.

·        Damaged roads should be properly  constructed and resurfaced.

·        Height of foot overbridges and roads should be increased.

·        Small dams should be reconstructed to make available drinking water.

 


Assistance asked and relief provided :

Assistance asked : The state government asked the central government for a loan of Rs.58 crore towards relief measures in the flood-affected areas of the state.

Damage during Konkan floods in June - Rs. 16 crores.

Damage during floods in western Maharashtra in August - Rs..44 crores.

Of which,

Restoration of agricultural land - Rs.4.35 crores.

Restoration of public property - Rs.11.30 crores 

The state government spent Rs.46.16 crores on flood relief by March  1994. Around 5.47 lakh houses had been constructed for the rural homeless.

Resettlement :

·        Around 119 villages in Nanded  were taken up for resettlement and the government tried to ensure that  the villages affected  are not reoccupied by others. The land was to be  treated as waste land. A special cell was set up to undertake a time-bound programme of shifting, under the supervision of the Nanded district collector.

·        Loans, subsidies and building materials were being supplied to various beneficiaries under this programme, for constructing new  houses on alternative plots allotted  free of cost from land acquired by the government in various neighbouring villages.

·        Schools, link and approach roads, drinking water supply, energy supply and plots for construction of  “Panchayat” offices are also being provided at the new site.

·        Different communities including scheduled castes and tribes and minorities, are living the together in an harmonious atmosphere.

·        The construction of one tenement has cost each family Rs.10,000. The cost was subsidised by loans and grants from the state government, in addition to various  building material supplied to them at the government’s cost.

·        Windows, doors, wooden beams and roof-tiles retrieved in good condition from  old abandoned houses, have been reused in the construction of the new houses.

·        The resettlement programme was completed in three months. People in several villages voluntarily came forward to sell parts of their land for a  good cause.

Source : Newspaper reports of the period.


An  article in the Times of  India, 2/8/85, written by M Z Hasan :

“In spite of efforts to contain it, the intensity of  floods  has been increasing, threatening more  areas year after year.  The loss due to floods,  which was Rs.210 million  in 1951 rose to Rs.6300 million in 1971. It reached Rs.11,320 million in 1981 and Rs.24,600 million in 1983,  recording 117 times increase in 33 years. The flood prone area, based  on the data available from 1953 to 1976 was assessed to be 25 million hectares. After the 1977 floods, it was revised to 34 million hectares. It has once again been revised to 40  million hectares.

The government has provided protection to 12.44  million hectares (about 30 per cent of the total flood prone area), by constructing 12, 905 kms of embankments and 25,331 kms of drainage channels and protection to 332 towns and 4,696 villages has been provided at a cost of Rs. 14,425.2 million.

But still floods occur in areas which have been protected. This could be because the embankments are known to have collapsed and town protection schemes afford little protection. Also, such steps provide protection to one area while they expose the adjoining areas to threats of floods. The second, and more important reason is that, while on the one hand, the country is spending millions to prevent flood, on the other hand, deforestation is adding its own share of damage. The denudation of forests, the consequent erosion of the top soil, the rapid and heavy siltation of rivers, the absence of anti-soil erosion measures and the failure to afforest regions bared of forest cover, especially in the catchment areas, have combined to ensure that floods recur and wreck greater damage than before.

It is not possible to tame this flow by engineering works alone. First, because the embankments have little effective life. Heavy siltation not only minimises their effectiveness but also fills the river beds making them shallow.  Dams also suffer from heavy siltation and their water storing capacity is eroded. Secondly, when the embankments provide protection to one area, they expose other areas to the  flooded danger.

It has also been estimated, that the loss of soil through erosion of  arable land is of the order of 6,000 million tonnes a year. This calls for speedy afforestation measures as the benefits provided by forests, if calculated in hard currency, amounts to over hundreds of thousand million; the insurance against floods, erosion and loss of soil nutrients adds up to Rs.300 billion; forests store water worth Rs.400 billion and they provide timber worth Rs.450 billion, besides maintaining ecological balance.”

II. 1989 Floods in Maharashtra : A Report

Heavy rains lashed all over Maharashtra on July 23, 1989, leading to floods in many parts. The rains were accompanied by high velocity winds with a maximum speed of 84 kmph. Raigad, Beed were the most affected..

Deaths : Around 920.

Reason of occurrence : It was the by-product of a cyclonic storm rising from the Bay  of   Bengal and moving in a west north-westerly direction, which crossed  Kalingapatnam, reached Akola and travelled upto Jalgaon, where it moved into position on the western coast of the state.

There was wide spread speculation  that the calamity was ‘man-made’, that is, due to the release of water from the dams. The government denied this.

Damage caused :

·        The rain and high winds uprooted trees, shattered glass windows and smothered the arterial roads under water.

·        Landslides at Bajhe village.

·        A number of leading industrial units in Raigad, suspended operations because of flooding of the Patalganga river. Large scale damage to machinery, almost total collapse of the power system and water supply, along with extensive damages to all offices in the projects of the Patalganga complex in Raigad district, have led to an estimated loss of over Rs.500 crores.

·        Hazardous chemicals stored in these industries spilled over into the flood waters.

·        Numbers of tribals in Jambhulpada were indirectly affected as they were dependent on the flood-hit areas for their bread and butter.

·        About 40,000 Ganesh idols were damaged in the floods.

·        Units in the Roha complex in the MIDC  area were immobilised. The damage caused was around Rs.80 crore.

·        About two lakh  people were rendered destitute. About 7,239 villages were affected.

·        Government estimates till July 31, of the public and private damage was Rs.2.08 crore

·        Damage to 900 low tension poles, 250 high tension pole, 220 low tension feeder lines and 52 transmission states.

·        Damage to public property in rural areas -- Rs.30 crore.

·        Damage to national and state highways, government buildings power stations, transmission lines and towers -- more than Rs.60 crore.

·        Power supply had been disrupted in 5,210 villages.

·        Rs.35.87 crore crops were damaged.

·        54,208 hectares of nalla bunds were destroyed, restoration of which will cost Rs.6.64 crore.

Communication :

·        14 villages in the vicinity of Vadkalnaka and Pen were marooned. Navy personnel tried to reach these villages using dingies, carried by trucks to Panvel, and then put into operation in the flood affected areas.

·        Road network to the Konkan region was disrupted.

·        Soil had been washed away from many farms and wells were covered with silt.

·        Roads were washed away, bridges had collapsed.

Response :

·        The army and navy were called out for help. The army had to launch rescue operations in several places. The INS ‘Hamla’ rescued 40 people from the Sanataram lake, located east of Malad.

·        The police and fire brigade worked overtime to clear road  blockades, answer calls to rescue crushed cars, rush to areas reporting houses and wall collapses.

·        Air force helicopters air-dropped nearly 4,000 loaves of bread, along with packets of jaggery and chutney over the marooned villages. 50 bags of wheat flour had been rushed to these areas.

·        The public health department set up special dispensaries at Aurangaabad, Panvel, Pune and other places to prevent a possible outbreak of cholera and water-borne diseases.

·        In Pune, organisations like TELCO and Bank of Maharashtra helped with the rescue work.

·        Volunteers from TISS, Yashwanti Hikers from Khopoli, Abhijit Mitra Mandal, Vavoshi Mitra Mandal and other agencies helped residents in Jambhulpada to clear the debris, repair damage houses and distribute provisions and medicines to the people.

Compensation :

·        An amount of Rs.20,000 was to be spent on rehabilitating each family evacuated from the flood-hit area. The allocation for repairing damaged huts  would be raised from Rs.3,000 to Rs.10,000.

·        The compensation for the loss of cattle would go up from Rs.2,000 to Rs.3,000 and for goats from Rs.250 to Rs.350.

·        Village artisans were to be given Rs.5,000.

·        Assistance of Rs.25,000 would be given for sunk fishing boats.

·        Compensation of Rs.110 per head upto a maximum of Rs.500 per family and 10 Kg of rice as the immediate benefit.

·        Subsidies will be provided to replace lost cattle.

·        For repair of houses,  Rs.8,000 would be given of which 25 per cent would be the subsidy.

Alert signals : Though alert signals were issued to fishermen, they were not heeded to, most probably because of the fact that there were as many as 25 warnings issued in the past 44 days. Fishermen have asked for other methods of warning like wailing of sirens, the flashing of signals etc.

Political Reaction :

·        Mrs. Mrinal Gore, leader of the opposition in the Assembly, said that Dalits and Muslims living in the river basin in Beed, were  the main victims of the flood in the town.

·        Mr. D.N. Chaulkar, Congress, blamed the Shiv Sena for the flood damage in Kurar village in Malad. He said the Sena allowed unauthorised cattle sheds which contributed to choking of the local drains.

·        Mr. Ram Kapse, BJP, said that the havoc was caused by government neglect and not misfortune. The government media   completely failed to alert the people against rains and floods. The government’s crisis management had also failed.

·        The PWP claimed that many people were left out of relief in Raigad.

Rehabilitation :

·        The government  decided to rebuild Jambhulpada and  other villages that were totally washed away on account of the floods. These villages would be rebuilt in safer locations, close to the site of the original villages.

·        A minimum plot of 1,000 sq.ft would be allotted to each dishoused family. The government would build tenements measuring 300 sq.ft., free of cost on each plot.

·        The cost ceiling for a dwelling unit was doubled from Rs.10,000 to Rs,20,000. Subsidy was stepped up from Rs.2,500 to Rs.10,000 in absolute terms, and from 25 per cent to 75 per cent of the ceiling cost in percentage terms.

·        The total expenditure on relief and rehabilitation was estimated at Rs.204 crore.

·        The government provided Rs.15,000 and another 6,000 rupees as loan for reconstructing houses.

Insurance  : Most of the industrial units did not have insurance cover against natural calamities. Reliance suffered losses of Rs.200 crore but wasn’t insured against  floods. In Roha Complex, only one unit was insured.

Other aspects : Slum dwellers in Kasade were denied relief, because a slum, by definition, was not a village.

Source : Newspaper Reports of the Period


III. 1991 Floods in Maharashtra : A report

Flash Floods in Wardha District on  July 30, 1991 led to many deaths in this region, Mowad being the worst affected area.

Deaths :  300

Reason of occurrence : An embankment on the Wardha river was breached at Mowad.

Communication :

·        Roads connecting to Wardha region were completely cut  off.

·        As many as five villages were marooned.

·        The rescue team could reach Mowad only after 20 hours of the incident..

·        An enquiry  was ordered by the state government into the delay by the official machinery in informing the Chief  Minister and other top officials about the tragedy in Mowad.

Damage caused : Over 800 houses collapsed and 2000 heads of cattle died in Mowad. The village post-office was also washed away.

River condition : Most of the rivers and rivulets were in spate following heavy rains.

All the dams  in Amravati district were overflowing.

Political reaction :

·        Mr. Dharamchand Choradia maintained that residents on both banks had been given no warning by the dam authorities who opened the sluice-gates.

·        The government was flayed in the Assembly by the opposition for its slackness in providing relief. The opposition also demanded the CM’s resignation.

Response :

·        The army and navy were called for rescue operations.

·        Many visitors to the area hindered rescue work.

·        Need for relief camp was felt.

Relief  work undertaken : (in Amravati and Nagpur districts)

·        Removal of debris with help from military and the Nagpur municipal corporation.

·        Temporary shelters were erected for 3,274 families  in Nagpur and 2,500 families in Amravati.

·        An amount of Rs.70 lakh was released for purchase of medicines. Care was taken to supply disinfected drinking water to the affected areas.

Other points : A  petition was filed in the Supreme Court for granting compensation of Rs.3 lakh per casualty.

Norms for Financial Assistance :

Considering the severity  and magnitude of this calamity and damages, the state government adopted the following norms for assistance to the affected people :-

·        The next of  kin of  deceased/missing persons will be eligible for an assistance of Rs.20,000 from the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund, irrespective of age and sex.

·        The persons rendered destitute due to this calamity, will be eligible for an assistance of Rs.250 (Rs.10 per head per day upto 15 days for covering the expenses on food and Rs.100 per head for purchases of utensils and clothings).

·        The owners of partially damaged houses will be eligible for an assistance of Rs.8,000 for repairs of the houses (25 per cent subsidy and remaining loan).

·        The owners of fully damaged houses will be eligible to get a subsidy of Rs.20,000 (Rs.10,000 from the calamity relief fund and Rs.10,000 from the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund). This assistance will be given only if the owner is willing to shift to a designated safe place. Steps will be taken for securing loans of Rs.5,000 from HUDCO, HDFC or public financial institutions, if required for the reconstruction of fully damaged houses if the cost exceeds Rs.20,000. For reconstruction of damaged huts, a subsidy of Rs.10,000  per hut will be given, provided the owner of the hut is ready to shift to the new safe site. Here also, if the cost of reconstrcution exceeds Rs.10,000, attempts will be made to raise the additional amounts as loans.

·        For the loss of cattle, the owners will be eligible for assistance of Rs.3,000 per head of cattle for purchase of new cattle (25 per cent subsidy and remaining loan).

·        For loss of sheep/goat, the owners will be eligible for an assistance of Rs.350 per sheep/goat.

·        The affected rural artisans will be eligible for assistance of  Rs.5,000 out of which Rs.1,000 or 50 per cent of the damage, whichever is less, will be subsidy, and the remaining loan.

·        The affected farmers more, than 50 per cent of whose crops have been damaged, will be eligible to get an assistance of Rs.1,000 per hectare, subject to a ceiling of  2 hectares. The assistance will be given in kind. If the input for resowing are not available, the assistance will be given in cash.

·        The affected farmers, whose lands have been damaged, will be eligible to get an assistance of upto Rs.2,000 per hectare (depending on the assessment of the extent of damage), upto a ceiling of 2 hectares of land.

·        Weavers have been included in the village artisans category. Each affected weaver will be given an assistance of Rs.3,000 (Rs.1,000 from Calamity Relief Fund and Rs.2,000 under scheme for renovation of looms).

Source : Newspaper reports of the period and memorandum on situation relating to natural calamities, heavy rains and flash floods in Maharashtra State, June to July 1991, Government of Maharashtra.


Appendix III

EARTHQUAKES IN MAHARASHTRA (INDIA)

                                                          From 1201 A.D. to 1994 A.D.

(Lat 15oN to 22oN long. 72o to 80oE)

        Sr.            Y         M         D         Lat            Long                      Location           IO     M   REF

       No.                                                oN                oE                                           MM

         (1)               (2)           (3)           (4)                (5)                     (6)                               (7)                        (8)       (9)   (10)

          1       1201           -           -          18.7            75.2         Appegaon, Paithan     - -          EB

          2       1594           -           -          19.4            72.8         Bassein                      IV   3.7   KEL 

          3       1618        05        26          18.9            72.9         Bombay                     IX(?) 6.9 OLD

          4       1678           -           -          19.4            72.8         Bassein                      VI   5.0   KEL

          5     *1684           -           -          21.2            72.9         Surat (Guj)                 IV   3.7   OLD

          6       1702           -           -          19.7            73.1         North Konkan           IV   3.7   KEL

          7       1751        12        09          19.1            72.9         Selsette region            V    4.3   KEL

          8       1752        01        05          19.1            72.9         Selsette region            V    4.3   KEL

          9       1752        02        05          18.7            73.4         Lohgad                      V    4.3   KEL

        10       1757        10        31          18.2            74.2         Toka, Dhom              V    4.3   KEL

        11       1760           -           -          18.5            73.6         Pune                          IV   3.7   KEL

        12       1764        08           -          17.9            74.1         Lonand                      VII  5.7   KEL

        13       1792        05        29          18.5            73.0         Revadanda                  V   4 .3 KEL

        14       1812        02        23          18.5            73.6         Pune                          IV   3.7   KEL

        15       1826        03        20          16.1            73.6         Moravade                   VI  5.0   KEL

        16       1828        08        22          15.9            73.5         Vengurla                     V    4.3   OLD

        17       1832        06        02          18.7            73.4         Lohagad                     IV   3.7   OLD

        18       1832        10        04          18.7            73.0       Ugate (Alibagh)           VI   5.0   KEL

        19       1835        01        04          18.7            73.4       Lohagad                      IV   3.7   OLD

        20       1835        01        14          18.7            73.4       Lohagad                      IV   3.7   OLD

        21     *1843        04        01          15.2            76.9       Near Bellary              VII   5.8   OLD

        22       1849        12        26          18.9            72.9       Bombay                      III    3.0   OLD

        23       1854        11           -          18.9            72.9       Bombay                      III    3.0   OLD

        24       1854        12        08          18.9            72.9       Bombay                       IV   3.7   OLD

        25       1856        12        25          20.0            72.7       Dahanu                      VII    5.7   MIL

        26       1858        12        31          21.0            75.0       Khandesh                  III      3.0   OLD

        27     *1860        04        27          21.2            72.9       Surat (Guj)                    -     3.7   OLD

        28     *1861        07        24          16.4            77.3,      Krishna Dt.                IV     3.7   OLD

        29     *1862        01        13          16.4            77.3       Krishna Dt.                IV     3.7   OLD

        30       1862        11        18          20.9            74.8       Dhule                         IV     3.7   TOI

        31     *1863        11        08          21.8            75.3       Burwani (MP)            VII    5.7   OLD

        32       1865        12        31          17.5            76.0       Sholapur                    III      3.0   TOI

        33       1869        07        04          20.0            73.8       Nashik                       IV     3.7   OLD

        34       1869        07        12          20.9            74.8       Dhule                         IV     3.7   OLD

        35     *1871        01        31          20.5            73.0       Surat (Guj)                 IV     3.7   TOI

        36       1872        07        12          20.9            74.8       Dhule                         III      3.0   TOI

        37       1877        12           -          18.9            72.9       Bombay                     IV     3.7   TOI

                  38       1883        07         27              21.5             79.0                           Nagpur                     II             2.3  TOI

        39       1886        05         13         16.7             74.2      Kolhapur                  III       3.0  TOI

 40       1891        05         06         18.9             72.9      Bombay                    III      3.0   STA

         41      1896         01         03         19.4             74.7      Bhorvadi                  -                USG

         42      1896         04         30             -                 -          Lonavala                 III      3.0   STA

43       1906         03          26            -                 -          Bombay                   VI       5.0   IMD

44       1910         09          01            -                  -          Kalyan                     III               IMD

45       1924         01          16            -                  -          Bombay                   III               IMD

46       1928         11          05            -                  -          Bombay                   III               IMD

47          1929       02          16         18.0              73.0          Bombay                  4.2   ISS

48          1933       07          17              -                  -             Bombay            V       4.3   IMD

49          1934       10          15               -                 -             Sholapur           III           IMD

50          1935        07         20          21.0              72.4          Near Dumas     VII    5.7   IMD


 

Appendix III  (contd)

          Sr.          Y             M           D     Lat             Long               Location                    IO         M         REF

          No.                                            oN                oE                                              MM

         (1)               (2)                       (3)                  (4) (5)                     (6)                              (7)                             (8)           (9)              (10)

51        1935           09        16     19.1       73.0                   Near Thane                III   3.0          IMD

52        1937           01        11           -             -                    Bombay                     III       -          IMD

53      *1938           03        14     21.5       75.7                    Khandwa (MP)          VIII 6.2          IMD

64        1938             -           -      21.05      75.05                  Amalner

55        1938           07           -           -             -                   Ahmednagar               III       -          IMD

56        1939           11        05           -             -                   Amravati                    III       -          IMD

67        1941           06        28     18.0       73.0                    Shiivardhan                 V    4.3          IMD

58        1941           05        28     18.0       73.1                   Ratnagiri                     V    4.3          IMD

59        1942             -           -     19.3       77.0                   North of Nanded        IV   3.7          GSI

60        1951           04        08     19.2       70.8                   Bombay Coast           VII  5.7          ISS

61        1951           04        09     17.3       73.2                   Jaygad                       V    4.3          REP

62        1951           12        05     17.3       73.2                   Jaygad

63        1953             -           -     19.0       75.8                   Beed Disttict              IV   3.7          GSI

64        1955           08           -     18.1       75.2                   Ujani                          IV   3.7          GSI

65        1957           10        17     21.5       79.0                   Nagpur-Khapa           IV   4.0          IMD

66        1961           01        26           -             -                   Bombay                     III       -          IMD

67        1962           09        28     17.0       73.5                   Ratnagiri                     V    4.3          KAR

68        1963           03        24           -             -                   Bombay                     IV   3.7          IMD

69        1965           06        04     17.0       73.4                   Ratnagiri                     VI   5.0          IMD

70        1965           07       1-2           -             -                   Bombay                     III       -          IMD

71        1965           11        19     18.8       73.1                   Alibag                                   -          CGS

72        1965           12        13     19.2       73.0                   Kalyan                       IV   3.7          IMD

73        1966           01        07     18.3       72.7                   Bombay, Pune                                 IMD

74        1966           01        22     18.3       72.7                   Colaba                                            IMD

75        1966           05        04     18.7       73.0                   Alibag                        V    4.3          REP

Appendix III  (contd)

          Sr.          Y            M           D          Lat         Long      Location      IO           M         REF

          No.                                               oN              oE                          MM

           (1)                (2)                 (3)             (4)      (5)                      (6)                     (7)               (8)                 (9)                   (10)

         76         1966        06       14         17.0           73.0       Ratnagiri    VI       4.8         CWP

         77       1967         02      17         19.3           73.0       Kalyan          -          -           IMD

         78         1967         04      19        18.1           73.4       Mahad                     4.7          CWP

         79         1967        04      25        18.2          73.4       Mahad        VII        5.6        IMD

         80 1967          05     18        17.9          73.0       Janjira         IV         3.6         CWP

         81         1967         05      19        17.0          73.5       Ratnagiri      V         4.3        CWP

         82 1967         06       20        18.7         73.0       Alibag           V         4.3        CWP

         83        1967        09        13         17.4        73.7        Koyna       VII          5.7        CWP

         84 1967         12       11         17.5        73.7        Koyna         IX         6.5         REP

         85         1967        12         25         17.4        73.7        Koyna        VI          5.0        CWP

         86         1968        07        21           21.4        77.8       Amravati                  3.6         HYB

         87         1968        10        29           17.4        73.7        Koyna       VI          5.2         CWP

         88          1968       11        04           16.2        74.0         Sawantwadi              3.5          IMD

         89 *       1968       11        14           21.8        78.0        Betul                        4.2          HYB

         90          1969       03        07           17.2        73.6       Sangameshwar           4.7         CWP

           91      1969        05        08           18.9        72.9         Bombay                       -          CWP

           92      1970        02        20           18.7        75.2         Paithan                      2.9         HYB

           93    *1970        03        23           21.7        73.0       Broach (Guj)              5.4         CWP

           94    *1970        08        30           21.6        72.7        Broach (Guj)              4.1         HYB

           95      1972        04        21           20.7        77.0        Akola                         4.3         HYB

           96      1973        10        17           17.3        73.6       Koyna                        5.2         CWP

           97      1974        04        17           17.5        73.1        West Coast                 5.0         IMD

           98      1974        10        20           21.5        74.2        Taloda                        4.6         HYB

Appendix III  (contd)

          Sr.          Y             M           D          Lat                   Long      Location       IO      M               REF

          No.                                               oN                      oE                           MM

                               (1)                (2)               (3)             (4)                 (5)                                  (6)                 (7)                  (8)         (9)                      (10)

           99    *1975        08        13           21.8               77.7       Betul (M.P.)          4.1               HYB

         100      1975        09        25           20.8               74.2       Dhule                    4.2               HYB

         101      1976        01        20           19.5               79.2       Wirur                    2.7               HYB

         102      1976        01        20           19.5               79.2       Wirur                    2.7               HYB

         103      1976        03        10           16.9               73.4       Near Lanja           4.0               CWP

         104      1980        01        06           19.8               73.7       Near Nashik         2.8               HYB

         105      1980        01        08           20.9               75.1       NE of Dhule          3.5               HYB

         106      1980        02        01           21.0               74.2       NW of Akola        3.1               HYB

         107      1980        03        30           20.6               76.0       Buldana                3.3               HYB

         108      1980        05        01           21.0               76.0       East of Jalgaon      4.1               HYB

         109    *1980        12        30           22.1               76.6       Bir (M.P)              3.4               HYB

         110      1981        05        06           20.2               74.3       Near Manmad      3.9               HYB

         111      1983        08        17           19.6               73.6       Khardi                  4.4               MERI

         112      1983        09        15           19.7               73.6       Khardi             VI 4.9               MERI

         113      1984        05        14           20.5               73.9       Near Nashik         3.0               MERI

         114      1984        10        11           18.1               74.6       Baramati               3.4               MERI

         115    *1986        02        26           20.6               73.3       Valsad (Guj)         4.3               IMD

         116    *1986        04        27           20.6               73.3       Valsad (Guj)         4.6               MERI

         117      1987        04        18           21.1               79.1       Nagpur                 4.9               USG

         118      1987        06        05           17.0               73.0       Ratnagiri               3.5               MERI

         119      1987        07        03           18.5               73.6       Pune                     3.0               MERI

Appendix III (contd.)

        Sr.         Y             M         D       Lat        Long  Location      IO          M       REF

        No.                                               oN           oE                         MM                                 

        (1)         (2)           (3)        (4)        (5)            (6)       (7)              (8)       (9)       (10)

        120      1989          03        16        21.6         74.4       Shahada                 3.0      MERI

        121      1989          06        02        20.1         72.9      Dahanu                  4.1      IMD

        122      1990          03        07        17.0         73.0      Ratnagiri                4.0      MERI

        123      1990          06        02     19.6          73.4       Khardi                    4.0      MERI

        124      1992          10        18      18.05        76,.55     Mllaii                       4.5      IMD

        125      1993          09        30     18.1          76.6        Killari                    6.3      IMD

        126      1993          09        30     18.0          76.4      Killari          VII      5.0      IMD

        127      1993          10        09     18.0          76.6       Killari                     5.2      IMD

        128      1993          11        12     18.0          76.5       Killari                       5.0      IMD

        129      1993          12        08     17.2          73.8       Koyna                     5.1      MERI

         130 *  1993          12        31     21.8          72.1       Bhavnagar (Guj)     3.9      MERI

         131     1994          01        09     19.9          73.1       Niedhi                      3.8      MERI

         132      1994         02        01     17.3          73.7       Koyna                      5.4      MERI

         133      1994         02         10    20.5          72.1      West Coast             3.7      MERI

         134      1994         02        28     19.9          75.4      Aurangabad               -       NGRI

         135      1994         08        12     21.4          79.3        Ramtek                  3.2      MERI

         136      1994         08        26     21.2          79.7      Bhandardara           3.2       MERI

         137      1994         11        29     16.5          74.6       SE of Kolhapur      4.2       MERI

Notes.-1.        Abbreviations denote the original source of the data.

KEL       Kelkar Y. N. (1968)

OLD       Oldham (1883)

REP        Report of the Committee of Experts, Koyna Earthquake of ilth December 1967.

MIL        Milne (1911)

TOI        Times of India, Daily Newspaper

STA       Statesman, Calcutta (News daily)

ISS         International Seismological Summary

IMD       India Meteorological Department

GSI        Geological Survey of India

KAR      Singh and Setumadhaan (1965)

CGS       Coast and Geodetic Survey

CWP      Central Water and Power Research Station, Pune

HYB       N. G. R. I. Seismological Observatory, Hyderabad

MERI:    Maharashtra Engineering Research Institute, Nashik.

USG :     United States Geological Survey

2  Earthquakes as below are only included in the list in the following seismically active areas. 

Other smaller magnitude earthquakes are not included.-

                      For Koyna-Wama and Killari area          :           M >=5.0

For Khardi (Bhatsa) area                        :           M >=4.0         

For Medhi (Surya) area                           :           M >=3.8

3.         *Earthquake outside Maharashtra.

 


Appendix  IV

Case Study of Two Industrial Accidents

I. Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Limited : An on-site accident at IPCL - MGCC complex

Introduction

An explosion followed by a fire took place in the Maharashtra Gas Cracker Complex (MGCC) of M/s Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd., (IPCL)  at Nagothane on 5th November, 1990 at about 7:15 p.m. The site of the accident was the feedstock and product ethylene, chilling and storage section of the out-side battery limit (OSBL) unit of the gas cracker plant in the complex. The main gas cracker plant or inside battery limit (ISBL) and also other facilities in the complex were intact.

With timely action of the fire wing of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), who are responsible for fire-fighting services in MGCC (assisted laters by fire tenders from RCF, Thal, ONGC, Uran, HOCL, Rasayani, District fire brigades at Roha, Alibag, Thane and Mumbai), the fire was brought under control, and the spread of fire to adjacent areas of tankage and spheres was arrested. This resulted in minimisation of damage and casualties. The accident, though major in nature, remained at the scale of an on-site emergency.

Site of the accident

The mother unit of the MGCC is the gas cracker plant. The areas covered by the plant are broadly divided into two categories:

ISBL    :           Gas cracker plant with cracking heaters and separation section.

OSBL  :           Feedstock receipt, chilling and storage and product/by-product storage.

The accident occurred in the OSBL unit.

Basic Details

At about 7.00 p.m. on 5/11/90 some of the officers working in the OSBL control room, heard a noise typical of gasket rupture followed by a hissing sound typical of leakage of gas in the feedstock, chilling and storage section of the plant in the OSBL. Immediately, some of the personnel in and outside the OSBL control room rushed to take remedial action to stop the flow in the plant.  The concerned plant in-charge ordered that the plant should be shut down and that the CISF fire brigade should be asked to rush to the spot. Action to shutdown the plant was initiated. The first fire tender arrived near the spot within three minutes of the call. Judging from the location of the bodies, it appears that, before the firemen could commence the fire fighting operations, an aerial explosion took place, followed by fire which engulfed the area.

Fire fighting operation

With the help of firemen from the first fire tender and those from the tenders that followed, as well as the fire-water network in the area, the fire was fought by CISF personnel under supervision of IPCL officials. The immediate concern was to contain the hydrocarbon fuelled fire and prevent any secondary explosion, a possibility  in such accidents.

On the north side of the offsite unit were four large double walled (DW) tanks for storing C2/C3 feedstock and ethylene. On the east side were propylene Horton sphere storage tanks. The fire tracing itself to the tanks could have assumed a large magnitude. One of the actions taken, was to actuate a foam system and a water spray system that form an integral part of the design and engineering of the storage tanks. The DW tanks are enclosed with a dyke wall with a system of foam spray. The activation of the foam ensured that the space between the DW tanks and the dyke wall was filled up by foam, preventing the fire from spreading. The water spray system on the DW tanks as well as the Horton spheres were automatically actuated, enabling the tanks to remain in a cool condition. A small fire near the DW tanks was put off immediately by a brave CISF fireman.

The second action was to fight the remaining hydrocarbon fueled fire in the offsite area, and control it  with cooling off of many other equipments in the vicinity in order to avoid the spread of heat to adjoining areas. The fire brigades of RCF, Thal  Roha, Pen and Mumbai were also requisitioned. As a result of the relentless fire fighting operations, the fire was brought under control. The remaining fire died out by midnight after which cooling continued till the early hours of 6th November, 1990.

Rescue and relief operations

Responsibilities were assigned to specific officers to take care of various tasks involved in the removal of dead bodies, medical attention to injured etc. In the meantime, doctors assembled in the IPCL hospital. The police control had sent messages, including alerting the civil hospital at Alibag. The civil surgeon and chief medical officer there, Dr. Sharad Hoshing, quickly assembled a team of doctors and medical staff.

Since most of the injured had high percentage (60 % plus) of third degree burns, they were shifted to Alibag hospital for emergency treatment and then to Sion and J.J. hospitals in Mumbai. Ambulance support came from within IPCL and externally from Alibag civil hospital, RCF, Shiv Sena and HOCL.

On-site support for moving the injured to Alibag and then to Mumbai, came from various quarters.

The district authorities led by Shri Ganesh Walawalker, district collector, and the police led by Shri Rakesh Maria, superintendent of police were at the site by 9.00 p.m.  and did a commendable job in quickly organising their forces,  rendering  assistance in fighting the fire and transportation of victims to hospitals. The police wireless network was used extensively in communication. They also rendered assistance in communicating with the population in the vicinity of the complex, which helped in arresting panic among the residents of nearby villages and in the restoration of normalcy.

Within IPCL, the message was relayed to Baroda and an emergency plan was drawn up. Clear cut communications were sent to internal personnel with a director in-charge of each facet of  the operation. Shri Sarup Chowdhary, director (marketing) who rushed to Mumbai on the night of 5th November, was made in-charge of the  work  of covering support forces at Sion/JJ hospitals, contacting relatives,  arranging for their travel to Mumbai, procedural formalities and handling of the dead etc. The concerned regional offices/sales centres and distributors of IPCL were also utilised in arranging for the contact and travel of relatives. IPCL RO Mumbai, MGCC-JVPD and CATAD office employees were organised for rotational duty at hospitals as well for blood donation.

A control room in the MGCC office of IPCL at Mumbai was setup  and manned round the clock. The control room enabled coordination of activities among Nagothane, Baroda, regional office, hospitals and CISF. Despite constraints in communication between Nagothane and Mumbai, (there being only one hotline between Nagothane and MGCC Office in Mumbai, whose operation was also interrupted due to technical problems and a stir by the telecom personnel) this round the clock control room at the Mumbai office of MGCC was helpful in providing information relating to the victims, coordination of the family members, travel to Mumbai, management of volunteers and IPCL medical support in hospitals, procedural formalities.

Shri S.K. Mukherjee, director (personnel) who also rushed to Mumbai on the same night,  and then to Nagothane, was incharge of Nagothane related activities. A major part of his work pertained to meeting people within IPCL, neighbouring villages, local leaders and local authorities to clearly communicate on the event. His endeavours also included bringing back the morale of employees and quickly working out ex-gratia and other assistance to the affected people. In order to ensure that correct information was given to the public  (as unsubstantiated rumours were in circulation in neighbouring areas), a number of prominent local leaders were taken to the site of the accident and were given complete information about the accident and the victims.

It was ensured that important personnel in the central government and Maharashtra state government were informed and a clear picture provided. The press personnel were allowed to visit Nagothane and the site of the accident within the complex, once it was clear that the fire fighting operation was complete in all respects. This was when the fire had died, the equipments/area totally cooled down by the water spray and an examination revealed that the place is free from any further danger.

The media  was given full details in the spirit of IPCL’s policy of openness in corporate communications, as also to dispel rumours. A separate press conference was organised at Baroda on 6th evening and addressed by Shri N. Chandar, director (finance), who was requested to stay back in Baroda to take care of the Baroda related matters.

Secretary, Chemicals and Petrochemicals, GOI, visited the site on 7th November, 1990, and addressed a press conference on the same afternoon in Mumbai. At Nagothane, Shri Gill had a detailed review with IPCL and EIL officers, and instructed that a detailed photo documentation be done and safeguarding of all evidence and records be ensured. He also mentioned that a fully empowered task force with financial powers will be setup to facilitate speedy rebuilding of the plant and that a comprehensive and thorough inquiry will be conducted by a government appointed committee. Accordingly, a committee was formed by the GOI, under chairmanship of Dr. R. A. Mashelkar.

Government enquiry committee

The enquiry committee appointed by the GOI, visited the site on 21st and 22nd of November, 1990. After visual inspection of the OSBL plant and other damaged items around the plant, the committee asked for some specific photographs and some metal samples for testing. The committee visited Nagothane again on 16th December, 1990, and agreed for removal of all debris and insulation in OSBL plant and surrounding areas.

The recommendations from this committee of secretaries have been implemented mostly before restart  of the complex, and, rest immediately before recommissioning.


II. Fire at Aromatic Tank Farm at BPCL

It was Wednesday, November 9th, 1988, and a holiday for the refinery, except for some essential activities. Loading of rail tank wagons was also being carried out that day. However, being lunch time the actual loading operations were temporarily suspended. Workers were taking lunch, sitting in small groups in the open areas of the distribution unit. Some had retired to the lunch rooms away from the site of the fire.

At 11.55 a.m. a fire call from the Aromatic Unit was received and within minutes there was a turnout of all the fire vehicles and ambulances from the refinery fire station. Immediately after assessing the intensity of the fire, the  fire call  wailing siren was sounded.

The fire originated as a massive fire ball / vapour cloud and engulfed an area of approximately 150 metres in radius, covering the Aromatic tankfarm, its pumphouse, area used for despatch of packing bitumen, alongwith products, and  the rail tank wagon loading gantry.

Two or three explosions were heard in short intervals before the fire engulfed the area. Apart from above locations, the surrounding locations right from north-east to south-west were also enveloped with minor fires and intense heat. Thick black clouds darkened the sky above the refinery and could be seen from far. The catastrophic proportions of the incident could be gauged by the loud  explosions and the height of the leaping flames. The explosions were heard upto a radius of 5 kms and the flames could be seen from as far as 20 kms. A slow wind blowing from the south-east to north-west at a velocity of 1 metre per second was making fire fighting operation extremely difficult from the road right next  to the tankfarm.

The refinery being a continuous process unit, dealing with hazardous materials, has a proven and time tested emergency handling response plan. Minor fires are tackled by the fire station and the personnel working in the refinery at that moment. However, in the event of a major emergency or a serious fire, when the wailing siren is sounded, all key personnel are immediately informed on telephone about the location of the incident, and  all residents of the staff colony turn out immediately to take up pre-assigned positions.

According to the plan, the key locations are pre-identified; and these are : the scene of the fire, entry gates to the refinery, control post-office which is immediately established close to the scene of the fire, the medical centre and the administration head quarters to establish channels of communication.

The refinery general manager becomes the chief co-ordinator to direct all operations in conjunction with the co-ordinators to put the disaster control Plan in action. He becomes the focal point of liaison with co-ordinators through out. In the process he is assisted by the dy. general manager (operations) who becomes the incident controller / plant co-ordinator at the scene of the fire. He is distinguished by  a red jacket. The dy. general manager (engg) takes on the control post duty as engineering co-ordinator. He is distinguished by a blue jacket. dy. manager (tech) and sr. fire and safety manager direct all fire fighting  operations in liaison with the incident controller at the site of the emergency. The chief technical services manager takes control of the essential back-up services at the fire station (the headquarters) where all mutual aid responses assemble. All residents from the colony who do not have a pre-determined role, are required to assemble and await duties connected with the fire station,  dy. general manager (P and A) takes on the very important role of  press/public relations officer to deal with the public and outside agencies. The chief staff and administrative services manager takes up his position at the fire station to be available close on hand to meet all the requirements of administration follow-up,  canteen services, rest room arrangements, hot snacks supply etc. The security / medical co-ordinator works in close liaison with the press / public relations officer.

Immediately after the major emergency call was sounded, the Bombay fire brigade was alerted on hot line and soon thereafter, all mutual aid members were  contacted for help. Fire vehicles on arrival at the scene of the fire, noticed huge flames all around covering

·        bitumen stacking area near the weighbridge

·        product despatch Gantry

·        road 7, storm water channel

·        road 3, storm water channel

·        northeast area of aromatic unit

·        aromatic tankfarms

 

A portion of  the canopy of  product despatch had blown up as a result of the explosion. At that time, the most urgent actions required, were attacking the fire from all fronts to contain it,  preventing its spread and giving urgent medical attention to the victims suffering from burn injuries by removing them immediately to hospitals.

While the fire fighting started in full swing, people from all areas rushed with all the vehicles like cars, jeeps, vans etc., and helped moving the injured persons to the medical centre for the first aid. The entire activity of moving the injured personnel to the outside hospitals was done in great speed and was completed within one hour by sending advance teams to the hospital authorities for urgent attention to the injured on arrival.

With the arrival of the Bombay fire brigade, the mutual aid and BPCL’s fire department personnel, there were as many as 15 fire tenders in operation by 1.00 p.m., fighting the fire from all directions. Cooling of the tanks which was on through fixed water sprinklers on the tanks was further intensified by water jets operated from hydrant tappings and portable fire appliances were deployed near the dyked wall in close proximity to the burning tanks. Foam was directed through the fixed foam risers of nearby floating roof tanks. By 2.00 p.m., the fire in the bitumen and PDF gantry, and all other fires except the fire in the tankfarm were completely put out.  Fire fighting operations were fully directed to the tankfarm areas where one tank and the surrounding area was totally engulfed in flames.

It was very important now to cool the tanks, not only with the fixed water spray system,  but also direct additional jets of water for cooling. The fire in the tanks remained unabated and engulfed two other tanks in the area. At the fire site, fire fighting operations were fully streamlined, with the fighters from the refinery, mutual aid members, Bombay fire brigade, ONGC, BPT etc., who were working  closely with zone fire  co-ordinators as well as fire station staff, to contain the fire  and prevent it from spreading.

By late  evening, a total  of four tanks were engulfed by the fire and were allowed to burn under controlled conditions. At this time, a tank at the southernmost end of the tankfarm caught fire at its breather valves, causing immediate concern. The incident controller along with the BPCL fire chief, sensing the danger of the fire escalating, sent a group of four refinery fire fighters up the burning tank with hand held portable extinguishers to put out the flame. This was done successfully by putting out the flames from two opposite directions in spite of a frightening rumbling sound from under the roof. Had it not been for their timely brave and courageous act in the face of all odds, and to grave risk to their life, the situation could have worsened and possibly led to let more tanks being involved in the fire.

The huge flames and heat inside the tankfarm were now getting more intense, and the fire fighting personnel in close proximity had to withdraw to safer locations. However, the unending streams of water for cooling  continued while changing the position of the portable monitors.

At 4.00 a.m. on the 10th,  while the fire fighters were continuously tacking the fire, one of the tanks which had caved in and distorted suddenly opened out with a loud sound emitting thick black smoke and the fire crossed over the dyke wall into the storm water channel and pipe track area. This was effectively contained, but the fire was reflashing and travelling back. However, due to constant pumping of foam and effectively bunding certain areas in the storm water channel with sand bags, this was extinguished with considerable difficulty.

By this time, the fire was being attacked from all  four sides in full swing. Many fire fighters were on the dyke wall very near to the burning tank area. Both at the fire station as well as at the fire site, a duty roster was prepared for the night ahead as well as the following day.  It was known by now that the affected tanks may have to be allowed to burn out and  efforts were concentrated in containing the fire and cooling the non-affected tanks.

Maintenance of supplies to the fire site from the fire station, which was established immediately after the fire, was organised such that the arterial road 3 and 7 were constantly fed with the supply of hoses, sand, different types of foams, dry chemical powder, small portable extinguisher and other specialised equipment needed at the fire site. An estimate of foam requirements were carried out, suppliers of foam stock with them were contacted, and vehicles despatched to bring in the necessary foams. Arrangements were also made to bring in foam from Thane-Belapur industrial belt.

On the administration and public relations front, a constant follow-up was maintained with the hospitals and nursing homes where the fire affected victims were  undergoing treatments for burn injuries.. At the same time, essential medical supplies were being obtained from all sources with the help of BPCL personnel stationed at these hospitals. Members of the public soon learnt of the huge fire through press and TV coverage. Some of BPCL’s staff who were on leave,  rushed to the refinery on hearing the news  while some others,  out of the city at other locations, cancelled their leave and made themselves available for help the following day. By the 10th morning, the fire was well under control and only the residual material in the tanks were being allowed to burn out. The fire was fully under control by mid-day on the 10th and finally put out by 4.00 p.m. Full control was established in 20 hours and it took a total of 28 hours to put out the last remnants of the fire.

Appendix V

Click here to see the chart

Appendix VI

Vulnerability Assessment Models

Vulnerability, that  is,  “the degree to which a community is at risk from the occurrence of extreme physical or natural phenomena, where risk refers to the probability of occurrence and the degree to which ‘socio-economic and socio-political factors’ affect the community’s capacity to absorb and recover from extreme phenomena (Westgate and O’Keefe. 1976. Some  Definitions of Disaster,) is complex, dynamic, cumulative, sometimes irreversible and frequently impossible to contain. According to Terry Jeggle and Rob Stephenson, “Vulnerability is a set of prevailing or consequential conditions of physical, socio-economic and/or political factors which increase a community’s susceptibility to calamity or which adversely affect its ability to respond to events.

Vulnerability is the product of interactions between natural and environmental forces and human, social and political constructs. The distinctions between vulnerability from a hazard  and vulnerability from socio-economic status, is a false one; vulnerability is a term which embraces not merely risk from extreme phenomena but also the endemic conditions inherent in a particular society that may aggravate the risk.

While, initially, conventional models linked vulnerability to cause and effect, that is, the physical vulnerability of the area leading to the vulnerability of the population, recent studies have clearly  linked vulnerability with development – the emphasis being on minimising avoidable suffering rather than just maximising safety. Therefore, it  is more important to improve living conditions and reduce social imbalances, the causes of which are internally generated in societies where suffering is found, and are predictable and occur continually.

Model 1

Peter Winchester’s model, based on differential vulnerability, takes these factors into account. His vulnerability model for a household or a community, takes into account those relationships and processes that are external and internal, and which affects its vulnerability. He identifies the external relationships and processes as being climate, physiography, the social relationships  production and development policies (after Blaike (1981). “Class, land use, and soil erosion”).  According to Blaike, the social relations of production were the result of the interaction between the political economy, “the systems within which problems are defined and decisions taken”. The political economy context is basically the product of the inter-relationship between : climate and physiography, the social relations of production and historical development policies.

To this, Winchester  adds the relationship between production, exchange and consumption (after Sen (1981).   Poverty and Famines, and Swift (1989). “Why are rural people vulnerable to famine”.  Sen showed that famines could take place even if there were no production failures and he identified  failures in the exchange market mechanisms (wage labour, agricultural and pastoral commodity markets). In Sen’s view, vulnerability to famine was a direct function of relative poverty, and relative poverty is a direct function of a household’s ownership of tangible endowments (assets of land, labour and animals and the rate at which it can exchange these for food). 

Swift expanded on this and said that one way of measuring vulnerability is through asset accumulation or depletion over time. He proposes a model which identifies three types of assets – investments (human investments, individual productive assets and collective assets),  stores (food stores, stores of value like gold, money or restore bank accounts) and claims (claims on other households, on government, on NGOs, on international community).  

Both Sen’s and Swift’s groupings directly affect the asset levels of households (or communities) and these in turn directly affect the risk-reduction and risk-diffusion strategies that a household may be able to use, thus giving a conceptual model of vulnerability.

A Conceptual Model of Vulnerability (by Peter Winchester)

                                                            Climate

Physiography                          Social Relations of Production          Development

Policies

Production                                                                                          Consumption 

                                                            Exchange

                                                           wage labour;

                                                Agricultural and pastoral

                                                     commodity markets

                                                Household Characteristics

                                                            Investments

Assets                                                     Claims                                           Stocks     

Risk Reduction Strategies                                                    Risk-Diffusion Strategies

                                               

                                                Household Vulnerability       


Model 2

The vulnerability assessment framework proposed by Mary B. Anderson  identifies four steps. identifying the hazards ­­– scientific and technical information about the likelihood or probability of the occurrence. The magnitude, frequency, scope and duration of the hazards are incorporated in this step. Identifying exposure – identifying the individuals, groups and communities that are most exposed to any given hazard.  Identifying the complex sources of the hazard – incorporating the complexity and interrelatedness of natural, social and developmental factors, taking time and space dimensions into consideration – taking into account the dynamic change and interrelatedness of factors that affect vulnerability.


Vulnerability Assessment Framework ( of Mary B. Anderson)

Step 1 : What? Identifying Hazards

    What?

Probability

Magnitude

Frequency

Scope

Duration

   Natural

   Hazards

Human systems based hazards

Step 2 : Who? Identifying Exposure

Factors

Exposure

Capacity to withstand

Proximity

Economic Class

Social Status

Political Status

Psychological Condition

Step 3 : Identifying the Complex Sources of the Hazard

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

History : What happened to make vulnerability high?

Who was involved in the decisions and choices ?

What are their economic, social, political and psychological characteristics ?

Who is the most affected by the decisions and choices ?

Step 4 : Time and Space Dimensions

When                                                                                                   Where


Rising/falling Trends?                            What ?                                     Local ?

Growing ?                                                                    Why ?              Global ?

Compounding?                                                                         Containable ?

Cumulating?                                                                                          Borderless ?

Reversible?                                                                                           Isolated ?        

Irreversible?                                         Who ?                                      Interconnected ?          


Model 3

Atiur Rahman divides his vulnerability model on the basis of the physical sources of vulnerabilities, that is, spatial (location and geography), material (possession or access to land and other material assets) and demographic (details of household),  the social sources of vulnerabilities, that is, isolation levels, information level and  level of institutionalisation, and motivational sources of vulnerability, that is, the coping ability and self-reliance.


Sources of Vulnerabilities

Click here to see the chart

REFERENCES

1. Disaster Management Action Plan for the State of  Maharashtra, June 1995,

    The office of the special commissioner for earthquake relief and rehabilitation.

2. Report of Workshop on Disaster Management, May 1995,

    Earthquake rehabilitation Cell, Government of Maharashtra.

3. Report of the expert committee on seismology, January 1995,

    Irrigation Department, Government of Maharashtra

4.  Flood Prevention Action Plans (1993) – Eastern Suburb, Western Suburb and City

       Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay. (Marathi document)

5. Note on Cyclonic storms in Arabian sea and Cyclone Warning System for Maharashtra

    State, Area Cyclone warning Centre, Regional MET Centre, Mumbai.

6. The Marathwada Earthquake Report,  An enquiry into the relief measures,

    The Indian People’s tribunal on environment and human rights, the third report.

7. Natural hazards and natural disaster reduction in Asia and the Pacific, 1995,

    Economic and social commission for Asia and the Pacific,

    United Nations.

8. Mary B. Anderson, “Vulnerability to Disaster and Sustainable Development : A   

    General Framework for Assessing Vulnerability”.

    Disaster Prevention for Sustainable Development, Economic and Policy issues,

    Mohan Munasinghe, Caroline Clarke, ed.(1994),

    IDNDR and World Bank.

9. Panwalkar V. G.

    Political and Social Dimensions of Natural Disaster (floods), An Analysis of some       

    Indian experiences.

10. Dr. Yvon Ambroise,

      CARITAS, India in the Earthquake affected Latur District, Maharashtra.

11. Atiur Rahman, (1991)

      Disaster and Development,

      A study in Institution Building in Bangladesh, International conference on the Impact 

      of Natural Disasters,

      UCLA, Los Angles

12. Peter Winchester, (1992)

      Power, Choice and Vulnerability,

      A case study in Disaster Management in South India,

      James and James Science Publishers Ltd., London,

13. Fredrick C. Cuny, (1983)

      Disasters and Development,

      Oxford University Press, New York

14. Harsh K. Gupta, (1992)

     ‘Reservoir - Induced Earthquakes’

     Seismology in India - An overview,

     Current Science, Vol. 62, number 1 and 2

15. Report of workshop on Natural Disasters and Human Settlements, (June 1996)

      Human Settlement Management Institute, New Delhi.

16. Social and Sociological Aspects, (1986)

      Vol.12, Disaster Prevention and Mitigation,

      United Nations, New York.

17. Newspaper reports of the last 20 years.

      The Times of India, Indian Express, Mid-day, Loksatta, Maharashtra Times,

       India Today (magazine).


 

Annotated Bibliography on Disaster Management

1. Alam, Nurul S.M. 1991. “Conquering Nature : Myth and the Reality of Flood Control in Bangladesh”, Paper Prepared for Presentation at the UCLA International Conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters, UCLA, Los Angeles, California, USA.

This paper was written in the backdrop of the experience of the two catastrophic floods of198 and 1988 to focus on certain existing myths regarding the causes of and ways to mitigate flood. According to the author, some of the prevalent myths are : Devastating flood is always caused by high precipitation; flooding is caused by deforestation in the upstream Himalayas; flooding in the floodplains can be controlled by building embankments etc. This paper takes the position that flooding in Bangladesh is not a mere physical and hydraulic phenomenon and there is no exclusive engineering blue-print for its solution. It is suggested that an attempt can be made to complement structural with non-structural measures. An attempt is made to describe the ways people conceptualise flood emphasising that people’s participation and responses should be taken into consideration before a comprehensive flood mitigation programme is undertaken. The paper argues for a holistic approach towards flood amelioration combining both physical structures and sociocultural responses in the floodplains. The paper also takes exception to the ambitious initiatives to combat flood through building embankments which Alam feels will create ecological disaster thus “creating disaster by the attempt to manage disaster.”

2. Bates, Frederick L., and  Walter Gillis Peacock. 1991. “The Cross-Cultural Measurement of Disaster Impact with Respect to Household Living Conditions”, Paper prepared for presentation at the UCLA conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters : Agenda for Future Action, Los Angeles, California, July 10-12, 1991.

Since disasters of any given type are relatively rare in any particular cultural setting, the accumulation of knowledge on such phenomena requires the bringing together of research findings obtained in different cultural contexts spread across the globe. For these reasons disaster research would be considerably facilitated if a set of pretested cross-culturally valid field work instruments were developed and made ready for immediate use.  A “tool kit” of pretested instruments would allow field workers to go into the field quickly, using comparable data collection methods and instruments, thus making the comparison of research results possible. The research thus focuses on developing a scale which would (1) measure impact in the case of any disaster which produces high physical damage and (2) to do so in such a way as to make the scale usable in any cultural setting or in any community, regardless of level of economic development of the society. The conclusion was that the domestic asset scale is a valid instrument for measuring living conditions on  a cross-cultural basis since the scale seemed to have worked in all countries, regardless of level of development or culture.

3. Blaikie, Peter., Cannon Terry, Davis Ian and Wisner Ben. 1994. At Risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London and New York.

The book suggests ways in which both social and natural sciences can be analytically combined through a “disaster pressure and release” model.  The author explore the extent and ways in which people can gain access to resources to counter vulnerabilities. Vulnerability and Hazard Types cover disasters like famine and natural hazards, biological hazards, floods, coastal storms, earthquakes, volcanoes and landslides. Part III of the book focuses on Disaster Reduction through relief and reconstruction and building a safer environment. The book draws practical and policy conclusions for disaster reduction and reducing vulnerability.

4. Cochrane, Hal. 1991. “The Principle of Damage Assessment Applied to the Loma-Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Hugo”, International Conference on “The Impact of Disasters”, University of California, Los Angeles.

In Hal Cochrane’s opinion loss estimation is imprecise, based on an incomplete and erroneous conceptual foundation and relies on hastily collected and inaccurate data. With few exceptions, the purpose of loss studies is all too often politically motivated.

The paper, therefore, tries to set down an internationally consistent set of principles to assist in the preparation of losses from natural and man-made hazards. Illustrations drawn from the Loma-Prieta Earthquake (San Francisco, 1989) and Hurricane Hugo (Charleston, 1989) are furnished to illustrate several important points.

5. Cuny, Fredrick C. 1983. Disasters and Development, Oxford University Press.

Fredrick Cuny makes clear that disasters are largely preventable, even when natural catastrophes are beyond human control or even prediction. Beyond this, a major contribution of the book is to significantly advance understanding of the interactions between disaster and poverty; between disaster recovery needs and ongoing development needs; and between the relief and development assistance strategies and programs of aid organisations.

Poor people are the most frequent victims of disasters. Cuny shows why the poor are especially vulnerable to natural and political catastrophes. similarly, disasters may further entrench or exacerbate poverty; or seen from another perspective, interrupt or reverse the progress of poor people in achieving self-reliant development. On the other hand, a disaster may open a society to development possibilities. Cuny explores several notions of how a disaster, for all its destructiveness, presages possibilities for development.

6. Daranandana, Niwat. 1991. “Impact of Flooding Disaster in Thailand”, International Conference on “The Impact of Disasters”, University of California, Los Angeles.

Flooding protection and drainage problem has played an important role in urban land management and development. Drainage engineers insist seriously in solving drainage problems in such a way that the flood prevention measures are important enough to put all other concerns such as the environment and social issues aside.

The first part of this paper reveals the impact on environment and social issues caused by flooding prevention measures in Bangkok and its vicinity since 1975. The second part of the presentation concentrates on the impact of the environment as a result of debris flow and landslide caused by heavy rainfall at Nakorn Srithammarat province, south of Thailand in November 1988. The objective of the presentation is to show various impact on environmental problems as resulted from flooding prevention measures in Bangkok.

7. Disaster Prevention. 1994-1995. United Nations Development Programme, Nordic Information Office.

In the year leading up to the World Summit for Social Development, 1995, UNDP was involved in funding and commissioning numerous studies into what they felt to be pressing issues. This document contains various articles related to security from disasters in the light of  human rights. The document concerns itself with ways and means to enhance human life and create an enabling economic, political and legal environment conducive to social development at all levels. As Inge Kaul argues in the article “Human Security…”, human security involves not just protection for people against excessive volatility and reversal in living conditions, but people should also be able to ensure their own basic livelihood and security.

Development is the most important ingredient but development which is pro nature and not development that damages the environment. There are other articles on “Early Warning”, “Global Security”, “The Peace Imperative”, “Redefining Security” etc.

8. Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.1986. Vol.12, “Social and Sociological Aspects”,  United Nations, New York, USA

A systematic review of experience provides the basis for a better understanding of the social dynamics of disasters, and is a  necessity for effective disaster preparedness and post-disaster response. This publication attempts to summarise various aspects of the impact of disaster on societies, review the findings of experience and social science studies regarding individual and organisational behaviour in emergency situations and suggest how social science information about individual and organisational behaviour in emergency situations can contribute to the prevention of or preparation for disasters, and to the better management of assistance in disasters. While the general goal of the publication is to present existing knowledge about the social aspects of emergencies, it is also intended to provide a framework for raising new and additional questions. The publication is written for a broad audience of persons involved in pre-disaster planning and emergency response activities, including persons engaged in programme implementation, planning and policy formulation. The social aspects of emergency situations are not simply an issue to be dealt with in local-level programming, but are an important consideration at all administrative levels, from specific programmes in individual communities to national and international assistance.

The concern of this publication is with “natural” disaster situations, such as earthquakes, cyclones, flooding, and tornadoes, and emphasis has been given to large scale emergencies, more towards the catastrophic end of the scale, than to small, localised events. While the social considerations of “man-made” emergencies such as explosions and fires, toxic substance spills, and transportation accidents have not been included, many of the observations about human and organisational behaviour mentioned in this publication are relevant.

9. Disasters, Planning, and Development: Managing Natural Hazards to Reduce Loss. 1990. Department of Regional Development and Environment with support from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance/US Agency of International Development.

Despite the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures, more than 90 per cent of international funding for natural hazard management in the region is spent on disaster preparedness, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, leaving less than 10 per cent for prevention before a disaster.

This book, a synthesis of the natural hazard experience of the Department of Regional Development and Environment of the Organisation of American States argues that the “most effective approach to reducing the long-term impact of natural hazards is to incorporate natural hazard assessment and mitigation activities into the process of integrated development planning and investment project formulation and implementation.

The book is directed towards decision makers in the member states and in development assistance agencies with the hope of influencing them to incorporate natural hazard considerations early in the process of integrated development planning and investment project formulation, to increase the proportion of expenditures for prevention activities relative to rehabilitation and reconstruction.

10. Drabek, Thomas E. 1986.  Human System Responses to Disaster, Springer-Verlag New York Inc., New York.

Drabek divides the life cycle of a disaster event into eight more-or-less discrete processes and categorises responses into one of six systemic levels. Based on this categorisation, Drabek undertakes an inventory of existing publications using the search word “disaster”. These are classified under Planning, Warning, Evacuation, Post-impact Emergency operations, Restoration, Reconstruction, Hazard Perception and Attitude toward and the Adoption of Adjustments. Based on this inventory, Drabek elaborates the priorities for disaster research, several topics meriting exploration-research questions still awaiting scholarly interest.

11. Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry. Sponsored by a Public-Private Partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

This guide provides step-by-step advice on how to create and maintain a comprehensive emergency management program. Section 1 looks at the aspects to go into while forming a planning team, how to conduct a vulnerability analysis and how to implement the plan.  Section 2 reveals how to build emergency management capabilities as life safety, property protection, communications and community outreach. Section 3 provides technical information about the hazards that a industry might face while Section 4 gives additional information sources.

12. FAMINE : Man-Made Disaster?. 1985. A Report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues,  Vintage Books, New York.

The report, written for a top-level international commission, is a devastating, non-partisan analysis of the elements that have brought starvation to Africa - and how they can be changed. It shows how famine conditions, which afflict so much of the Third World, have been brought about largely by man-made mistakes in policy and management rather than by natural catastrophes. Over-intensity farming, loss of top-soil and ignorance of proper irrigation contributed to situation in Africa long before the drought delivered the coup de grace.

Many of these conditions have been the results of policy decisions, some of the most damaging of which were made by development “experts.” Bigger food handouts cannot prevent future famines, but with understanding and aid from the outside world, African resilience and resourcefulness can bring about steady recovery and rearrange the inequitable distribution of food into a system that provides enough for all.

13. Foster, H.D. “Disaster Plans” from Disaster Planning : The Preservation of Life and Property, Springer-Verlag, New York.

Foster list the typical contents of a disaster plan and clearly mentions that no  disaster plan is likely to prove effective if it does not have the strong support of senior members of the government for which it is being prepared.  For a truly effective disaster plan to be prepared the safety plan coordinator and his committee must be cognizant of the hazards facing the community.  Detailed information about the probable locations  and scale of expected damage and casualties are required if the demands likely to be placed on personnel and equipment are to be predicted and accommodated. Each disaster plan should also include a section devoted to simulations of probable disasters which include predictions of the type and extent of damage, the nature and scale of probable casualties and the various needs and responsibilities that these circumstances generate. The extract highlights the importance of proper communication channels, evacuation procedures, location and nature of emergency shelters, control rooms etc.

14. Gastal, Alfredo. 1991. “Economic and Social Consequences of Natural Disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean”, International Conference on “The Impact of Disasters”, University of California, Los Angeles.

Natural disasters are the subject of this paper. This paper presents an estimate of social and economic consequences of natural disasters in Latin America  and the Caribbean, with a view to justify the undertaking of disaster prevention and planning activities in the region, based on information collected by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Using a damage assessment methodology developed by ECLAC detailed analyses were carried out to determine the social and economic consequences of selected major disasters which occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean during the period 1972-1988. Thus, it was observed that the weaker the economic position  of the country the greater will be the relative impact of the damages on the national economy. Natural disasters also affect key sectors of a country’s economy creating, in addition to the economic losses, restrictions for the evolution of economic growth.

Disasters tend to exacerbate existing social problems and restrict the capacity of the governments to attend such needs. Therefore, disaster planning should include disaster vulnerability analyses of all large-scale development works including human settlements and long-term disaster planning should include potential disaster effects as a new variable - giving due consideration to needs for disaster relief programmes and contingency measures to be adopted in cases of disaster.

15. Geophysical Hazards in Developing Countries and their Environmental Impacts, Abstracts from Hazards’91 an International Symposium, August 4-9, 1991, The International Natural Hazards Society and The IAPSO Commission on Natural Marine Hazards.

The objective of this symposium on natural and man-made hazards are to promote the advancement of hazard sciences, to perceive and explore the aspects that may be similar among some of the various hazards, to review the latest developments in a few selected fields, and also to outline new directions for future research.

The symposium had sessions which covered topics relating to earthquakes, water pollution, wind waves/storm surges. Climatic/atmospheric hazards, oil slicks, tsunamis, the socio/economic aspects, biological/environmental hazards and landslides. Papers were presented by eminent people from various countries focusing on mitigation strategies and preventive engineering in addition to gauging vulnerability of the society.

16. Herzer, Hilda Maria and Sergio Federowisky. 1990. “Natural Disasters are not that Natural”, International Sociological Association, Committee on Natural Disasters.

The term ‘nature’, the authors argue is ambiguous since it conveys a double meaning : what is brought about by Nature and what is logical according to the nature of things and their normal course. By acceptance, it is understood that not only the acts of Nature, but its effects themselves on the population become unavoidable events. According to the authors, what will happen, when it will happen and to whom it will affect when it happens is determined by the social, economic and political structure of each particular society. Every disaster is a consequence of human actions; a disaster is not a physical event but a social, political and economic process triggered by a natural phenomenon. To call them natural is inappropriate since such term implies that they might exist regardless of societies and of men’s actions and decisions.

17. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters.

March 1989, Vol. 7, No. 1;

August 1989, Vol.7, No.2.;

November 1989, Vol.7, No. 3;

March 1990, Vol. 8, No. 1;

August 1990, Vol. 8, No.2;

November 1990, Vol. 8, No. 3;

March 1991, Vol. 9, No. 1;

August 1991, Vol. 9, No.2;

November 1991, Vol. 9, No.3;

March 1992, Vol. 10, No. 1;

August 1993, Vol. 11. No. 2;

November 1994, Vol. 12, No.3.

The official journal of The Research Committee on Disasters, these Journals, published tri-annually, address issues of theory, research, planning and policy. The central purpose is the publication of results of scientific research, theoretical and policy studies, and scholarly accounts of such events as floods and earthquakes, explosions and massive fires, disorderly crowds and riots, energy cut-offs and power blackouts, toxic chemical poisonings and nuclear radiation exposures, and similar types of sudden crisis-generating situations. The articles in these Journals reflect cross-cultural data which is of prime importance in minimising the effects of disaster.

18. Jansson, Kurt, Micheal Harris & Angela Penrose. 1987. THE ETHIOPIAN FAMINE : The Story of the Emergency Relief Operation, Zed Books Ltd., London.

This concise, factual and immensely well-informed book offers a unique insight into the causes and consequences of the 1984-86 famine. The book investigates why such a potential disaster was allowed to develop. Forewarning of imminent famine was available from many sources early in 1984. Yet a complex web of factors prevented more than a trickle of aid from reaching Ethiopia. The problem of rebel-held areas in Tigray and Eritrea, the Ethiopian Government’s controversial resettlement programme, accusations of corruption, inefficiency and food diversion are all dealt with in a critical manner. Jansson argues that despite some shortcomings, the UN system led to a largely effective operation which saved millions of lives. Harris and Penrose provide essential background to this and show conclusively that eleventh hour intervention could have been avoided had the warning signals been heeded.

19. Keller, Edmond J. 1991. “Drought, War and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia”, Paper prepared for presentation at the UCLA conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters : Agenda for Future Action, Los Angeles, California, July 10-12, 1991.

This essay analyses critically how politics has contributed to an exacerbation of the natural catastrophe of drought in Ethiopia over the past decade. Despite being faced with a natural disaster of enormous proportions, the government of Ethiopia’s People’s Democratic Republic (PDRE) continued to pursue its expensive, ill-conceived socialist development strategy and continued to attempt to militarily eliminate its opponents.

In the process, the regime systematically used relief aid as a replacement for funds it devoted to prosecuting military objectives. The long-term implication of such developments is the persistence of conditions that will continue to threaten all aspects of national as well as regional security for some time to come.

20. Khondker, Habibul Haque. 1991. “The Socio-Political Consequences of Floods in Bangladesh : The Floods of 1988 in Perspective”, Paper prepared for presentation at the UCLA conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters : Agenda for Future Action, Los Angeles, California, July 10-12, 1991.

Although flooding of a substantial part of the country is an annual environment hazard in Bangladesh, the 1988 flood was special not only in terms of its magnitude but also its consequences. The flood affected, for the first time, a large part of the capital city Dhaka, submerging the diplomatic enclave and the cantonment. Also, for the first time serious talk of flood prevention ensued after the flood water receded and prompt actions were taken to provide relief to the victims.

This paper examines the social and political context of the 1988 flood and the unusual response it evoked. The paper argues that although flood is a natural hazard its effects and response are determined by such factors as class background of  the victims, their linkages to the centre of power and the accessibility of media. The 1988 flood affected the elite, the diplomatic corps, the military and the most affluent sections of the Bangladeshi population. For the urban-based elites this was an intimate experience of a natural disaster. Dhaka, being the center of both the local and international press corps in Bangladesh, the flood received a great deal of media coverage which also prompted dispatch of international aid. This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the social determinants of the consequences of the natural hazards which the flood of 1988 in Bangladesh cogently illustrates.

21. Kreps, Gary A. 1989. “Disaster Preparedness : What does it mean?”, Lecture prepared for the Research Seminar on Socioeconomic Aspects of Disasters in Developing Countries of the Asian Pacific Region.

The first part of the lecture highlights two central foundations of emergency management – improvisation and preparedness. Each foundation is illustrated by an actual emergency situation. These examples seek to show that improvising during an emergency is a basic strength of human communities, and second, that the ability to improvise can be increased before hand.

The second part of his lecture offers a small set of focused principles of emergency preparedness which can be applied to any level of government within a society. The principles are based on realism about the disaster environment and the potential for emergency preparedness.

In the third part of the lecture Kreps  proposes a useful way to identify specific emergency needs. The approach involves asking local leaders to examine their own situation in terms of a checklist of emergency management requirements.

22. Ottenberg, Perry. 1984. “Civil Disaster Planning: A Psychiatric Perspective”, from Phenomenology and Treatment of Psychiatric Emergencies, ed. B.S. Comstock, W.E. Fann, A.D. Pokorny, and R.L. Williams. Spectrum Publications.

At times of disaster, when people regress to unusual forms of behaviour, they may turn to psychiatry for assistance. Psychiatry as a medical speciality is eminently qualified to cope with massive grief, personal loss and sudden death that accompany civil disasters. Civil disaster planning has therefore to challenge the acceptance of irrational belief systems that avoid the troublesome process of consciousness raising in nuclear, environmental and social disasters. The need is for organisations which will form the basis for group support for each other to bind the emergent anxiety. The phenomenon of civil disaster planning requires a look at human kind’s worst fear – the nightmare of chaos that becomes reality. One of the most important tasks in civil disaster planning is convincing people that disaster is real and that reality can be modified through human cooperation.

23. Panwalkar, V.G. “Political and Social Dimensions of Natural Disasters (Floods) : An Analysis of Some Indian Experiences”.

The paper deals with some of the flood experiences with which the author was associated as a relief coordinator under the aegis of different voluntary agencies. While presenting brief notes on three different episodes, one particular experience is analysed in detail and experience from other episodes is brought in to draw generalisations.  The post relief situations, for instance, are characterised by a number of charges and counter-charges of corruption and manipulation, resulting in action against defaulting bureaucrats, including their transfers and other punitive actions taking place. The pre-disaster community dynamics has a lot of significance for the post-disaster relief and rehabilitation. In most disasters, the unity of purpose experienced during the first few weeks, start fading afterwards. More and more survivors think that the relief organisations do not understand their problems. The bottlenecks in resettlement and rehabilitation start becoming more prominent, and acquire political dimension. Understanding disaster politics will thus require identification of various levels of decision making and the degree of unity of purpose that is achieved.

24. Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, February 1995, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee, USA

The planning guide was developed under the direction of the U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which jointly coordinate and direct the development of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP).

This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organisations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events.  It contains checklists to assist in assuring that all important aspects are included in the plans and procedures developed at each Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) location. The checklists are supplemented by planning guidelines in the appendices which provide more detailed guidance regarding issues. This planning guide broadly describes an adequate emergency planning base that assures that critical planning decisions will be made consistently at every chemical stockpile location.

This document thereby hopes to promote the development of an effective, complete, and comprehensive emergency response capability at each chemical agent stockpile location by providing guidance and direction to assist state, local, and Army installation planners in formulating, coordinating, and maintaining effective emergency response plans.

25. Quarantelli, E.L (ed).  Disasters : Theory and Research. Sage Publications, London.

This book contains several articles on community response and organisation  relating to disaster management. Wenger’s essay on “Community Response to Disaster” is interesting for its examination of the basic alterations that have been observed to occur in community structure and functions during disaster situations with a focus on the American society. Kreps attempts to define the basic elements of organised disaster response and then develop ideas which both suggest patterns of inter-relationships among them and provide mechanism to account for these patterns, while Stallings reviews a major typology identifying four distinct types of organised behaviour in disaster and lists the major propositions it has generated. The typology is grounded in a larger model of organisational structure in crises and developing propositions based upon some major premises of organisational theory which are specifically testable in disaster.

26. Quarantelli, E. L. 1991. “More and Worse Disasters in the Future”, Paper prepared for presentation at the UCLA International  Conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters : Agenda for Future Action, Los Angeles, California.

Quarantelli identifies five conditions that are responsible for the world facing more and worse disasters in the future :- i. Old kinds of natural disaster agents will simply have more to hit along some lines more vulnerable populations to impact. ii. There are new and increasing kinds of technological accidents and mishaps that can result in disasters which were almost nonexistent prior to World War II. iii. Technological advances add complexity to old threats. iv. New versions of past dangers. v. New risks emerging that have not been traditionally thought of as in the province of emergency management.

The future disasters Quarantelli feels will also be influenced by four other factors :

i. Natural disasters will increasingly generate technological disasters. ii. Increasingly localities will be faced with disastrous conditions from sources that are far from distant. iii. Many of the future threats have high catastrophic potentials. iv. Some of the future disasters will be economically more costly or socially disruptive.

27. Rahman, Atur. 1991.  “Disaster and Development : A study in Institution building in Bangladesh”, Paper prepared for presentation at the UCLA International  Conference on the Impact of Natural Disasters : Agenda for Future Action, Los Angeles, California.

Rahman elucidates the view that despite the ravaging effects of disasters in Bangladesh, the concern for preparedness and mitigation of natural disasters still belong only to the narrow domain of short term emergency crisis management and not to long run sustainable development perspective of the decision makers in Bangladesh. Therefore, Rahman feels in a country like Bangladesh, disasters ought to become the central concern for development. The disaster preparedness programme must broaden its scope from pre-disaster preoccupation and penetrate deep into the post-disaster recovery and development phase.

At present, disaster preparedness in Bangladesh is quite loose and responsibility of it remains dispersed in several locations and lacks coherent institutional set-up. Key policy makers therefore have to appreciate the urgency of relating disasters with development with particular emphasis in removing vulnerabilities from the vast majority of the people.

28. Research on Socio-economic Aspects of  Disaster in the Asia-Pacific Region, Seminar Report, March 22-24, 1989, Organised by Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (Asian Institute of Technology) and Disaster Research Centre (University of Delaware), Sponsored by U.S. National Science Foundation (Science in Developing Countries Division).

The report is divided into three parts. Part I includes a more detailed description of the structure of the seminar, a consolidated report of the status of social science research on disaster within the region, and a statement of the concerns identified by the participants as focal points for future research. In addition, the participants also identified strategies that could facilitate the implementations of those collective research goals.

Part II consists of a consolidated bibliography of social science research in the region, and bibliographic sources which were identified by participants. Part III includes substantive papers that were used as reference materials at the Seminar. Those papers include an overall paper on conceptualising disaster in ways productive for social science research (Dynes), reviews of existing research that have focused on mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery, (Nigg, Kreps, Tierney, Quarantelli), field research (Britton), and more extensive discussions of the research tradition in India and Bangladesh (Ragavulu, Alam).

29. Sazanami, Hidehiko. 1991. “Integration of  Disaster Management  with Development Planning”, United Nations Centre for Regional Development.

In developing countries where resources available for national development are limited, little attention has been given to disaster prevention measures. This has resulted in enormous losses whenever they are hit by natural disasters, and this, in turn has imposed further constraints on national development. Thus, the author argues it is essential to incorporate long-term post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes into a comprehensive development planning process, as well as short-term emergency relief and recovery programs. It is necessary to take disaster prevention technology into account and to develop a program for prioritising such technology from the standpoint of urban and regional planning and plan application.

30. Sinha, Dilip Kumar  1991, Coping with Natural Disasters An Integrated Approach, Presidential Address, 78th session, Indian Science Congress Association, Calcutta.

This presidential address document looks at the various definitions of “Disaster” as also “prevention” and “recovery” as enabling one to make use of them in the context of an integrated approach to disaster management. The author reviews the existing warning systems, and makes a case for enhanced usage of scientific methods for the communication of knowledge and application of knowledge as envisaged by the UN resolution for the IDNDR. The need of the day is a comprehensive disaster map for the country as well as integrating communication and information management to facilitate smoother technology transfer.

31. Smith, David Ingle. 1991. “Flooding in Australia - Perspectives and Prospects”, UCLA International Conference on the Impact of  Natural Disasters, Los Angeles, California.

Smith reviews the flood prevention situation in Australia as also the laws governing the state as well as the local territories. He feels that many of the problems encountered have been the result of  inappropriate institutional arrangements and as such the physical nature of the flooding problem cannot be separated from institutional matters. He asks basic questions like what is a flood prone land, who is responsible for zoning, cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures,  flood warning systems, rare flood events etc. He recommends that zoning should be undertaken jointly with the local community within guidelines produced by state or federal governments. Ideally, this would lead to a choice of flood standard that is appropriate to local conditions such as the pattern of hydrological variables.

32. Sociology of Disasters : Contribution of Sociology to Disaster Research.

This work has very notable essays by authors like Neil Britton, Dennis Mileti, R. Dynes, J. Nigg, Thomas Drabek et.al. These authors tackle various issues relating to the social aspects of disaster. Britton provides a model illustrating the process of disaster vulnerability in terms of the interaction between the physical event (disaster agent) and the social condition of the human organisation, while Nigg focuses on communication research during the pre-impact phase of a disaster and differentiates between two units of analysis – organisational behaviour and individual behaviour. Stallings’ essay looks exclusively at the contribution of the sociology of disaster to the study of organisational change. The potential of natural disasters as a research setting for the study of organisational change is explored in light of current organisational theory and the methodological requirements of such research.

33. “STOP Disasters”, Number 26, IV/1995. The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) Magazine.

This issue of the magazine concerns itself with the aspects of training and education as an important tool to stop disasters. The challenge is to create the environment in which ideas, knowledge and experience on disaster reduction can be freely exchanged and then to ensure that such information is made accessible to those who use it for disaster reduction, through relevant and appropriate training.

This issue contains many important articles such as “Training for Disaster Reduction at Universities”, Disaster Reduction for Safer Communities in Asia”, “Science and Disaster Reduction”, “Training for Management of Urban Disasters”, “A False Prediction of an Earthquake” etc.

34. TTC Area Disaster Management Plan, prepared by  Thane Belapur Industries Association.

This plan specifies the emergency measures to be taken once an industrial disaster strikes the area. Basic details about the industrial area are provided, like the number of industries, the topography etc. Telephone numbers of emergency personnel are given as also an area wise distribution of hospitals and fire services. General guidance on the immediate response, a chemical response sheet, first aid treatment details are listed in a simple manner.

35. Unscheduled Events : Research Committee on Disasters, Newsletter of the International Research Committee of Disasters,  Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University, USA.

Vol. 9, No. 1, 1991

Vol. 11, No. 1, 1993

Vol. 12, No. 1, 1994

These official newsletters of the Research Committee on Disaster of the International Sociological Association contain important papers such as “Strategies to reduce the vulnerability of communication systems during disasters”, “The preparedness level of the tourism industry to disasters”, apart from providing information about the happenings (conferences, courses etc.) in relation to disaster research.

36. Weir David, 1988, The Bhopal Syndrome, Earthscan Publications Limited, London.

This book documents the growing threat to human life and the environment posed by the global pesticide business. It evaluates the risks involved in the current worldwide escalation in the production and use of agricultural pesticides. It provides the information needed for a common fight against a common danger. David Weir argues for a new awareness, increased knowledge, and, most of all the will to act locally and globally. There is the need to change the value systems of  industrial enterprises so that the health and safety of both people and the environment is paramount, superseding any technical or commercial considerations. This will include the “right to know’ and the “freedom of information” on health and safety issues. The book by David Weir takes us on a journey through many continents and shows us the pervasiveness of  “the Bhopal Syndrome.”

37. Wijkman, Anders and  Lloyd Timberlake, 1984, Natural disasters Acts of God or acts of Man?, Earthscan, International Institute for Environment and Development and the Swedish Red Cross.

Droughts, famines, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes...six times more people died from natural disasters each year in the 190s than in the 1960s. But the number of disaster went up by only 50 %. Why?

This book shows how people are changing their environment to make it more prone to disasters, and to make themselves more vulnerable. It shows that disasters mainly hit poor people in poor countries. It shows how misleading the term “natural disasters” can be. Forces of nature such as earthquakes, cyclones and extreme variations in weather can trigger disasters, but in many Third World countries it is environmental degradation, poverty and rapid population growth which turn a natural hazard into a major disaster.

The book questions whether the rich nations’ usual response to disaster - fast, short-lived emergency assistance - is any longer adequate. Today, most major disasters are “development” gone wrong, development which puts millions of poor people on the margins of existence.

Disaster relief alone is like bandaging a rapidly grown wound. The appropriate response must include an element of true development - development which reduces rather than increases vulnerability to disasters.

38. Wilhite, Donald A. 1991. “Overcoming the Enigma of Drought : Policy issues for the 1990s”, International Conference on “The Impact of Disasters”, University of California, Los Angeles.

Drought is the most complex and least understood of all natural hazards, affecting more people world-wide than any other hazard. Previous research has shown that the impacts of both short-term and multiyear drought have been aggravated by poorly conceived or non-existent assessment and response efforts by governments. The lessons of these past response efforts strongly suggest that the “risk management” or proactive approach to drought management is a more effective mitigation tool than the “crisis management” or reactive approach. Sharply focused contingency plans, prepared in advance, can assist government and others in the early identification of drought and its likely impacts, lessen personal hardship, improve the economic efficiency of resource allocation, and ultimately, reduce drought related impacts and the need for government sponsored assistance programmes. This paper provides an overview of the concept of drought and planning as a means to reduce societal vulnerability. A planning process completed to facilitate the development of drought plans by state government in the United States is presented as a model that could be adapted to other levels of government and to other drought-prone areas.

39. Winchester Peter, 1992, Power, Choice and Vulnerability : A Case Study in Disaster Management in South India, James and James Science Publishers Ltd., London.

By examining the cyclone prone area of Andhra Pradesh in great detail over a 10-year period Peter Winchester has come up with some perceptive answers towards disaster management. In particular, he formulates a set of five “golden rules” for disaster management. The aim of the book is to explain how a view of vulnerability that is different from the one currently being used can improve some aspects of disaster management and can go some way in making disaster mitigation and post-disaster development more effective. The view centres on the concept of differential vulnerability which is applicable to all types of disaster but has here emerged from a study of cyclone mitigation policies and post-cyclone disaster development.

40. World Map Of Natural Hazards. 1988. Munich Re, Germany.

For the purpose of illustrating objectively the worldwide distribution of exposure to the most significant natural hazards, Munich Re has created this map of the world. Numerous Maps have been published in recent decades showing the geographical distribution of natural hazards. Most of them are of limited value since they deal with individual hazards, one single area or mark and grade the exposure according to subjective criteria. This world map tries to avoid these inadequacies. Wherever possible, exposure details have been given as figures. The exposure details contained in the world map indicate wherever possible, the three factors, intensity, frequency and reference period.

41. Vrolijks, Luc and Elina Palm. 1995. “Disaster Reduction in Urban Areas”, Policy Paper by Secretariat of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.

The paper outlines the strategies and approaches of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR, 1990-2000), and gives a brief overview of its institutional arrangements and programmes. It emphasises the importance of urbanisation for the level of risk to natural disasters and other phenomena, and highlights the need to address disaster management issues in the context of urban development planning. The paper analyses disaster reduction as a multi-sectoral issues in urban development and notes that the  main  issues that should be considered include housing, infrastructure, urban poverty, land use and urban management. The paper indicates how the IDNDR framework can assist in addressing these issues and outlines some key policies for consideration. Emphasis is placed on attainable goals in reducing the vulnerability of the people at risk, mostly low-income groups. Urban infrastructure and critical facilities need special attention, in particular in very large areas. Institutional strengthening is required to improve the capacities of governments to prepare for and respond to disasters and other emergencies.




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